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EDWARD CAIRD

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The career of a man who devotes his life to reflection upon philosophy and religion, whose active work consists in teaching these subjects and in writing about them, is little likely to furnish incidents meet for flamboyant biography. But it may well be a source of profound influence, destined to affect the culture of a people or an age long after events that splash noisily upon the momentary surface have sunk into oblivion. Now Caird constituted an exceptional force, particularly in that native home of English-speaking philosophy and religion, Scotland; as such he merits memorial in these pages. Moreover, we must remember that, although, to his great regret, expressed to me often, he never visited the United States, his spirit has wrought strongly on this continent. Years ago, when I was a young Fellow at Glasgow, I received a letter from an American philosopher which concluded with words that have always stuck in my memory, "We look to Glasgow for light and leading." Here Glasgow happened to be a synonym for the brothers Caird.

The external facts of Edward Caird's life are as follows. He was born in the Clydeside city of Greenock on March 22d, 1835, sixth son of John Caird, head of the firm of Caird & Co., engineers and shipbuilders. Like his distinguished eldest brother, John, who was fifteen years his senior, and afterwards his academic chief at Glasgow, Edward received his early education at the Greenock Grammar School (Academy). Thence he passed to the University of Glasgow at the age of fifteen, and resided as

an undergraduate from 1850-56. In the academic year 1856-57, he matriculated as a student of theology at the University of St. Andrews, but returned to Glasgow in 1858-59, having apparently abandoned his first intention to enter the ministry of the Church of Scotland. As an undergraduate he achieved distinction in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. In April, 1860, he gained the Snell Exhibition, a foundation that has sent a long line of eminent Scotsmen to Oxford,¹ and entered upon residence at Balliol College in the October following. In 1861 he was awarded the Pusey and Ellerton Scholarship for Hebrew, and in 1862 the Jenkyns Exhibition, a coveted distinction; he took a First-Class in Classical Moderations in the same year, and a First-Class in the Final School of *Literae Humaniores* in 1863, when he proceeded to the degree of B.A. He refused to pass to the M.A. degree till the theological tests were abolished (1873). In 1864 he was elected a Fellow of Merton College, and remained here for two years, engaged in the usual work of a college tutor at Oxford. In 1866 he was elected to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, whither his brother John had preceded him by four years to the Chair of Divinity. Here he spent the twenty-seven best and most fruitful years of his life. He received the customary two-year appointment to the Gifford Lectureship on Natural Theology² in the University of St. Andrews in 1890. Upon Jowett's death, after a unique career as Master of Balliol, the Fellows were in serious straits regarding a successor. Consequent upon anxious deliberation, wherein, as one has heard, many possibilities were discussed, the office was offered to Caird in the early winter of 1893. In the spring of 1894 he resigned his Glasgow chair, forsaking the wonderful position he had created for himself—an act of deliberate self-sacrifice—and returned to Oxford, where he conducted the most famous Foundation of the University with marked success till ill-health compelled his resignation in 1907, when, to his deep gratification, he was succeeded by his

¹ See W. Innes Addison, *The Snell Exhibitions from the University of Glasgow to Balliol College, Oxford, 1697-1900.* (New York, Macmillan Co., 1901.)

² Cf. Articles by me: "The Gifford Lectureships" (in *The Open Court*, February, 1900); "Philosophy of Religion and the Endowment of Natural Theology" (in *The Monist*, October, 1901).

lifelong friend, and old pupil of Merton days, Dr. J. L. Strachan-Davidson. In 1900 he returned to the scene of his Scottish triumphs as Gifford Lecturer.

As was to be anticipated, more than the ordinary share of academic honors fell to his lot. He received the honorary degree of LL.D. from St. Andrews in 1878; of D.C.L. from Oxford in 1892; of LL.D. from Glasgow in 1894; of Litt.D. from Cambridge in 1898; of D.Lit. from Wales in 1902; and, most appropriately, he was created an honorary Doctor of Philosophy by Kant's University. In 1900, the Royal Society of Edinburgh added his name to its short list of Honorary Fellows. Inevitably, he became one of the original Fellows of the British Academy, and he honored the French Academy by accepting election as a Corresponding Member. Early in 1906 he suffered a paralytic seizure, which proved the first indication of the break-down that ended in death on November 1st, 1908. He lies buried at Oxford beside some whom he had "loved long since, and lost awhile."

Plainly enough, this bare record divides the career into several parts. We have, *first*, the period of formation, and early experience as a teacher at Oxford; *second*, the epoch—this is the only name for it—of the Glasgow professorship; *third*, the headship of Balliol; *fourth*, the work and the man.

I

It is difficult, if not impossible, for one writing at this late day to realize the atmosphere of Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Oxford in the middle of the 19th century. The "reforms" wrought upon the Scottish and English universities since were still in the future, and many things differed vastly from their present state. So far as the Scottish universities were concerned, and with special reference to his eventual eminence in philosophy, it is probably correct to adduce a familiar maxim in description of Caird's experience: "Every man who rises above the common level has received two educations: the first from his teachers; the second, more personal and important, from himself." At Glasgow, William Ramsay, professor of Latin, was a remarkable personality, a capital teacher, and a scholar of parts; Lushington, professor of

Greek, Tennyson's brother-in-law, combined profound learning with much grace, but could not teach beginners; Weir, professor of Hebrew, ranked with the best in his subject. From them Caird undoubtedly secured the groundwork of accurate scholarship that stood him in such good stead later at the home of classical learning. But the philosophical professors, as he informed me himself, helped him little. "Logic Bob," as Buchanan, professor of Logic and Rhetoric was dubbed, excelled in the art of teaching, possessed a caustic wit, but lacked speculative insight. Fleming, in Moral Philosophy, Caird's immediate predecessor, happened to be more or less a respectable nonentity. With reference to the theological professors, Luke, the ablest Glasgow man then at Oxford, wrote to John Nichol, afterwards Caird's colleague in English Literature, "Caird is at St. Andrews—enjoying it—delivered from St. Rollox³ and the Glasgow Divinity Hall" (1857). The strong likelihood is that Caird migrated to St. Andrews in the expectation that he would get something more to the point from Tulloch, who had entered upon his professorship in 1854; but Tulloch, despite his eminence as an orator, as a literary man, and as a liberalizing influence in the Church, could hardly be accounted a philosopher. Whether Caird acquired aught from Ferrier, the celebrated professor of Moral Philosophy, I do not know; as a theological student, he would not be required to hear him.

On the other hand, at Glasgow, as at Oxford after, Caird fell among a group of exceptionally gifted students, some of them devoted to the new prophet, Carlyle. From association with them he obtained materials for the "second education—from himself." Of this scintillating company were John Nichol; John Service, thirty years later the most remarkable man in the ministry of the Church of Scotland, and author of what has been called the best volume of sermons ever written;⁴ Ross, the historian of early Scottish literature; Luke, the brilliant classic, snatched by drowning ere his prime; A. Mackennal, afterwards a light in the English Free Churches; Donald Macleod, editor of *Good Words*,

³ The slum district of the city, in which the university buildings were situated then.

⁴ *Salvation Here and Hereafter.* (Macmillan & Co., 1877.)

and Moderator of the Church of Scotland; Henry Crosskey, the geologist, and Unitarian leader at Birmingham; Flint, most learned of Scottish theologians; D. B. Monro, who became one of Oxford's bright particular stars, Provost of Oriel; Jack, once editor of the *Glasgow Herald*, still professor of Mathematics at Glasgow; and Alexander Smith, the poet, whom Herbert Spencer ranked "as the greatest poet since Shakespeare."⁵ These ardent youths stimulated one another, lived a vivid intellectual life irrespective of their teachers, enjoyed the fostering friendship and hospitality of Nichol's father, J. P. Nichol, the eloquent professor of Astronomy, partisan of Kossuth and Mazzini, fervid sympathizer with the anti-slavery party in the United States, protagonist of free-trade. To alter a phrase of Bentham's,⁶ they were talking nonsense, and accumulating wisdom. Accordingly, Caird arrived at Oxford with a capital linguistic outfit, with a perspective incomparably wider than that of the English Public School boy, with a deep tincture of seriousness, inbred by the national Calvinism—in short, revolving the deep things.

At Balliol, too, Jowett certainly excepted, and possibly Riddell,⁷ he appears to have gathered much more from his associates, especially several who were his seniors in academic standing, than from the regular staff. John Nichol had preceded Caird in the Snell by four years, and the Society—remarkable for its *personnel*—founded by him offered the younger man an environment even more memorable and transforming than that of Glasgow. "By some members" of the 'Old Mortality,' Caird wrote long after, "its meetings are remembered as the very salt of their university life. The free discussion of everything in heaven or earth, the fresh enjoyment of intellectual sympathy, the fearless intercommunion of spirits, the youthful faith that the key of truth lies very near to our hands, give a unique zest and charm to those meetings of students with students, before the inevitable parting of the ways of manhood has come."⁸ "Its being's end and

⁵ David Duncan, *Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer*, I, 87 (American edition).

⁶ Cf. *Deontology*, I, 39.

⁷ Cf. *Dictionary of National Biography*, XLVIII, 270–271.

⁸ William Knight, *Memoir of John Nichol*, p. 154.

aim," wrote another member, "was philosophical discussion, and certainly its mental atmosphere was very keen." The same writer also recorded, "Kant and Hegel were new names to most of us, and we got our first introduction to them from Nichol. His strong Scotch logic was of no ordinary force, at a time when Mansel's Bampton Lectures waged the war of orthodoxy with the sword of Sir W. Hamilton."⁹ Small wonder that the Society left its mark, for of its number were T. H. Green, Swinburne, A. V. Dicey, T. E. Holland, Luke, Birkbeck Hill, James Bryce, Pater, and Bywater, with others destined to scarce less distinction. A new wave was gathering, to sweep the place left vacant by the receding tide of the Oxford Movement, and to cast up something less dispiriting than Mansel's agnosticism. To this Caird himself was to contribute more effectually than anyone save T. H. Green and, indirectly, Jowett.

Of the two years at Merton little need be said. Caird undertook the philosophical instruction for "Greats," and proved a recruit of distinctive capacity. His knowledge and sweep, humor and kindness, were in evidence already, although his extraordinary power and luminousness as a lecturer had not developed fully as yet. "He nearly always could, and (which is quite a different thing in pastors and masters) always, when he could, would tell you what you wanted to know, and not merely what he wanted to say. And I still have (or ought to have) in a letter which he wrote to me, on an occasion to me sufficiently disgusting, one of the kindest and wisest documents of marked wisdom and kindness that I ever received myself or read as having been addressed to others."¹⁰

II

It may be taken as almost axiomatic that remarkable men seldom achieve full success unless supported by congenial, if not completely amicable, circumstances. The power of the man and the power of the moment must agree, as Matthew Arnold phrased it. Sufficient water has run beneath the bridges since 1866 to

⁹ William Knight, *Memoir of John Nichol*, pp. 148-149.

¹⁰ Professor Saintsbury, "Caird at Merton" (*Glasgow Herald*, November 6th, 1908).

make it apparent to the present observer that Caird entered upon his Glasgow Chair at a favorable period. The Alexandria of Scotland stood on the verge of her striking expansion in wealth and population, paralleled only in the young cities of the New World. The Act of 1859 had ended some abuses in the universities, and, the battle lost and won, men could adjust themselves calmly to the fresh order. Educational agitation rent the air, and the epoch-making bill of 1870 lay just ahead, destined to rouse keen self-consciousness among the people as a whole. The religious world, echoes of German "rationalism" in its ears, had begun to doubt the old ways. The democratic movement that kept the Liberals in power for nigh two generations maintained its restless march. The idea of civic responsibility, fated to great illustration in Glasgow, was on the point of asserting itself. On all these issues Caird stood with face turned immovable, and full of hope, to the progressive things. Moreover, when her history comes to be set down, even with those deductions that will be made inevitably when we actors in her drama are gone, it will surely record that the University of Glasgow had arrived on the threshold of her golden age. During the years from 1860 to 1890, she commanded the services of a galaxy of talent unexampled before, little likely to be duplicated for long. Experts, running critical eye along the list, can hardly fail to note names of the highest eminence in their respective fields. The lustre cast upon philosophy by Caird and his brother was much enhanced in other departments by such men as Nichol and A. C. Bradley in English literature; Lushington, Jebb, and Murray, now Bywater's successor at Oxford, in Greek; Veitch, the learned mediaevalist, in logic; Lord Kelvin in physics; Grant in astronomy; Macquorne Rankine in engineering; Elgar in naval architecture; I. Balfour (now professor at Edinburgh) and Bower in botany; Allen Thomson and Cleland in anatomy; McKendrick in physiology; Leishman, Macewen, and Thomas Barr in surgery; Dickson, of prodigious learning, Story, prince of ecclesiastics, and Robertson, a kind of Old Testament Zahn, in theology; W. G. Miller in jurisprudence; Max Müller, and W. Wallace, Hegel's expositor, in natural theology—a truly remarkable aggregation. Nor were the younger men who assisted unworthy their chiefs.

At least a score of them have won their own spurs since; it may not be invidious to mention Sir William Ramsay, the chemist, Sonnenschein, the Plautine scholar, and Smart, the economist.

The university proved a veritable seething-pot of ideas, the Witenagemot Society being our counterpart to the Old Mortality of Caird's student days at Oxford. No one would deny that Caird played the rôle of presiding genius, and that the impassioned pulpit eloquence of his brother, the Principal, carried the doctrine everywhere. I entered the Moral Philosophy class in 1879, the period of the very crest of the wave, to be swept off like the rest. In eighteen months I found myself a changed being; too much so, for the terrific competitive strain characteristic of the Scottish universities, plus the stress of spiritual readjustment, broke my physical strength, and I had to seek restoration in travel. On return, nearly two years later, the tide stayed still at the full,¹¹ and gave few signs of recession for a septennate. When Caird returned to Balliol, outsiders, among whom I recall specially A. B. Bruce, the intrepid theologian, held that the ebb had set in. Even so, the flood left a mark that will not become part of a historical past for another generation. The effervescence could not but produce results, and Caird's pupils are everywhere now, his look, gesture, and utterance, above all, his character, speaking to and through them. They fill twenty-five chairs, a majority in philosophy and theology, in the Universities of St. Andrews, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Wales, London, and in the Free Church Colleges at Aberdeen and Glasgow. Naturally, the English universities were affected otherwise. Caird's Oxford influence has passed mainly, I judge, into the Public Services and politics, though some Tutors, and several Professors, have not escaped it. At Cambridge, two or three prominent philosophers, though never his pupils, feel the touch of his magic. His intellectual children guard the outposts of the Empire. Seven chairs in Canada, five in India, two at least in Australia, one at the Cape, one at least in New Zealand, are in their occupancy; while three, possibly more, labor in the United States, where the careers of Morris, Howison, Harris, Dewey,

¹¹ Many would agree, I think, that high tide was marked by the publication of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (1883); see bibliography, p. 137.

Royce, and others, testify to his persuasiveness. Forty-four professorships, at a minimum, represent an incalculable leverage, one exercised on a larger scale and with a bigger audience in the Scottish churches, whose outlook he and his brother may be said to have transformed in considerable part. Nor is this all. The great world of practical effort bears his sign. To give a brief list, the Archbishop of York, the Secretary of the Scottish Education Department, the Minister of Education in Egypt, the Master of the Canadian Mint, the Superintendent-General of Education at the Cape, the Secretary of the Carnegie Trust for the Scottish Universities, all heard him at Glasgow, while the Minister of War is a distinguished Edinburgh coworker. Such things are not accomplished down the averages of time. They cannot fail to create curiosity about the man among those who never met him face to face. For the upshot of the matter is that, like Hume a century sooner, though in circumstances more favorable by far to personal leadership, he placed Scotland once more in the main stream of modern thought.

III

When we come to the period of the Balliol Mastership, I must state at the outset that intimate knowledge fails me. For, while I lived in Glasgow for twenty-four of the twenty-seven years covered by Caird's professorship, I crossed the ocean two years after his migration to Oxford, and thus lost the personal familiarity with events possible to a fellow-citizen and, in a lesser degree, to a resident of the same country. Accordingly, I am unable to offer more than impressions formed at Oxford on three visits during Caird's *régime*, two of them, thanks to his hospitality, at Balliol Lodge. Of course, public reports and private letters lie before me, as well as notes of conversations with several Oxonians, Balliol and anti-Balliol.

By way of introduction, it may be as well to face a disagreeable business and have done with it. The single serious check, if such it can be called, in Caird's external career was his failure to secure election to the Whyte's Professorship of Moral Philosophy after Wallace's lamentable death by accident, in 1897. And some things about the difficulties and problems of the Mastership,

possibly best left unsaid, are explained when one remembers that the professorial incident may be laid in part to College jealousies and faction, probably the fruit of long tradition, in part to politics, in great part to *odium theologicum*. The simple facts are: that Caird submitted his name to the electors—itself a sufficiently superfluous requirement—in response to a memorial signed with practical unanimity by Oxford teachers of philosophy, and by eminent representatives of the subject elsewhere; that British expert opinion elected him overwhelmingly; and that the non-expert Board thought otherwise. Those who are able to read between the lines can supply the perspective for themselves.¹²

It is not possible to grasp the conditions that confronted Caird without some reference to what had preceded. Balliol's golden age coincided with the reign of Jowett. As details are out of the question in the space at disposal, it may be said bluntly that the eminence of the College pivoted upon two men—Thomas Hill Green and Jowett himself. For Caird personally, I am inclined to believe that, on the whole, the former proved more important. The Caird epoch at Glasgow found contemporary parallel at Oxford in a manner quite similar, *mutatis mutandis* for striking differences between Scots and English circumstances.¹³ A philosophical renaissance swept the university, wielding potent influence, not merely in scholarship, but also in social and political life. Green, who was Caird's junior by one year, had come up to Balliol five years sooner, thanks to Rugby training. He thus began his transforming activity as a teacher while his friend was still an undergraduate. His predecessor, W. L. Newman, author of the monumental edition of Aristotle's *Politics*, ranked, in Green's estimate, "the best lecturer he had ever heard," so that

¹² This delicate situation has been discussed with an admirable combination of tact and firmness by Prof. J. H. Muirhead, of Birmingham, in "The Oxford Chairs of Philosophy," in the *Contemporary Review*, LXXIV, 724 f. (1898). This article contains much information that cannot fail to interest the cisatlantic academic world; I suggest, however, that it would hardly be wise to proceed to thank God that we are not even as this publican! For there is an exceedingly strong tradition in Oxford against the appointment of the 'Head of a House' to a professorship, although a professor who is elected 'Head of a House' is under no obligation to resign his chair.

¹³ Cf. my article "Some Lights on the British Idealistic Movement," in the *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1901.

the new-comer felt stimulated to do his utmost from the outset. Disappointed of Ferrier's chair at St. Andrews, by the time Caird returned to Glasgow, Green had settled down to Oxford life, fortified by valuable experience as a member of the Schools Inquiry Commission (1864).¹⁴ An exceptional personality, of potent moral force, he was fortunate in exceptional pupils and associates.¹⁵ To name a few out of many. William Wallace matriculated at Balliol in 1864 and, after a distinguished course, remained in Oxford as a Fellow of Merton.¹⁶ A little later F. H. Bradley, who also became a Fellow of Merton, and R. L. Nettleship,¹⁷ who was to be Green's colleague from 1869, entered. Bernard Bosanquet, who was elected a Lecturer of University College in 1871, followed immediately, to be succeeded by another remarkable pupil in the person of Arnold Toynbee;¹⁸ about the same period, Andrew Cecil Bradley, who became Green's colleague in 1874, joined the College. Thanks to this wealth of talent, the philosophical movement assumed large proportions, not without opposition, as may be supposed, *testè* Green's failure to receive election to the Whyte's Professorship, in 1874, and Nettleship's, to the Waynflete Professorship of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, in 1889. Meanwhile, as concerned the relation of the College to the ampler world of the University, of society, politics, and empire, Jowett was engineering prodigious success, in short, was "the mainspring of its activities." Thanks to his knowledge of human nature, and shrewd wisdom not common in the children of light, "Balliol had become the nursery of Bishops, Viceroys, and Cabinet Ministers, an Eton among colleges, and almost a university in itself. The Master's Lodge . . . was the scene of week-end parties, where European secrets were discussed and Cabinet affairs settled. Its success had its dangers, for the

¹⁴ Cf. Memoir by R. L. Nettleship, in Works of Thomas Hill Green, vol. III (1888). A remarkable piece of biography "from the inside out."

¹⁵ Cf. E. Abbott and L. Campbell, Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett, *passim*.

¹⁶ Cf. Biography (by Caird), in W. Wallace, Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics (1898).

¹⁷ Cf. Biographical Sketch, A. C. Bradley and G. R. Benson, in The Philosophical Lectures and Remains of R. L. Nettleship, 2 vols. (1907).

¹⁸ Cf. Memoir (by Jowett), in Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England (Rivingtons, 1884).

Jowett *régime* was very worldly." So far as I am able to form impressions, three things had happened when Caird succeeded. First, the Green movement, its founder dead twelve years, tended distinctly to wane.¹⁹ Second, Jowett's policy of "colonizing" other colleges with Balliol men had eventuated in several formidable rivals. Third (this I mention with reserve), in some quarters Balliol had developed incipient consciousness of her utilitarian attitude towards success in the "great world." In addition, one must allow for perspective induced in the public mind by the passage of time. The men who stand to the credit of the Jowett administration have reached ages of from thirty-six to sixty now, have taken their permanent places on the ladder of life—some count as personages. On the contrary, the products of Caird's incumbency, at the ages of from twenty-five to thirty-five, still face towards their main activities. Allow twenty years to elapse, and the comparison will run fairer.

There can be no doubt that, when Jowett died, all felt the unique nature of the gap. A successor who could or would follow in his very steps did not exist. Accordingly, Caird's election was accompanied by much shaking of heads in England and Scotland alike. I know many who believed then that he would live to regret the change, for the Oxford of the nineties had travelled a long road from the Oxford of the sixties. But *le vrai mérite ne dépend point du temps ni de la mode*. Caird remained his old self, and won success, thanks in large part to the vivid contrast between him and his predecessor. Balliol and, in a lesser degree, the University, recognized that they had to reckon with a force of a new order. Further, in the first place, the younger teachers of philosophy were ready to welcome him—his accession lent fresh hope, for it added a distinguished personality to the staff at a time when outstanding figures lacked. In the second place, Balliol stood ready to discover his worth. And from the outset he devoted himself to the College. From beginning to end of his Headship, he mastered little details, and conducted trivial

¹⁹ This decline received striking emphasis at the time of Caird's death from the jaunty nonchalance evidently deemed the proper attitude towards the event by a London weekly. One may hazard the remark, it is well for the Mother Land that she produces Scottish philosophers sometimes. Otherwise cockney journalists might delude her into the belief that the sound of Bow Bells coincides with the music of the spheres.

pieces of business which, in the eyes of an outsider at least, seemed sometimes too wasteful of time so valuable. Not only this; he took the trouble to place himself in close touch with the course followed by undergraduates, even to the extent of careful study of the prescribed texts, and familiarized himself with the examination tests by undertaking the duties—no light matter for one of his years—of a Public Examiner in the Final Schools. He showed distinct ability to adapt himself to the unaccustomed position with its more unaccustomed calls. As a result, Balliol preserved her reputation intact, and her faithful staff, like her students, rallied to him, full of confidence. So far as I am able to judge, he did not essay a prominent part in the workaday business of the university, although I have heard it said frankly, and with evident sincerity, by men of experience outside Balliol circles, that he was the most weighty personality in Oxford. He labored for Somerville College, and for the education of women generally. His power within Balliol rooted in his character; within the University, in his outstanding position as a representative of his subject. With regard to the latter, the University had good reason for its estimate. In the United States, at all events, Oxford at once moved to a higher plane by the mere fact of his presence. Unquestionably, he made common cause with a party that counts numerous enemies, and identified himself with unpopular causes open to easy ridicule—degrees for women, female suffrage, radicalism in social, political, and theological controversies. Moreover, he advocated all with a serene simplicity devoid of anything like calculated worldly wisdom, so that, likely enough, his practical interferences were not always well timed. I understand that his activity at the time of the South African War was particularly resented. So, summing everything, “his work was with Balliol, and in a secondary sense with the teaching of philosophy in Oxford. Under his rule the first did not lose prestige, and the second most assuredly developed.” Thus, if we reckon fairly with what had preceded, and realize the consequent difficulty, complexity, ay, hopelessness, as it seemed to some, of the situation to be met, we must grant that his achievement left his lustre undimmed. His domination at Glasgow did not, simply because it could not, repeat itself at Oxford. Nevertheless, he main-

tained Balliol's leadership in a crisis that might readily have proved fatal, and lent additional fame to the university as a home of philosophical inquiry. It was no common feat for a student by nature and nurture to effect so much. And the outcome ran favorable, because motivated, not merely by a rare intellect, but by a *humane* being, whose forgetfulness of self, sacrificial devotion to truth, persistent energy, and incapacity for anything petty or mean, could not but win upon others. Principal Fairbairn, who saw much of the Master during these years, summarizes the case delicately, and reveals the basal fact, when he avers, "I never met Caird without feeling humiliated and reproved. Under him Balliol acquired a new reputation: it was less a home of brilliant scholars than of men who had the sincerity of large convictions and genuine insight." Caird's magnificent integrity touched his Headship to fine issues, whereof Balliol and the Empire will yet learn in years to come. Briefly, the magnitude of the man developed a new magnitude in the office, no matter how greatly it had been filled in the immediate past. Ever and anon in his *Lay Sermons* he lays bare, all unconsciously, the secret of his Oxford success—a success, not of things that command attention by loud appeal to conventional judgments, but of transforming thrust into the recesses of the human spirit. "We should endeavor to view our life and our relations to others in the light in which we are revealed to ourselves in our clearest and best moments. . . . All men have such moments of awakened consciousness or conscience, . . . moments in which it seems a simple and plain thing to succeed, and almost an impossibility to fail in living the better life."²⁰ His feet, lighted by this lamp, stood firm and sure, and he enjoyed that greatest of privileges, power to show others the more excellent way, wherein they might walk to their lives' end. This, as I saw and see it, lent amplitude and truest success to the Oxford career.

IV

In order to render this article, so imperfect otherwise, a less unworthy memorial of Caird, I append a list of his publications known to me. Although it may lack a few reviews, contributed

²⁰ Pages 35-36.

anonymously to the *Glasgow Herald*, for example, and episodal writings, of local interest more or less, pertaining to the Balliol years, it suffices to show the curve of his activity, and to illustrate his central interests. In conversation once he said to me, with characteristic simplicity, "I had done nothing when I was appointed to the Glasgow chair; it was much easier to obtain a professorship then than it is now." Nevertheless, the two *North British Review* articles indicate that, at the age of thirty-two, his standpoint had already gone far towards formation. For the rest, the list reveals that his productive life divides itself into three periods. We have, first, the time of preliminary work, including the earlier form of the great book on Kant, the *Britannica* article on "Cartesianism," itself a notable performance, and the illuminating critique of Rousseau. The years of most continuous and important production follow (1879-93), with a score of serial publications, and four books, among them the two masterpieces—the masterpiece in large, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, and *Hegel*, the "little masterpiece." Finally we have what may be termed the theological (in the sense of philosophy of religion) period, with the two series of Gifford Lectures, the *Lay Sermons*, and some half-dozen articles whose theological titles arrest the eye. It may be remarked that, as his Scottish pupils know very well, the Gifford Lectures belong really to the time of the Glasgow professorship, and that *The Theory of Ethics*, announced (in 1890) for the 'Library of Philosophy,' edited by Professor Muirhead, was never written, the urgency of Oxford duties interposing—a matter for permanent regret. Later still, bodily weakness frustrated his intention to lecture on the philosophy of religion from Augustine to the present day. He has left no manuscripts that could be published.

Thanks to the difficulties that beset intimate knowledge of our fellow-men, we rest satisfied for the most part with synoptic views, often of a rather external kind. This tendency leads by insensible steps to labels and, finally, the static label appropriates the place of the dynamic personality. Philosophers, especially if they command attention from the man in the street, suffer more than their fair share of ills from this otiose method, and Caird fell a ready victim to its apt spell. I remember very well when one

morning, now thirty years ago, I stood at the door of Jebb's class-room, a raw Freshman, a mate confided to me that Caird was a transcendentalist. I did not know what this strange animal might be; but, forthwith, Caird occupied a decent, orderly corner in my jumbled intellectual rag-bag. Later on, I discovered that older and more authoritative folk baptized him a Hegelian, and the *affiche* serves handily with many even yet. Still this is no more than a lazy evasion of a question fraught with several difficulties. Like Green and Wallace, the two contemporaries who were his compeers and coworkers, Caird held that Plato and Hegel must be accounted the thinkers of the past who had sensed the truth most surely. They approached the problem in the right spirit, and along the strait path that led past every blind alley. But, attempt to range him with Hegel's pupils and colleagues, in the attractive rows of Right, Left, or Centre, and you find at once that he eludes your complacent attentions. The national temper and traditions of the Scot vary so fundamentally from those of the Swabian, the philosophical situation in Britain during the rule of Gladstone was so different from the speculative excitement in the Prussia of Stein and Hardenberg, that simple reproduction of the one spirit by the other is an idea too naïve for serious consideration.²¹ Further, Caird has indicated his own attitude with no uncertain sound. "To us, at this distance of time, Hegel, at the highest, can be only the last great philosopher who deserves to be placed on the same level with Plato and Aristotle in ancient, and with Spinoza and Kant in modern times, and who, like them, has given an 'epoch-making' contribution to the development of the philosophic, or, taking the word in the highest sense, the idealistic, interpretation of the world. . . . The only important question now is, not whether we are disciples of Hegel,—the days of discipleship are past,—but whether we recognize the existence of a living development of philosophy, and especially of that spiritual or idealistic view of things in which philosophy culminates."²²

²¹ The same thing holds always. To take a contemporary case: I find my advanced students of philosophy of religion puzzled constantly by the strong protestant note sounded so frequently in the works of German writers, Pfleiderer and Harnack, for example. We do not need to strike it—and thereby hangs a most important tale.

²² Hegel, pp. 223, 224.

Appreciation of a thinker's philosophy demands some knowledge of his life-history. For, after all, consecutive reflection constitutes an effort to dispel problems, and these originate amid definite conditions as seized and presented by a vital personality. The Scotland of Caird's youth had not emancipated herself from the bonds of the eighteenth century; theology formed her main intellectual interest, and here she was still threshing the old straw—not hers, but presented to her—of the Westminster Confession. In 1831, John M'Leod Campbell had been deposed from the ministry of the National Church, because he had maintained a view of the atonement traversing the doctrines of 'reprobation' and 'election.' For the next twenty-five years ecclesiastical controversy swept the land, and the evangelical party, which founded the Free Church (1843), won immense political *éclat*, thus concentrating attention upon practical affairs and postponing discussion of fundamental problems. The works of Burns and Scott, popular though they were, failed to transform, indeed they hardly touched, convictions on deep things of the spirit. So far as mental activity went, headquarters were at the University of Edinburgh, then midmost its golden age. Hamilton, Christopher North, Aytoun, Forbes, Syme, Christison, Simpson, Gregory, and Bennett maintained the reputation of the capital as the "modern Athens." Yet, even at this, the influence must be characterized as literary rather than speculative in the higher sense. Eminently cultivated, pleasing, respectable, or what you will, it was nevertheless a back-water in the broad current of modern thought. First principles were not being subjected to critical examination. Strange as it may seem in these days of rapid international intercourse, even Kant amounted to little more than a vagrom rumor two generations after *The Critique of Pure Reason!* What Caird records of his brother, the Principal, held true of the atmosphere he himself encountered at the University of Glasgow. "He had been brought up in a circle into which any idea of scepticism as to the doctrines of the Christian faith had hardly entered; and his philosophical studies, which were at that time mainly in Reid and Stewart, while they exercised his powers, were not such as to affect his intellectual or moral life very deeply."²³ The date of this refer-

²³ *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, xiv.

ence is 1840-45. Caird went up a decade later, and even a decade may count for righteousness. What was the difference? In the spring of 1880, during a long tramp with Caird through the country round Glasgow, he stopped suddenly, faced round to me, and asked, "What are you young men thinking about, who is influencing you?" I replied instantly, "Darwin, and the whole question of evolution." Then, without giving him time to strike in, I inquired, "What were you and your comrades thinking about thirty years ago, who was influencing you?" He answered, as rapidly, "Carlyle!" If we recall what Carlyle thought of his Edinburgh professors—"hide-bound pedants," was the barbed phrase—we have the key to the beginning of things with Caird. Coleridge's Teutonic obligations had been noised abroad by Ferrier as early as 1840,²⁴ by the fifties, students at least knew something about the sources of Carlyle's inspiration. So quite naturally Carlyle led to Goethe and Fichte, whence it was but a step to Kant and the whole idealistic movement. Once this became accessible to Caird and his generation, longing as they were for deliverance from the polite ineffectualities that occupied the "seats of the mighty," it sounded in their ears like a trumpet-call, and rallied to a new life. Here, I think, we must detect the secret of the profound influence wielded by the British idealistic masters. Not only were they strong men by grace of nature, but they had appropriated a veritable gospel, and they preached it as if inspired. But, thanks to their national circumstances, it became a new thing in their hands. Hume and Rousseau did not move them as Kant had been moved; they were not required to unify and deliver a people, like Fichte; the progress of science had set Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* beyond the bounds of practical politics; a lifetime of revolutionary riot, such as caused Hegel to long for peace, formed no part of their portion. Above all, the inbred puritan strain turned their thoughts to ethics and religion,

²⁴ Cf. Blackwood's Magazine, March, 1840. It should be noted that Coleridge exerted much directer influence upon philosophy in this country than in Britain; witness James Marsh, Hickok, Tappan, Shedd, Bushnell, and Bascom, to name no others. Some American scholar ought to elucidate this movement thoroughly. Perhaps it may not be too presumptuous in a foreigner to say that, after Edwards, Marsh and Tappan are the most original minds in philosophy that the United States has produced so far.

interests never very far off even in their most technical excursions; while the social structure of England directed their appeal to the whole body of the middle and upper classes rather than to neophytes of *Wissenschaft*. *Nullum simile quatuor pedibus currit.*

When Caird came to his own, the philosophical outlook in Britain could not be called promising. Intuitionism, under Hamilton, sensationalism, under the Mills, seemed to have accomplished their best—or worst. Some raw rationalism, connected with 'advanced' political notions, harbored here and there. Spencer was just afoot, with his cosmic extension of Hume. Darwin had revealed himself, while Huxley and Tyndall were about to deliver their onslaught upon the scientific infelicities of dogmatism. It looked as if a dull, drab view of life might submerge everything, and the sole recourse for safety appeared to be pious iteration of outworn formulae. Carlyle had prophesied against it all. "On the one side has been dreary cant, with a *reminiscence* of things holy and divine; on the other side, acrid candor, with a *prophecy* of things brutal, and infernal." But he had not attempted anything in the nature of systematic demonstration. "Though he owes much to the later German philosophy, especially to Fichte's popular works, he seems to have cared only about the results, and nothing at all about the processes. Metaphysical theories in general . . . he regards as absurd attempts to measure the immensurable, or weigh with earthly scales . . . infinite reality."²⁵ Caird joined the lists at this juncture, and showed that a thoroughgoing analysis of experience enables one to transcend the partial views of reactionary intuitionism and of militant sensationalism—to prove, in short, that the cosmos incarnates a spirit which "does all things well." He thus became a prominent exponent of the genetic view of the universe interpreted in terms of idealism. While this is not the occasion to expound his philosophy, it is well to note that it operated in three directions. First, it resulted in a new study of philosophy as *Wissenschaft*. Second, it passed over into the world of practice, deflecting the old Liberalism of *laissez-faire*, and transforming the outlook upon moral, social, and even political problems. Third, it evoked a fresh interest in systematic study of religion. A word is proper here with respect to the last.

²⁵ E. Caird, *Essays*, I, 248.

It must be said that, so far, Caird's teaching has not resulted in any thorough-going reconstruction of religious thought, framework with facts. But it may be affirmed that the traditional ideas upon which Scotland, and England in another fashion, had fed for some generations, have undergone deliquescence. Men think no longer in the consecrated categories. Higher criticism, like scholarship in general, has lost many of its terrors. At the same time, the situation diverges widely from that regnant, say, in Germany. All things considered, theologians attach themselves, not to philosophical movements, with their transitive principles, but to the confessional churches, State and Free, with their practical needs. Accordingly, without conscious evasion, a mediating tendency has held captivity captive for the most part. In other words, while ready to accept all the weapons proffered by idealism for discomfiture of materialism, sensationalism, agnosticism, and naturalism, few theologians have evinced ready disposition to go the whole way with the purview implied in the system. So, I think, we must view Caird's achievement—not in his own person assuredly, but in those whom he led—as that of a *Bahnbrecher* rather than the founder of a 'new' theology. Criticism in detail, panoplied by history, anthropology, and the like, must still effect much ere the old country will be ready to accept the principles of the idealistic synthesis so completely as to use them in construction of a modern edifice from the foundation up. Perhaps large social displacements may have to supervene; for it has even been alleged that high churchmen have "carried off the honey from the Hegelian hive." Truth to tell, whenever it has been possible to snatch at means of compromise, this method has found nimble supporters, tingling with alacrity. As Caird said himself of his brother's attitude, there must be an immense transformation of the Creed of Christendom before the hut of the fisherman can be transformed into the altar of the great Temple of Humanity.²⁰ What shall we say of this transformation? "We might call it, in Carlyle's own language, a Christianity divested of almost all its clothing; a Christianity without supernaturalism, without dogmas, and without church, reduced to the belief that the universe is in its deepest meaning spiritual, and that therefore, as he expresses it,

²⁰ Cf. *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, lxvii.

‘the true Shekinah is man’; a belief, in other words, that in the moral life of man we have the clearest revelation or symbol of that which the divine Spirit is.”²⁷ Nevertheless, Caird’s enormous service lay in showing that, no matter how far we *must* go with modern science and scholarship, the last word lies with the spirit of man, not with the play of spectral atoms or the heedless crash of ‘causal’ history. It was an invaluable work, done with superlative skill, and with a weight of high seriousness that carried it far further than the circumstances might have permitted in other hands. We may characterize it as the first, and therefore most difficult, chapter in an entirely new book, so far as English-speaking folk are concerned. Caird wrote *himself* into it, when a different personality might easily have made lamentable shipwreck.

And this leads me to say, in conclusion, that the man was made for the mission. Needless to record, the subtle force of any personality, especially of a great personality, escapes every verbal statement. It must therefore suffice to relate that Caird owned in altogether remarkable degree one of the main characteristics of genius. He was compelling, in the sense that he could transplant himself, and this without apparent effort. He passed over to others, making his ideals theirs, reorienting their very being so that, having once felt the magic of his power, they became as men transfigured. Undoubtedly, many factors combined to this end. Caird’s possession of and by a message lent him incalculable representative and reproductive capacity. He impressed, because he stood for an entire universe of things unseen and eternal. His being thus underwent enlargement by its own loss of self.

The historic personage

Put by, leaves prominent the impulse of his age;
Truth sets aside speech, act, time, place, indeed, but brings
Nakedly forward now the principle of things
Highest and least.

Nichol once said to me, “Caird’s great limitation is that he has a gospel.” On the contrary, to those of us who were younger, this proved the transitive secret of his winsomeness.

²⁷ E. Caird, Essays, I, 256.

Once more, and on the practical side, nature and experience had gifted him with preternatural facility of luminous exposition. His books, admirably written though they are, models of philosophical interpretation, convey but faint idea of his felicity as a lecturer. I have heard many eminent teachers, but he stands first—with no second. The very artlessness of his performance rendered it the more striking. And here, I think, we must find the clue, missed by his mere readers, in the character of the man. In this respect he was a walking epitome of the best that Scots nationality can produce—and a Scot may be forgiven for saying that this is very good! The combination of serious, but light, gravity, of quaint humor, keen yet never mordant, of simplicity, sometimes almost laughable, with a mind that spent its whole time in intimate companionship of the masters of those who know, culminated in a vitalizing temperament that wrought irresistibly. Like all human beings, he had his limitations. But, in his chosen sphere, the class-room, they counted least, nay, almost disappeared; in the professorial chair, he came as near the ideal as anyone ever can. Entirely unaware of the fact, he ruled by service; and, inevitably, earned the teacher's highest praise and richest reward—he had many souls to his hire. Those of us who knew him intimately, who must remain under incalculable obligation to him to our lives' end, in taking last, poignant farewell, can only say of him, to others who knew him not—*Sic itur ad astra*; and, sharpened by fond remembrance, readopt the principle he inculcated and lived—*Sic vos non vobis*.

True master thou of those that know and hope,
Whose wise years mingled with the wine of youth,
Leader unlost, upon the upward slope,
Of souls that freely climb fresh opening truth;

Here, in still Autumn's lingering prescient pause,
Death lays in love a reconciling palm
On that broad brow, and more divinely draws
Life's veil. God's light is thine, His gracious calm.

We, half forlorn, although our spirits live
Rich heritors of all thy lips bequeath,
We, poorer now, disciples, debtors, give
Out of our poverty love's reverent wreath.

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CALVIN AND SERVETUS¹

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In the Genevan suburb of Champel, in an angle formed by the crossing of two unfrequented roads, stands a monument erected in the year 1903 by citizens of Geneva to commemorate an incident in the history of their community which for three centuries and a half has justly been regarded by critics as a blot upon its good name. The monument consists of a rough, irregular granite block about a man's height and resting upon a base of natural rock. On one side is the name of Michael Servetus, and on the other the following touching inscription:

FILS
RESPECTUEUX ET RECONNAISSANTS
DE CALVIN
NOTRE GRAND REFORMATEUR
MAIS CONDAMNANT UNE ERREUR
QUI FUT CELLE DE SON SIECLE
ET FERMEMENT ATTACHEES
A LA LIBERTE DE CONSCIENCE
SELON LES VRAIS PRINCIPES
DE LA REFORMATION ET DE L'EVANGILE
NOUS AVONS ELEVE
CE MONUMENT EXPIATOIRE
LE XXVII OCTOBRE MCMIII

That such an inscription could be accepted as an expression of the best judgment of the modern Genevese in regard to this action of their fathers is evidence of a change of sentiment that has required all these three and a half centuries to come to its rights. During my travels two years ago I met a Genevan scholar of world-wide reputation in a field of knowledge that has kept him for the greater part of his active life far removed from the provincial feeling that might well cling to one who had never left the familiar scenes of early life. He was a member of an ancient

¹A lecture given in the Lowell Institute course at King's Chapel, Boston, January 25, 1909.

Genevan aristocratic family, still in possession of a landed estate that for six generations at least had been in the hands of his fathers. In the course of conversation I remarked upon the admirable action of his fellow-citizens in showing, though tardily, their sense of the historic significance of Calvin's terrible act of justice. In so doing I meant to pay to Geneva the respectful tribute of my humble admiration. But the response was not such as I had anticipated. Not even yet was this Genevan aristocrat quite ready to admit that his fellow-citizens had done well to recognize thus publicly their regret that the man to whom they as well as he looked back as the creator of their redoubtable commonwealth had allowed himself this one human slip. Even modified as their expression of regret was, even though they had guarded the reputation of Calvin by ascribing his fault to the Spirit of the Age, still it seemed to this sturdy conservative that any such confession of error could be only another outburst of that radical temper which was slowly transforming the Geneva of Calvin into a community more in sympathy with the liberalism of the modern world.

During my last visit, in 1907, the whole canton of Geneva was thrown into the greatest excitement by the proposition to withdraw all public support from the churches, in other words, definitely to separate between church and state. I found that the conservative elements, notably the remnants of the ancient aristocracy, however much the theory of a free church in a free state might appeal to them individually, were to a man united against putting it in practice in their own community. They dreaded still lest, if this ancient bond were severed, the inrush of the modern spirit of unrest, already in many ways threatening the fair fame of their city, should prove fatal to the traditions they valued. I believed this point of view to be wrong, because it seemed to me that the spirit of Calvin at his best as well as at his worst was still very much alive in this scene of his wonderful activities. For years, while the recognized churches of Geneva had been supported by public taxation, there had been also in existence a church of the type with which we are familiar. A preacher of great personal influence had gathered about him a congregation that Sunday after Sunday packed the largest assembly hall in

the city, paid its own bills, and was exercising in the whole community an influence greater than that of any other religious organization. It seemed to me that this was in so far evidence that Geneva was not likely to become less religious, but rather more so, when her own people were thrown upon their own resources to prove their loyalty to their great inheritance.

It has seemed worth while to take these hurried glimpses into the modern world of Genevan thought and feeling in order that we may the better understand—or come the nearer to understanding—the conditions of our subject. There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between this community in the year 1553 and the man who is to occupy us today. If there is one thing more than another that marks the Puritan commonwealth, it is the sense of obligation of the individual to submit himself to the higher judgment of the community as a whole, this judgment being expressed through its recognized organs. If we had to select one trait of Servetus that would express the man almost to the exclusion of all others, it would be his rampant self-assertion. It is in the dramatic opposition of these two qualities that the interest of his encounter with Calvin is mainly to be found.

Our information as to the origin and early life of Servetus is singularly meagre and untrustworthy. It is derived in great part from his own declarations made under the stress of trial for his life, and unhappily it appears quite certain that many of these declarations were more or less deliberately untrue. Furthermore there has not yet appeared any one successful effort to unravel the mystery of Servetus' life and thought. Frequent attempts have indeed been made. The most important contributor to our knowledge in recent times has been a Protestant pastor in Magdeburg, in Germany, by the name of Tollin, who, in a series of monographs published in several different periodicals and covering the eighth and ninth decades of the last century, has tried to clear up one after another of the puzzles presented by this enigmatic personage. It appears to have been Tollin's intention eventually to write the long-desired biography of Servetus, but he died before this could be accomplished. In England there is little beyond the careful study of Robert Willis, a physician who,

largely relying upon Tollin's work, but adding much on the side of Servetus' contributions to natural science, published in 1877 an interesting narrative account in one sizable volume. The libraries of Harvard College and the City of Boston have each a copy of the second imprint (1790) from the original edition of 1553 of the *Christianismi Restitutio*, the most important of Servetus' own writings. The copy in Harvard College was the property of my predecessor Professor Converse Francis, of the Harvard Divinity School, and has many manuscript notes in his hand.

Michael Servetus, alias Reves, alias Villeneuve (Villanova), was undoubtedly a Spaniard, a native either of Aragon or of Navarre. He was almost, if not exactly, of the same age as Calvin; born, that is, in the year 1509 or 1511. He came evidently of a family of some consideration and was given the best education possible to his time. His precocity is one of his most striking traits. He can hardly have been much over nineteen when he was selected by Father Quintana, the confessor of Charles, King of Spain and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, as in some sense his private secretary. Probably this choice was due to the boy's proficiency in languages; for he seems already to have had a practical command of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—very remarkable attainments at any time, but little less than phenomenal in a day when these studies, under the eager leadership of Erasmus and his fellow-workers, were just beginning to acquire a scientific standing in the educational centres of western Europe. Whatever his duties in the capacity of secretary may have been, the important thing in his relation to Quintana is his expedition to Italy, and thence into Germany, in the following of the Emperor. These were the months just after that terrible sack of Rome by the imperial army which resulted in the restoration of what was called peace between Papacy and Empire and the consequent strengthening of the Emperor's hands, so that he could turn his attention for the first time seriously to the religious movement in Germany.

Servetus was present at the triumphal entry of the Pope and the Emperor into Bologna, an event which left upon his sensitive mind a profound impression of the worldliness and unsanctity

of the papal institution, and prepared him unquestionably to expect to find among the reformers in Germany and Switzerland a condition of things more in harmony with the ideas of the religious life that were already shaping themselves in his independent thought. At Augsburg, whither the imperial journey was directed, Servetus was—or might have been—present at the meeting of the famous Diet of the Empire at which the Lutheran party presented their “Confession,” the fundamental document of German Lutheranism for all time. With the exception of Luther, the leading theologians of the party were gathered at Augsburg, and it would not have been impossible for the young Spaniard at least to have had speech of them, but there is, I think, no trace of any significant personal relations with them at this time. Pastor Tollin, it is true, makes as much as possible out of a brief notice of a conversation between Philipp Melanchthon and certain Spaniards in the antechamber of Quintana, but I cannot think this important. What has, however, a real bearing upon our subject is that the Lutherans at Augsburg were above all things interested in presenting their case to the Diet in such moderate terms that they might conciliate opposition. Their chief desire was to let Papacy and Empire see that they were not extremists. Radicalism in any form was as repellent to them as to their Catholic opponents. Schism, a division in the sacred unity of the church, was far from being their ideal solution of the religious conflict. In those paragraphs of the Confession which touch upon the radical tendencies of the day, they take every pains to show that these are not characteristic of their own ways of thought.

It is clear therefore that, in so far as the mind of Servetus was already leaping forward to the conclusions inevitable from his independent attitude, he was quite as little likely to find sympathy here as in the immediate surroundings of the imperial court. What it was that led to his parting company with Quintana we do not know. It is more than probable that some indiscretion on his part had revealed to the imperial confessor the danger that might come from his continued patronage of a man who dared think for himself and was already showing a perilous tendency to speak out his innermost thought. At all events, it is clear that shortly

after the Diet of 1530 Servetus was afloat upon the world, dependent for his living upon the exercise of his many talents.

For a short period he seems to have had the wherewithal to exist, and he improved this interval to make, or attempt to make, connections with the reformers of Switzerland. In their denunciations of radicalism the German Lutherans had pointed in unmistakable terms to their Swiss brethren. Only a year before, at the decisive conference between the two reforming churches at Marburg, they had drawn the lines of their differences so that henceforth their fundamental opposition of attitude toward the tradition of the church could not fail to be clear to every one. On the critical question of the transubstantiation the Swiss had crossed the line from the "sacramental" to the figurative interpretation, and thus definitely declared themselves for the natural or rational understanding of the whole system of Christian thought. When, therefore, he had failed to make connections with the Germans, it was quite natural for Servetus to imagine that he might receive from the Swiss the kind of welcome which his own rapidly advancing thought would seem to warrant. He began at this time a series of letters—unfortunately lost, and known to us only by the writings of his opponents—in which he called upon the leading Swiss theologians to give their opinions in regard to his views about the primary propositions of Christian speculation. It is clear from the comments of his correspondents that he was already well started along the several roads which his maturer thought was to follow. The impression he made upon them was that of a restless, half-irresponsible youth, losing himself in the mazes of a philosophy that was more heathen than Christian. The chief theologian of Basel, Oecolampadius, complained to Zwingli, the leader of the church at Zürich, that he was being tormented by a Spaniard who had put forward doctrines in regard to the person of Christ which savored strongly of Arianism. He had declared that Christ was not consubstantial and co-eternal with God. It is interesting to notice that Oecolampadius criticizes Servetus especially for implying that in the prophetic writings of the Old Testament it is always a future Son of God that is predicted. He would not admit, says his critic, that the eternal Son of God was to appear as man, but only that a man

was to come who should be the Son of God. This is the earliest intimation we have as to the speculations which were occupying the mind of the young scholar. It is highly significant that from the start he was impressed with what we should now call the historical view of theology. As he read the Old Testament, its writers seemed to him to be referring to things that their hearers would understand. Their gaze into the future was limited by the fortunes of their people at the moment. To imagine them possessed of all the divine mysteries and to have in mind the person of the man Jesus as the ultimate object of all their prophetic vision was to reflect back the knowledge of history into a past to which such knowledge was impossible. So far as I can understand him, this is the key to all Servetus' later thought. His manner of expressing himself is confusing and intricate to the last degree, so much so that neither in his own time nor since has any one quite dared to say that he understood it. To his contemporaries he was a half-mad fanatic; to those who have studied him, even sympathetically, his thought remains to a great extent enigmatical; but this one point is fairly clear: that he grasped, as no one up to his time had grasped, this one central notion, that, whatever the divine plan may have been, it must be revealed by the long, slow movement of history—that, to understand the record of the past, it must be read, so far as that is possible, with the mind of those to whom it was immediately addressed, and must not be twisted into the meanings that may suit the fancy of later generations.

To have seized upon such an idea as this—an idea which has begun to come to its rights only within our own memories—was an achievement which marks this youth of twenty as at all events an extraordinary individual, a disturbing element in his world, a man who was not likely to let the authorities rest calmly in possession of all the truth there was.

These earliest speculations seem to have occupied Servetus during the latter part of the year 1530. If he seemed to be entering into a field of thought where speculation was out of place and where it was the manifest duty of the Christian man to accept the teaching of authority and be happy, we must remind ourselves that in the year 1530 this question of authority was precisely the

one as to which no final answer was possible. The whole world of thinking men was disturbed by the stirring of a spirit of inquiry and criticism that would not be held in check. In the thirteen years just preceding, the Lutherans in Germany had been working out their protest into a scheme of doctrine and of organization which had just been put before the world at Augsburg in such a form that it was clear there was to be no going backward from it. Carried along on the wave of this more conservative Lutheranism there had gone side-currents of radicalism that within five years were to culminate in the horrors of Münster, and thus to show all the elements of order in society how carefully they must guard themselves against this insidious foe. Switzerland had developed its own triumphant Protestantism, differing alike from that of the Lutherans and of the now discredited radicals. John Calvin was a student at Paris, laying the foundations of that system which in the next five years was to ripen out into the scheme of theology that was to prove the most effective agent in the spread of the reformed faith. Erasmus, living at Basel at the moment, was serving now the cause of revolt and now that of reaction, as the pressure of the case seemed to warrant. Even the organized mechanisms of the Roman tradition were proving unequal to the task of satisfying the restless spirit that was abroad among its own enlightened followers. Where was a young, eager, inquiring scholar in the year 1530 to look for satisfaction if not into the inner depths of his own honest thought?

Such, so far as we can trace it, is the genesis of the first important work by which Servetus drew upon himself the attention of the learned world. In the course of the year 1531 appeared the treatise, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*. It was printed at the little town of Hagenau in Alsatia, and bore on its title-page the name "Michaelem Serveto, alias Reves, ab Aragonia, Hispanum," but no indication of the publisher or the place of publication.²

In the months immediately preceding its appearance, Servetus had been, as we have seen, in frequent relations with the leaders

² I am indebted for a copy of this very rare book to Dr. Samuel Macauley Jackson, of New York. The Library of Harvard University contains a manuscript copy of perhaps the seventeenth century.

of the Swiss Reformation, and seems also to have had friendly dealings with the heads of the reformed church at Strassburg, Bucer and Capito. His name was on the title-page of this terrible book, and yet it appears to be a fact that he was not personally identified with its authorship until shortly before he appeared on trial for his life twenty years later at Geneva. The essential point of Servetus' error in this first formal presentation of his thought is his treatment of the accepted doctrine of the Trinity. He starts, as all his predecessors along this same line had started, from the idea of the oneness of God as the necessary presumption of all thought about the divine being. It seemed to him that the church in its formulations had departed from this essential conception, and had wandered over into the region of polytheistic imaginings, from which it still believed itself to have escaped. In this aberration of the church he thought he saw the reason of its failure to appeal to the vast masses of mankind, notably to those peoples who had found in the monotheism of Islam the satisfaction of their religious demands. It seemed to him that, in its attempt to exalt the person of Christ, the church had in reality distorted it, and deprived it of its true relation to mankind.

The Christ idea as represented in the person of Jesus was to him worthy of all devotion. No language is too strong for him to express his almost extravagant sense of the dignity and elevation of this central figure of the Christian tradition. Like his great forerunner, Arius, he was willing to accept almost any description of the divine perfections of the redeeming Christ—only he would not admit the thought of his eternal existence. The word Trinity he could not find in the Scriptures, nor in the writings of the earliest Christian theologians of the formative period. Yet he had no objection to the term if only he might give it his own interpretation. He could quite comprehend the value of a method of approach to an understanding of the divine nature which sought to distinguish between the various forms in which that nature is revealed to men. He was willing to use the words "Son" and "Holy Spirit," provided only that these should not be thought of as separate existences by themselves. He did not even object to the word "Person," but insisted that it should be used in its

proper and original sense of a dramatic impersonation. He went back to the Greek equivalent *πρόσωπον*, and showed how this had been used by early Greek writers to express precisely this notion—that the several persons of the Trinity or Triad were only manifestations of the one single and indivisible idea of supreme Deity.

In a word, Servetus shows himself the intellectual kinsman of those thinkers of the second century who have come down to us as Monarchians. His thought reminds us at once of those opposite types of monarchian speculation which are identified with the names of Sabellius and Paul of Samosata. It was largely in combating these attempts to formulate Christian doctrine on a strictly monarchian basis that the creeds of the fourth and fifth centuries had been evolved. Those creeds represented a long series of compromises. They were the expression of an enforced unity, made possible through an alliance with the civil government, and supported by a theological method in which plain reason and the laws of the physical universe were subordinated to a religious ideal too lofty and too spiritual to admit of expression in language intelligible to ordinary human understanding. The creeds did their great work of welding together all the divergent forces of aggressive Christianity and concentrating them on the one great task of winning the world to the following of the Christ. That was their merit, and for that service they deserve our interest and our gratitude; but, like all formulations of human speech, they could win their victory only by a rigid exclusion of whatever tended to weaken their hold upon the blind acceptance of their followers. Above all else they excluded, and must exclude, all right of the individual mind to indulge in the free exercise of its own native powers upon the subjects they claimed once for all to have disposed of.

Upon this comparatively simple substructure of the great creeds the church had reared its fabric of doctrines and usages, for which it had tried to claim the same sanctity as for the creeds themselves. It had secured the same kind of support from the new civil governments of Europe that had been given it by the older civil government of Rome. It had evolved a new theology to maintain this new structure of faith and practice. That had gone

on until, from the early fourteenth century onward, one after another of its defences had been attacked, and in the great Protest of the sixteenth it seemed as if there were danger that they would be swept away entirely. The authority of the Papacy had been rejected. The sacramental system, the key to its hold on the consciences of men, had been reduced to its lowest terms. The whole theological method of the Middle Ages had been held up to the contempt of the enlightened intellect. Where should men stop?

The answer is to be found in the universal horror with which this first essay of Servetus was received in the circles where he thought he might most surely count upon a favorable hearing. The expressions of opinion that have come down to us are almost entirely from the Protestant regions of Switzerland and Germany. In Catholic France the book seems to have been little known. Almost without exception, the judgment of the Protestant leaders was hostile in the extreme. It is not that they were led into controversy with the daring author. Nothing could have pleased him better than that. It is rather as if some noxious reptile had suddenly appeared in their midst and threatened to poison the very springs from which they drew the sources of their own resistance to the dominant church. From Luther and from the heads of the Protestant communities in Switzerland and Upper Germany we have utterances that reflect the controversial temper of the age. Bucer in Strassburg, often known as the Peacemaker of the Reformation, seems at first to have listened with some patience, if not actual interest, to the Spaniard's vagaries, but now, having read his book, he publicly declares that such a man ought to be disembowelled and torn to pieces.

Philipp Melanchthon, the theologian of the Lutheran party, was inclined to be a little more lenient. Servetus interested his eminently speculative mind; but, as he came to examine more carefully into his thought and to see whither it must lead, he too joined in the chorus of condemnation. The most he could say was that this whole subject of the Trinity was one involving a mystery, about which men ought to be careful in expressing definite opinions.

Disappointed in his expectations of finding sympathy among

those of his contemporaries who were themselves rebelling most distinctly against the existing church order, Servetus now left Germany and went over into France. There he dropped his proper family name and took that of Villeneuve (Villanovanus) from the name of his birthplace. So completely did he cover the traces of his life during the past few years that for the next twenty he was able to live and work with entire freedom and no little success in several lines of activity without, so far as we know, rousing the slightest suspicion that he was the Michael Servetus whose name stood on the title-page of the terrible pamphlet of 1531. His first visit was to Paris, where he lived for some time, perhaps supporting himself by the natural resource of teaching, while he was at the same time attending more or less of the instruction offered at the University. There was a tradition that in these earliest years at Paris he made the personal acquaintance of Calvin, and had plans for a public discussion with him on religious questions, but that this plan failed. There is, I believe, but slight foundation for a situation so full of dramatic suggestion for the future of the two youths; but it is more than probable that they were at Paris at the same time, and they may well have met in the gatherings of eager minds already deeply moved by the stirrings of the Reformation.

In 1534 we hear of Servetus at Orleans and at Avignon, and then at Lyons, where he settled for a time as a reader for the press of the famous publishers, the brothers Trechsel. It was while in their employ that he edited a new edition of Ptolemy's Geography, following the text of Wilibald Pirkheimer, the Nuremberg humanist, and adding commentaries of his own. In these commentaries Servetus brings in the scraps of learning about men and countries that he had collected from wide reading. They are of interest to us only as showing his irrepressible impulse to express what he had in his mind without special concern as to its relevancy. In connection, for instance, with the map of the Holy Land, he states the accepted tradition that it was a land flowing with milk and honey, but adds that this was mere boasting and falsehood, for the observations of modern travellers had shown that it was a barren, desolate region, without attractions of any kind. So that one might say that this "promised land" was anything but

a "promising land." This passage appears in the edition of 1535, but in the second edition of 1541 the whole section in regard to the Holy Land has disappeared.³

During his trial at Geneva, eighteen years later, this criticism of the Hebrew tradition was brought up against Servetus as proof of his readiness to question the trustworthiness of Moses as a recorder of geographical facts.

Soon after this, Servetus is again at Paris, living probably on the proceeds of his industry at Lyons, and now engaged in the study of medicine. He advanced here to the degrees of A.M. and M.D., and began to lecture on Ptolemy and on astrology, of the scientific nature of which he was, curiously enough, thoroughly convinced. He is reported to have been a successful lecturer and to have attracted large audiences. In any case he was widely known under his soubriquet of Villeneuve, and, though well known also to be of Spanish origin, no one seems to have connected him in any way with the dangerous doctrines of Servetus. Trouble, however, came upon him through his incredible devotion to the pseudo-science of astrology. He was prosecuted on this ground by the Medical Faculty, and examined by the Inquisitor of Paris as to his religious soundness. The Inquisitor satisfied himself of his orthodoxy, but he was then tried by the highest civil jurisdiction, the Parliament of Paris, for the offence of teaching and practising astrology. In spite of a vigorous defence, he was condemned, was forbidden to teach further, and ordered to withdraw the pamphlet in which he had presented an apology for the forbidden science.

Evidently a singular person, widely gifted, insatiable in his desire for knowledge, industrious, and with personal attractions that secured him friends; but erratic in his pursuits, restless under authority, and liable, as in this matter of astrology, to be led off into side-paths of speculation that might carry him over into regions of pure fantasy.

We next hear of Servetus at the little town of Charlieu, near Lyons, as a practising physician; but apparently some trouble with citizens of the place led to his removal in the year 1539 to Vienne, in the Rhône valley, where the Archbishop, Paumier,

³ Both editions are in the Library of Harvard University.

was a former friend and fellow-pupil of his Paris days. Here he really settled, and for the next fourteen years lived as a physician of good standing, occupied with studies in many fields, but never quite forgetting his early interest in theology. He re-edited Ptolemy, and in 1542 published an edition of the Bible in Latin from the text of Pagnini, with original notes, chiefly historical and literal, but without betraying any dangerous tendencies in the direction of criticism.

The final chapter in Servetus' life begins in 1546 or 1547. At that time he opened a correspondence with Calvin, still, of course, under his name of Villeneuve, and many letters passed between them. Those of Calvin are unfortunately lost, but those of Servetus are printed in his later book. They show that his mind was now turning with increasing interest to the problems that had occupied him sixteen years before, the fundamental questions of the Christian theology. His inquiries of Calvin related especially to the doctrine of the Trinity and the proofs necessary to establish it. It is evident that the tone of Calvin's answers was severe to the point of violence, and Servetus was not behind him in his use of vigorous language. In a letter written to Farel at this time, Calvin refers to this correspondence, and makes the afterwards famous declaration that, if he could lay his hands on the wretch who was publishing such outrageous views, he would never let him escape alive. Much has been made of this letter as showing the *animus* with which Calvin entered upon the fateful trial of 1553, but I hardly think too much weight should be laid upon it. Such an expression was quite in the natural order of sixteenth century controversy, and probably reflected nothing more than Calvin's natural horror at opinions that seemed to him nothing short of blasphemous. It is clear that Servetus had found himself rather strengthened than otherwise in the opinions of his youth by later study. What had been in 1530 the intuitive perceptions of an unusually clever youth had ripened in the interval into something that might be called a philosophy of life. His appeal to Calvin is perfectly in accordance with his action in the earlier stage of his thought. As he had then addressed himself to the leaders of what he supposed to be the most advanced theological thought, so now he turned to the man who more than any other

was shaping the thoughts of the Protestant world. His attitude then was not precisely humble, and it was not greatly changed now. He was not appealing to an authority now any more than then, but it would have been a great encouragement to him in the loneliness of his own researches if he could have gained the countenance of an acknowledged expert in his field. The result was, as it had been before, to throw him back upon himself, and to show him that, if his views were to win a place in the world, it must be in virtue of their own convincing force.

It is probable that in connection with his correspondence Servetus sent to Calvin a draft of the book which is his chief literary monument, the *Christianismi Restitutio*, which, however, was not to be printed until 1553. The leniency or indifference of the authorities in the good Catholic town of Vienne has always been a matter of wonder to the students of Servetus. It seems altogether probable that he was regarded there with the kind of indulgence which men everywhere and always are inclined to give to a "queer fellow" of undoubted gifts, useful in his way, though with notions that might perhaps be a little off color, but were not clearly perceived as dangerous. The Archbishop was his friend, and we must bear in mind that Villeneuve was so far not suspected of any connection with the forgotten heretic Servetus, of nearly twenty years before.

I wish I were at once theologian, philosopher, and natural scientist enough to make quite clear either to you or to myself just what this philosophy of life was that had half formed itself in the active brain of Servetus, and was now crowding for expression. So far as I can grasp it, it was based upon a profound conviction of the unity of all being, this unity expressing itself indeed in manifold forms, but these forms all correlated to each other and to the whole by an active principle which corresponds to his idea of God. Or, putting it in the reverse order, his idea of God was of a being so completely pervading all life that it was hardly to be distinguished from the things it so utterly filled and animated. The handiest word to describe an idea of this sort is "pantheism," and in fact the theology of Servetus has often been thus described. Yet he was quite ready to use most of the terminology of the

church, provided only that he might give to it his own interpretation.

The most curious illustration of this striving after a unity of life is to be found in the extraordinary discovery upon which he seems to have fallen in the course of his regular medical study and practice, but which he at once incorporates into his discussion of theology. There can be little doubt that Servetus had practised dissection of the human body, and had made himself familiar especially with the processes of foetal life. In the chapter of his book on the Restoration of Christianity in which he treats of the Holy Spirit, he attempts first a definition of the several spirits, the natural, the vital, and the animal, by which the human body is animated. In the course of his description of the vital spirit he tells how, in his opinion, the blood is sent from the right to the left ventricle of the heart, not, as was generally supposed, by passing through the mid-wall of the heart, but passing first through the pulmonary artery into the lungs and thence through the pulmonary vein into the left ventricle. The aeration of the blood in the lungs he describes as a mingling of the outer air with the rarer parts of the substance of the blood, thus producing the vital spirit, which is then communicated to the body through the red blood of the arteries. In other words, Servetus is the undoubted discoverer of so much of the fact of the circulation of the blood as relates to what is called the pulmonary circulation. Apparently he was led to his conclusions by the observations, first, that the mid-wall of the heart was not of a texture to permit as free passage for the blood as would be necessary, although a slight transfusion might take place, such as I am informed does actually occur in certain forms of disease; then, the reflection that so great a supply of blood could not be sent to the lungs merely for the purpose of nourishing them; and also that the left ventricle was too small to permit of the thorough mingling of the air with the blood whereby the vital spirit is produced. It is generally accepted as a fact that the rest of the process, the systemic circulation whereby the blood is returned to the heart, escaped the observation of Servetus, and it would certainly be presumption for a mere layman to assert the contrary. It is quite certain that he does not describe the process in any language that would correspond to

our modern description. It is certain that he did not understand the idea of capillary attraction. Yet one cannot quite overlook his remark that what he calls "the natural spirit" is communicated from the arteries to the veins "by their *anastomoses*." Some notion of a passage from the arteries to the veins he must have had. It must be remembered that he is writing not primarily a treatise on physiology, but on theology, and that his interest in the question was merely the definition of the vital spirit. I am not yet so far convinced by the arguments of Dr. Willis as to be perfectly sure, as he is, that the honor of this immense discovery is not to be ascribed in full measure to Servetus rather than to Harvey nearly a century later.

As to the book itself, the *Christianismi Restitutio* is an attempt to bring Christianity back to what Servetus believed to be its original conditions. It is not merely reform, it is restoration, that he has in mind. He finds the central fact of Christian speculation, not in the doctrine of the Trinity as formulated by the schools, but in the fact of the divine incarnation in the person of Jesus. He admits the divine birth, explaining it as in harmony with a general law of divine manifestation whereby the spiritual is revealed in the material. He would not accept the idea of an eternal sonship, except in this sense, that the divine Word, the Logos, had always been active as the expression in outward form of the divine activity. So, in the fulness of time, this same Logos produced a being from a human mother upon whom at the moment of his birth the divine Spirit was breathed. Obviously this is not the "eternal Son" of the creeds, and herein lay the especial theological crime of Servetus. In his criticism of the church order, of the papal government, of the sacramental system, he does not differ essentially from the more radical of the reformers. On the essential matters of baptism and the Eucharist he goes quite beyond the established reforming churches. In both cases he invokes the principle of plain reason. He rejects infant baptism on the ground that the infant can have no faith, and that the practice is therefore mere incantation. He denies transubstantiation on the rational basis that substances and accidents may not be separated, and does not spare the reforming leaders for what seemed to him their half-hearted attitude on this point. His language throughout

is harsh and violent, except where, as at the close of his chapters, he passes over into the forms of devotion and closes his diatribes with prayers of great beauty and spirituality.

This work was done by Servetus while he was living unmolested in a thoroughly Roman Catholic community, surrounded with all the mechanisms of detection and repression always at the disposal of the church. The printing was accomplished in secret, and a thousand copies were made ready for the market. It seems clear that an early copy reached Calvin, and confirmed him in his purpose, probably long since formed, to crush this enemy of all Christian men whenever the opportunity should occur. There is little room for doubt that the information upon which the authorities of Vienne were led to action reached them by way of Geneva. We have the correspondence between a French refugee, a friend of Calvin, and a Viennese friend of his upon which the proof is based. The authorities were informed that the supposed Villeneuve was no other than the wretch Servetus, and they at once proceeded to act. Servetus was arrested, examined, and imprisoned in the episcopal palace. His imprisonment seems to have been a rather nominal one; the garden gate was conveniently left open, and he had only to walk out and betake himself to a place of safety. The local inquisitor came into the affair just too late to recapture him, and had to be content with condemning his books and having him burned in effigy.

This brings us to the last scene in the tragedy of this singular life. Writers have exhausted their ingenuity in guessing why, of all places in the world, Servetus should have ventured into the Geneva of Calvin, the most outspoken enemy he had ever encountered. In his own testimony Servetus apparently wished to convey the idea that he was on his way to Italy, and that he had in fact made all arrangements for leaving Geneva after a short sojourn, when, having ventured into a public meeting, he was recognized by some one who reported his presence to Calvin and thus brought about his arrest. I am inclined to bring this Genevan visit into line with other earlier actions of Servetus, and to think that he was led by the same desire which had once led him to seek out the leaders of thought in Switzerland and Germany and to take the serious risks of a long correspondence with Calvin

himself. He was obviously a singular mixture of prudence and imprudence, and this time the imprudence got the better of him.

The account of this, one of the famous heresy trials of the world, is preserved to us in the formal records of the Genevan Councils and in the abundant contemporary writings. It has been the subject of a vast deal of sentimental criticism, and has served as the text for infinite demonstrations that Protestantism was no better than its predecessor in the matter of religious liberty, and that Calvin was a furious tyrant, thirsting for the blood of his opponents. A calmer judgment, however, shows us that seldom, if ever, was a trial for opinions conducted with larger guarantees of fairness, more openly, or more in accordance with the principles which the soundest leaders of thought at the time would approve. The methods of judicial inquiry in the sixteenth century and for a long time afterward were not pretty methods. The right of the accused to have counsel and to be placed on an equality, so far as opportunity was concerned, with the accusing party, was not recognized. Imprisonment was harsh, the means of extracting evidence were barbarous, and the tone of the judicial authorities toward the alleged criminal was such as to prejudice his case to the utmost. All these incidents were present in the trial of Servetus. There can be no doubt that Calvin—who, it must be remembered, held no office in Geneva other than that of its most respected preacher—pushed the case to its utmost limit. It has been shown, especially in recent treatments of this subject, that he had what may on the face of it be described as a personal interest in the issue. In spite of the success that had so far attended his work in Geneva, we must not forget that this success had been gained in the face of an opposition that was by no means overcome. Personal and family animosities had been developed that would have tested the strength of a far stronger governmental machine than he had at his disposal. The one indispensable condition of permanence for his work was that it should be held straight to the program with which it started—the establishment in Geneva of a civil state founded on the idea of the kingdom of God. To do this, it must above all else keep itself pure from even the suspicion of fanaticism or false doctrine.

The conviction of error within its borders was the most tangible form which such proof of Puritan thoroughness could take. If, therefore, such conviction was in a sense a personal victory for Calvin, we must remember that, aside from the triumph of principle, he had no ends of his own to gain. If we are tempted for a moment to compare him with those other tyrants who, for instance in the Italian republics, raised themselves and their families to wealth and hereditary power by methods of which we are here reminded, such a comparison breaks down at the start. No such ambition for personal or family honors stains the memory of Calvin. He threw himself into this prosecution of Servetus with all his energy because he believed that upon its success depended the victory of truth over falsehood and right over wrong.

It cannot serve our purpose to go, ever so slightly, into the miserable detail of the proceedings. From the beginning it was made clear that the real crime of Servetus was that which the dominant church has always correctly described as heresy; i.e., the crime of choosing one's opinions for one's self instead of accepting them from any authority whatever. It was not merely the opinions themselves. Even so moderate a person as Melanchthon had admitted that the formulas of expression as to the divine nature contained much that was puzzling to the thoughtful mind. It was rather that attitude of the mind which the earliest church had instinctively expressed by the word from which we take our word "heresy"—the word "choice." He who dares to choose his belief must necessarily be wrong, and, as soon as the church had made its fatal alliance with the civil power, it inevitably took the next step and, attaching to the idea of free choice the further notion of moral depravity, invented the crime known as *haereticae pravitatis*. And this idea persisted. It is only the modern world that has come to recognize in honest heresy a title of honor. The leaders of the Reformation repudiated the charge with the utmost indignation, and, entering again into alliance with the civil powers, gained once more the means to shift the burden of theological freedom on to the shoulders of men who dared to go beyond the limits they themselves prescribed.

The case of Servetus was not the first in which the Genevan tribunals had vindicated the purity of their faith. In the previous six years there had been several notable instances of opposition to the dominant doctrine and discipline, and these had all so far been decided to the advantage of Calvin. Still, the hostility continued, and at the moment of the arrest of Servetus it seemed almost as if the strain were coming to be too great for his resources. It has been conjectured, with some show of reason, that Servetus was actually, though not openly, protected by these elements of the Genevan opposition—was, in short, made a tool for their purposes, and that to this fact is owing the prolongation of the trial and its apparent uncertainty. It would be strange indeed if considerations of this sort had not played their part in this as in other complications of Genevan politics; but it should not blind us to the real issue. What that issue was is clearly enough reflected in the replies of the other important churches of Switzerland to which Geneva referred the case for their opinion. Without a dissenting voice, the ministers of Zürich, Schaffhausen, Basel, and Bern, declared that the opinions of Servetus were contrary to the true faith, congratulated Geneva on having got him into its power, and expressed the hope that this pest of the Christian world would not be allowed further opportunity to corrupt the faithful with his horrid blasphemies. In no one of these replies is the punishment of death specifically mentioned, but the implication was enough. So far as the Protestant world was concerned, Calvin had nothing to fear. The Roman Catholic authorities at Vienne had sent a request that Servetus might be handed over to them; but Geneva replied that he could be properly attended to there.

It is evident to any one who reads the record of the court that the condemnation of Servetus was a foregone conclusion. His own attitude towards his judges was certainly not calculated to lessen the feeling of hostility. His confidence in himself and his open contempt of his accusers did not desert him for a moment. He was defiant to the last. It would be a satisfaction if one could make him rather more of an heroic figure; but it must be admitted that his account of himself was not always consistent and can in some places be shown to be incorrect. Calvin was

insistent for the sentence of death, but said what he could in favor of a merciful form of execution. Overcome for a moment by the announcement of his sentence, Servetus rallied at once and met his end with cheerful fortitude. With his last breath he called upon the name of Jesus, the Son of the eternal God.

Thus Genevan orthodoxy was vindicated. If Servetus had been willing to change the order of his last words and say "Jesus, the Eternal Son of God," he might, probably, have been set free. It was this which stamped him as the enemy of Christian truth, against whom every Christian man's hand ought to be raised in protest even to the point of his destruction. In reply to certain unofficial criticisms of his action Calvin wrote an extended refutation of the errors of Servetus, incorporating with this a defence of the principle of capital punishment for heresy. The essence of this defence is in its concluding paragraph. No sane man, he says, will deny that there are two good reasons for such punishment: first, if the man is so obstinate that he cannot be brought to reason by milder measures: second, if the content of his opinion is desperately vicious. Now in the case of Servetus both these reasons are combined. In other words, he was condemned for fidelity to his opinions and because those opinions seemed to the leaders of orthodox thought dangerous to the welfare of Christian society. It can hardly soften our judgment of Calvin that in this attack upon an enemy now beyond the reach of his assault, he should have chosen to employ the foulest and most insulting language in his choice vocabulary of abuse. That he acted throughout in what he believed to be the only right way there is as little doubt as there is that the execution of Servetus was a foul crime against the higher law of liberty which Calvin had himself followed in breaking away from the servitude of Rome. The spirit of persecution has never lacked arguments, and never will, whenever the fatal union of civil and religious power puts effective weapons into its hand.

THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGION

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It is generally agreed that religion is either the paramount issue or the most serious obstacle to progress. To its devotees religion is of overwhelming importance; to unbelievers it is, in the phrasing of Burke, "superstitious folly, enthusiastical nonsense, and holy tyranny." The difference between the friends and the enemies of religion may, I think, be resolved as follows. Religion recognizes some final arbitration of human destiny; it is a lively awareness of the fact that, while man proposes, it is only within certain narrow limits that he can dispose his own plans. His nicest adjustments and most ardent longings are overruled; he knows that until he can discount or conciliate that which commands his fortunes his condition is precarious and miserable. And through his eagerness to save himself he leaps to conclusions that are uncritical and premature. Irreligion, on the other hand, flourishes among those who are more snugly intrenched within the cities of man. It is a product of civilization. Comfortably housed as he is, and enjoying an artificial illumination behind drawn blinds, the irreligious man has the heart to criticize the hasty speculations and abject fear of those who stand without in the presence of the surrounding darkness. In other words, religion is perpetually on the exposed side of civilization, sensitive to the blasts that blow from the surrounding universe; while irreligion is in the lee of civilization, with enough remove from danger to foster a refined concern for logic and personal liberty. There is a sense, then, in which both religion and irreligion are to be justified. If religion is guilty of unreason, irreligion is guilty of apathy. For without doubt the situation of the individual man is broadly such as religion conceives it to be. There is nothing that he can build, nor any precaution that he can take, that weighs appreciably in the balance against the powers which decree good and ill fortune, catastrophe and tri-

umph, life and death. Hence to be without fear is the part of folly. Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.

Religion is man's recognition of the overruling control of his fortunes. It is neither metaphysical nor mythical, but urgently practical. Primeval chaos, Chronos the father of Zeus, and the long line of speculative Absolutes have no worshippers because they take no hand in man's affairs. They may be neglected with impunity. But not so the gods who send health and sickness, fertility and death, victory and defeat, or he who sits in judgment on the last day to determine the doom of eternity. Religion is the manifestation of supreme concern for life, an alertness to the remotest threat of danger and promise of hope. A certain momentousness attaches to all the affairs of religion, because everything is at stake. Its dealings are with the last court of appeal, in behalf of the most indispensable good.

In form, religion is a case of *belief*; that is, of settled conviction. There is no religion until some interpretation of life, some accommodation between man and God, has been so far accepted as to be unhesitatingly practised. The absurdity of doubt in matters of religion has been pointed in the well-known parody, "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul." The quality of religion lies not in the entertaining of a speculative hypothesis, but in an assurance so confident that its object is not only thought, but enacted. God is not God until his unquestioned existence is assimilated to life. Indeed, it is conceivable that an object thus made the basis of action should still remain theoretically doubtful. To Fontenelle is attributed the remark that he "did not believe in ghosts, but was afraid of them." This is a paradox until we distinguish theoretical and practical conviction; then it becomes not only credible, but commonplace. If one prays to God, it is not necessary for the purposes of religion that one should in Fontenelle's sense believe in him. But I prefer to use the term "*belief*" more strictly, to connote such assent as expresses itself, not in a deliberate judgment made conformable to one's intellectual conscience, but in fear, love, and purpose, in habitual imagery, in any attitude or activity that is spontaneous and that freely presupposes the object with which it deals.

By conceiving religion as belief we may understand not only

its air of certainty but also the variety of its forms and agencies. Belief sits at the centre of life and qualifies all its manifestations. Hence the futility of attempting to associate religion exclusively with any single function of man. The guises in which religious belief may appear are as multiform as human nature, and will vary with every shading of mood and temperament. Its central objects may be thought, imagined, or dealt with—in short, responded to in all the divers ways, internal and overt, that the powers and occasions of life define.

This will suffice, I trust, to lay the general topic of religion before us. I shall employ the terms and phrases which I have formulated as a working definition: Religion is belief on the part of individuals or communities concerning the final or overruling control of their interests. I propose from this point to keep in the forefront of the discussion the standards whereby religion is to be estimated, and approved or condemned. On what grounds may a religion be criticized? What would constitute the proof of an absolute religion? History is strewn with discredited religions; men began to quarrel over religion so soon as they had any; and it is customary for every religious devotee to believe jealously and exclusively. There can be no doubt, then, that religion is subject to justification; it remains to distinguish the tests which may with propriety be applied, and in particular to isolate and emphasize the moral test.

In the first place let me mention briefly a test which it is customary to apply, but which is not so much an estimate as it is a measure. I refer to the various respects in which an individual or community may be said to be *more* or *less* religious. Thus, for example, certain religious phenomena surpass others in acuteness or intensity. This is peculiarly true of the phenomena manifested in conversion and in revivals. In this respect the mysteries of the ancients exceeded their regular public worship. Individuals and communities vary in the degree to which they are capable of enthusiasm, excitement, or ecstasy.

Or a religion may be measured extensively. He whose religion is constant and uniform is more religious than he whose observance is confined to the Sabbath day, or he whose concern in the matter appears only in time of trouble or at the approach

of death. This test may best be summed up in terms of consistency. Religion may vary in the degree to which it pervades the various activities of life. That religion is confined and small which manifests itself only in words or public deeds or emotions exclusively. If it is to be effective it must be systematic, so thoroughly adopted as to be cumulative and progressive. It must engage every activity, qualify all thought and imagination, in short, infuse the whole of life with its saving grace.

It is clear, however, that a measure of religion does not constitute either proof or disproof. If a religion be good or true, or on like grounds accredited, then the more of it the better. But differences of degree appear in all religions. Indeed, the quantitative test has been most adequately met by forms of religion the warrant of which is generally held to be highly questionable. We may, therefore, dismiss this test without further consideration. The application of it must be based upon a prior and more fundamental justification.

There is one test of religion which has been universally applied by believers and critics alike, a test which, I think, will shortly appear to deserve precedence over all others. I refer to the test of truth. Every religion has been justified to its believers and recommended to unbelievers on grounds of evidence. It has been verified in its working, or attested by either observation, reflection, revelation, or authority.

In spite of the general assent which this proposition will doubtless command, it is deserving of special emphasis at the present time. Students of religion have latterly shifted attention from its claims to truth to its utility and subjective form. This pragmatic and psychological study of religion has created no little confusion of mind concerning its real meaning, and obscured that which is after all its essential claim—the claim, namely, to offer an illumination of life. Religious belief, like all belief, is reducible to judgments. These judgments are not, it is true, explicit and theoretically formulated; but they are none the less answerable to evidence from that context of experience to which they refer. It is true that the believer's assurance is not consciously rational, but it is none the less liable before the court of reason. Cardinal Newman fairly expressed the difference be-

tween the method of religion and the method of science when he said that "ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt," that "difficulty and doubt are incommensurate." Nevertheless, the difficulties are in each case germane; and the fact that every article of faith has its besetting doubt is proof that the thorough justification of faith requires the settlement of theoretical difficulties.

No religion can survive the demonstration of its untruth, for salvation, whether present or eternal, depends on processes actually operative in the environment. Religion must reveal the undeniable situation, and prepare man for it. It must charge the unbeliever with being guilty of folly, with deceiving himself through failing to see and take heed. Every religious propaganda is a cry of warning, putting men on their guard against invisible dangers; or a promise of succor, bringing glad tidings of great joy. And its prophecy is empty and trivial if the danger or the succor can be shown to be unreal. The one unfailing bias in life is the bias for disillusionment, springing from the organic instinct for that real environment to which, whether friendly or hostile, it must adapt itself. Every man knows in his heart that he cannot be saved through being deceived. Illusions cannot endure; and those who lightly perpetrate them are fortunate if they escape the resentment and swift vengeance which overtook the prophets of Baal.

The grounds of religious truth will require prolonged consideration; but before discussing them further let me first mention a test of religion which belongs to the class of psychological and pragmatic tests to which I have just alluded, but which has latterly assumed special prominence. Though realizing that I use a somewhat disparaging term, I suggest that we call this the therapeutic test. It has been proved that the state of piety possesses a direct curative value through its capacity to exhilarate or pacify, according to the needs of a disordered mind. As a potent form of suggestion, it lends itself to the uses of psychiatry; it may be medicinally employed as a tonic, stimulant, or sedative.

Now we can afford to remind ourselves that from the point of view of the patient this use of religion bears a striking resemblance to certain primitive practices in which God was conceived as a

glorified medicine-man, and the healing of the body strangely confused with spiritual regeneration. Bishop Gregory of Tours once addressed the following apostrophe to the worshipful St. Martin: "O unspeakable theriac! ineffable pigment! admirable antidote! celestial purgative! superior to all the skill of physicians, more fragrant than aromatic drugs, stronger than all ointments combined! thou cleanest the bowels as well as scammony, and the lungs as well as hyssop; thou cleanest the head as well as camomile!"¹

It is true that religion is in these days recommended for more subtle disorders; but even religious ecstasy may be virtually equivalent to a mere state of emotional exhilaration, or piety to a condition of mental and moral stupor. What does it profit a man to be content with his lot, or to experience the rapture of the saints, if he has lost his soul? The saving of a soul is a much more serious matter than the cessation of worry or the curing of insomnia, or even than the acquiring of a habit of delirious joy. Tranquillity and happiness are, it is true, the legitimate fruits of religion, but only provided they be infused with goodness and truth. If religion is to be a spiritual tonic, and not merely a physical tonic, it must be based on moral organization and intellectual enlightenment. I do not doubt that religion has in all times recommended itself to men mainly through its contributing to their lives a certain peculiar buoyancy and peace. There is such a generic value in religion, which cannot be attributed wholly to any of its component parts. But, like the intensity or extent of religion, this may manifest itself upon all levels of development. Sound piety, a tranquillity and happiness which mark the soul's real salvation, must be founded on truth, on an interpretation of life which expresses the fullest light. Again, then, we are referred to the test of truth for the fundamental justification of religion. There is a generic value which is deserving of the last word, but that word can be said only after a rigorous examination of the moral fundamental values from which it is derived.

Religious truth is divisible into two judgments, involved in every religious belief, and answerable respectively to ethical and

¹ Munro and Sellery, Mediaeval Civilization, p. 69.

cosmological evidence. Since religion is a belief concerning the overruling control of human interests, it involves on the one hand a summing up of these interests, a conception of what the believer has at stake, in short an ethical judgment; and on the other hand, an interpretation of the environment at large, in other words a cosmological judgment. Religion construes the practical situation in its totality; which means that it generalizes concerning the content of fortune, or the good, and the sources of fortune, or nature. Both factors are invariably present, and no religion can escape criticism on this twofold ground.

The ethical implications of religion are peculiarly far-reaching, since they determine not only its conception of man, but also in part its conception of God. This is due to the fact that the term God signifies not the environment in its inherent nature, but the environment in its bearing on the worshipper's interests. It follows that whether God be construed as favorable or hostile will depend upon the worshipper's conception of these interests. Thus, if worldly success or long life be regarded as the values most eagerly to be conserved, God must be feared as cruel or capricious; whereas, if the lesson of discipline and humility be conceived as the highest good, the providence of God may be trusted without any change in its manifestation.

Furthermore, as we shall shortly have occasion to remark, it is characteristic of religion to insist, so far as possible, upon the favorableness of the environment. But this favorableness must be construed in terms of what are held to be man's highest interests. Consequently, the disposition and motive of God always reflect human purposes. This is the main source of the inevitable anthropomorphism of religion.

Conceptions of nature, on the other hand, define the degree to which the environment is morally determined, and the unity or plurality of its causes. Animism, for example, reflects the general opinion that the causes of natural events are wilful rather than mechanical. Such an opinion obtained at the time when no sharp distinction was made between inorganic and organic phenomena, the action of the environment being conceived as a play of impulses.

Religion is corrected, then, by light obtained from these sources:

man's knowledge of his highest interests and his knowledge of nature. As a rule, one or the other of these two methods of criticism tends to predominate in accordance with the genius of the race or period. Thus the evolution of Greek religion is determined mainly by the development of science. Xenophanes attacks the religion of his times on the ground of its crude anthropomorphism. "Mortals," he says, "think that the gods are born as they are, and have perception like theirs, and voice and form." But this naïve opinion Xenophanes corrects because it is not consistent with the new enlightenment concerning the *ἀρχή*, or first principle of nature. "And he [God] abideth ever in the same place, moving not at all; nor doth it befit him to go about, now hither, now thither."²

In a later age Lucretius criticized the whole system of Greek religion in terms of the atomistic and mechanical cosmology of Epicurus:

For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things station themselves each in its right place guided by keen intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions each should assume, but because many in number and shifting about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has been formed.³

In the light of such principles Lucretius demonstrates the absurdity of hoping or fearing anything from a world beyond or a life to come. In this case, as in the case above, the religion of enlightenment does not differ essentially from the religion of the average man in its conception of the interests at stake, but only in its conception of the methods of worship or forms of imagery which it is reasonable to employ in view of the actual nature of the environment.

If on the other hand we turn to the early development of the Hebrew religion, we find that it is corrected to meet the demands not of cosmological, but of ethical enlightenment. No question arises as to the existence or power of God, but only as to what he

² Fragments of Xenophanes. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 115.

³ Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, i, 1021-28. Translation by Munro.

requires of those who serve him. The prophets represent the moral genius of the race, its acute discernment of the causes of social integrity or decay. "And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil: learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."⁴

But whichever of these two methods of criticism predominates, it is clear that they both draw upon bodies of truth which grow independently of religion. The history of Christianity affords a most remarkable record of the continual adjustment of religious belief to secular rationality. The offices of religion have availed no more to justify cruelty, intolerance, and bigotry than to establish the Ptolemaic astronomy or the scriptural account of creation. This is more readily admitted in the case of natural science than in the case of ethics, but only because teachers of religion have commonly had a more expert acquaintance with moral matters than with the orbits of the planets or the natural history of the earth.

For the principles of conduct, like the principles of nature, must be derived from a study of the field to which they are applied. They require nothing more for their establishment than the analysis and generalization of the moral situation. If two or more persons conduct themselves with reference to one another and to an external object, their action either possesses or lacks, in some degree, that specific value which we call moral goodness. And by the principles of ethics we mean the principles which truly define and explicate this value. Now neither the truth nor the falsity of any religion affects these fundamental and essential conditions. If the teachings of religion be accepted as true, then certain factors may be added to the concrete practical situation; but if so, these fall within the field of morality and must be submitted to ethical principles. Thus, if there be a God whose personality permits of reciprocal social relations with man, then man ought, in the moral sense, to be prudent with reference to him, and may reasonably demand justice or good-will at his hands.

⁴ Isaiah 1 15-17.

But the mere existence of a God, whatever be his nature, can neither invalidate nor establish the ethical principles of prudence, justice, and good-will. Were a God whose existence is proved to recommend injustice, this would not affect in the slightest degree the moral obligation to be just. Moral revelation stands upon precisely the same footing as revelation in the sphere of theoretical truth: its acceptance can be justified only through its being confirmed by experience or reason. In other words, it is the office of revelation to reveal truth, but not to establish it. In consequence of this fact it may even be necessary that man should redeem the truth in defiance of what he takes to be the disposition of God. Neither individual conscience nor the moral judgment of mankind can be superseded or modified save through a higher insight which these may themselves be brought to confirm. Whatever a man may think of God, if he continues to live in the midst of his fellows, he places himself within the jurisdiction of the laws which obtain there. Morality is the method of reconciling and fulfilling the interests of beings having the capacity to conduct themselves rationally, and ethics is the formulation of the general principles which underlie this method. The attempt to live rationally—and, humanly speaking, there is no alternative save the total abnegation of life—brings one within the jurisdiction of these principles, precisely as thinking brings one within the jurisdiction of the principles of logic, or as the moving of one's body brings one within the jurisdiction of the principles of mechanics.

Religion, then, mediates an enlightenment which it does not of itself originate. In religious belief the truth which is derived from a studious observation of nature and the cumulative experience of life is heightened and vivified. Like all belief, religion is conservative; and rightly so. But in the long run, steadily and inevitably, it responds to every forward step which man is enabled to take through the exercise of his natural cognitive powers. Only so does religion serve its real purpose of benefiting life by expanding its horizon and defining its course.

I have hitherto left out of account a certain stress or insistence that must now be recognized as fundamental in religious development. This I shall call the optimistic bias. This bias is not

accidental or arbitrary, but significant of the fact that religion, like morality, springs from the same motive as life itself, and makes towards the same goal of fruition and abundance. Life is essentially interest, and interest is essentially positive or provident; fear is incidental to hope, and hate to love. Man seeks to know the worst only in order that he may avoid or counterwork it in the furtherance of his interests. Religion is the result of man's search for support in the last extremity. This is true even when men are largely preoccupied with the mere struggle for existence. It appears more and more plainly as life becomes aggressive and is engaged in the constructive enterprise of civilization. Religion expresses man's highest hope of attainment, whether this be conceived as the efficacy of a fetish or the kingdom of God.

Such, then, are the general facts of religion and the fundamental critical principles which justify and define its development. Religion is man's belief in salvation, his confident appeal to the overruling control of his ultimate fortunes. The reconstruction of religious belief is made necessary whenever it fails to express the last verified truth, cosmological or ethical. The direction of religious development is thus a resultant of two forces: the optimistic bias, or the saving hope of life, and rational criticism, or the progressive revelation of the principles which define life and its environment.

I shall proceed now to the consideration of types of religion which illustrate this critical reconstruction. The types which I shall select represent certain forms of inadequacy which I think it important to distinguish. They are only roughly historical, as is necessarily the case, since all religions represent different types in the various stages of their development and in the different interpretations which are put on them in any given time by various classes of believers. I shall consider in turn, using the terms in a manner to be precisely indicated as we proceed, *superstition*, *tutelary religion*, and two forms of *philosophical religion*, the one *metaphysical idealism*, and the other *moral idealism*.

Superstition is distinguished by a lack of organization both in man and his environment. It is a direct cross-relationship between an elementary interest, passion, or need, and some isolated and capricious natural power. The deity is externally

related to the worshipper, having private interests of his own which the worshipper respects only from motives of prudence. Religious observance takes the form of barter or propitiation—*do ut des, do ut abeas*. The method of superstition is arbitrary, furthermore, in that it is defined only by the liking or aversion of an unprincipled agency.

Let us consider briefly the type of superstition which is associated with the most primitive stage in the development of society. The worshipper has neither raised nor answered the ethical question as to what is his greatest good. Indeed, he is much more concerned to meet the pressing needs of life than he is to co-ordinate them or understand to what they lead. He cannot even be said to be actuated by the principle of rational self-interest. Like the brute whose lot is similar to his own, he feels his wants severally, and is forced to meet them as they arise or be trampled under foot in the struggle for existence. There is little co-ordination of his interests beyond that which is provided for in the organic and social structure with which nature has endowed him. Over and above the instinct of self-preservation he recognizes in custom the principle of tribal or racial solidarity. But this is proof, not so much of a recognition of community of interest, as of the vagueness of his ideas concerning the boundaries of his own selfhood. The very fact that his interests are scattering and loosely knit prevents him from clearly distinguishing his own. He readily identifies himself not only with his body, but with his clothing, his habitation, and various trinkets which have been accidentally associated with his life. It is only natural that he should similarly identify himself with those other beings like himself with whom he is connected by the bonds of blood and of intimate contact. Morally, then, primitive man is an indefinite and incoherent aggregate of interests which have not yet assumed the form even of individual and community purpose.

To turn to the second, or cosmological, component, we find that primitive man's conception of ultimate powers is like his conception of his own interests in being both indefinite and incoherent. In consequence of the daily vicissitudes of his fortune, he is well aware that he is affected for better or for worse by agencies

which fall outside the more familiar routine operations of society and nature. So great is the disproportion between the calculable and the incalculable elements of his life that he is like a man crouching in the dark expecting a blow from any quarter. The agencies whose working can be discounted in advance form his secular world; but this world is narrow and meagre, and is overshadowed by a beyond which is both mysterious and terrible. Of the world beyond he has no single comprehensive idea, but he acknowledges it in his expectation of the injuries and benefits which he may at any time receive from it. It is an abyss whose depths he has never sounded, but which he is forced practically to recognize, since he is at the mercy of forces which emanate from it.

The method of primitive religion is the inevitable sequel. In behalf of the interests which represent him, man must here, as ever, make the best terms he can with the powers which beset him. He has no concern with these powers except the desire to propitiate them. He has no knowledge of their working excepting as respects their bearing upon his interests. Obeying a law of human nature which is as valid now as then, he seeks for remedies whose proof is the cure which they effect. Let the association between a certain action on his own part and a favorable turn in the tide of fortune once be established, and the subsequent course of events will seem to confirm it. Coincidences are remembered, and exceptions forgotten. Furthermore, there always remains, as the final justification for his belief in the effectual working of the established plan, the difficulty of proving any other alternative plan to be better.

But, in order to understand superstition, it is not necessary to reconstruct the earliest period in the history of society, nor even to study contemporary savage life; for the superstitious intelligence and the superstitious method survive in every stage of development. They appear, for example, in mediaeval Christianity; in Clovis's appeal to Christ on the battlefield, "Clotilda says that Thou art the Son of the living God, and that Thou dost give victory to those who put their trust in Thee. I have besought my gods, but they give me no aid. I see well that their strength is naught. I beseech Thee, and I will believe in Thee, only save

me from the hands of mine enemies." The same period is represented by the petition attributed to Saint Eloi, "Give, Lord, since we have given! *Da, Domine, quia dedimus!*"⁵ In modern life the motive of superstition pervades almost all worship, appearing in prayer for rain or the healing of the sick, and in sundry expectations of special favor to be gained by service or importunity.

The application of critical enlightenment to this type of religion has already been made with general consent. It is recognized that morally superstition represents the merely prudential level of life. It bespeaks a state of panic or a narrow regard for isolated needs and desires. Furthermore, it tends to emphasize these considerations and at the same time degrade the object of worship through claiming the attention of God in their behalf. The deity is conceived not under the form of a broad and consecutive purpose, but under the form of a casual and desultory good nature.

But superstition has been corrected mainly by the advancement of scientific knowledge. Science has pronounced finally against the belief in localized or isolated natural processes. Whether the mechanical theory be accepted or not, its method is beyond question in so far as it defines laws and brings all events and phenomena under their control. So far as nature is concerned, there can be no favoritism, no special dispensations, no bargaining over the counter.

The correction of superstition brings us to our second type, which I have chosen to call *tutelary religion*. It is distinguished by the fact that life is organized into a definite purpose, which, although still narrow and partisan with reference to humanity at large, nevertheless embraces and subordinates the manifold desires of a community. The deity represents this purpose in the cosmos at large, and rallies the forces of nature to its support. He is no longer capricious, but is possessed of a character defined by systematic devotion to an end. His ways are the ways of effectiveness. Furthermore, since his aims are identical with those of his worshippers, he is now loved and served for himself. It follows that he will demand of his followers only conformity to those rules which define the realization of the com-

⁵ Munro and Sellery, Mediaeval Civilization, pp. 80, 75.

mon aim, and that these rules will be enforced by the community as the conditions of its secular well-being. Ritual is no longer arbitrary, but is based on an enlightened knowledge of ways and means.

While this type of religion is clearly present in the most primitive tribal worship, it is best exemplified when a racial or national purpose manifests itself aggressively and self-consciously, as in the cases of ancient Assyria and Egypt. Here God is identified with the kingship, both being symbols of nationality. Among the Assyrians the national purpose was predominantly one of military aggrandizement. Istar communicates to Esarhaddon this promise of support: "Fear not, O Esarhaddon; the breath of inspiration which speaks to thee is spoken by me, and I conceal it not. . . . I am the mighty mistress, Istar of Arbela, who have put thine enemies to flight before thy feet. Where are the words which I speak unto thee, that thou hast not believed them? . . . I am Istar of Arbela; in front of thee and at thy side do I march. Fear not, thou art in the midst of those that can heal thee; I am in the midst of thy host."⁶

Egyptian nationality was identified rather with the principles of agriculture and political organization. The deity is the fertilizing Nile, or the judge of right conduct. There is recorded in the Book of the Dead the pleading of a soul before Osiris, in which the commands of the god are thus identified with the conditions of national welfare.

I have not committed fraud and evil against men.
I have not diverted justice in the judgment hall.
I have not known meanness.
I have not caused a man to do more than his day's work.
I have not caused a slave to be ill treated by his overseer.
I have not committed murder.
I have not spoiled the bread of offering in the temples.
I have not added to the weight of the balance.
I have not taken milk from the mouths of children.
I have not turned aside the water at the time of inundation.
I have not cut off an arm of the river in its course.⁷

⁶ Sayce, Babylonians and Assyrians, p. 253.

⁷ Wiedemann, Religion of the Ancient Egyptians, p. 250.

Similar illustrations might be drawn from the nationalistic phase of Hebraism. The same principle appears in mediaeval Christianity, and is thus embodied in the prologue of the Salic Law, "Long live the Christ who loves the Franks." In more recent times one might point to the Christianity of the Puritan revolution, not wholly misrepresented by the maxim popularly attributed to Cromwell, "Put your trust in God and keep your powder dry," or in Poor Richard's observation that "God helps them that help themselves."

Such is the religion of nationalism, sectarianism, of sustained but narrow purpose. I shall not attempt to formulate exhaustively the ideas through which this religion has been corrected. It is clear that its defect lies in its partisanship. All forms of partisanship yield slowly but inevitably to the higher conception of social solidarity. Such enlightenment reflects a recognition of community of interest, and a widening of sympathy through intercourse and acquaintance. Tutelary religion, in short, is corrected through the validity of the ethical principles of justice and good will. The cosmological correction of this type of religion is due to the same enlightenment that discredits superstition, a knowledge, namely, of a systematic unity of the cosmos. The laws of nature are as indifferent to private purposes as they are to private desires, and whether they be personal or social in their scope. Furthermore the universality of God is recognized in principle in the rules of worship. For a god of war or agriculture or politics cannot be privately appropriated. If the observance of the principles proper to these institutions brings success to one, it brings success to all. In short, a god of nationality must be a god of all nations.

The correction of tutelary religion brings us at length to a type which may be said to be formally enlightened. Both components of belief, the ethical and the cosmological, are universalized. I shall call this type, in its general form, *philosophical religion*, since it recognizes the unities which systematic reflection defines. It recognizes, on the one hand, the summing up of life in a universal ideal, and on the other hand, a summing up of the total environment in some scientifically formulated generalization. It affirms the priority of justice and good-will

over party interest, and the determination of the world without reference to special privilege. Religion is now the issue between the good—the highest good, the good of all—and the undivided cosmos.

Within the limits of philosophical religion thus broadly defined, there is yet provision for almost endless variety of belief. Religions may still differ in tradition, symbolism, and ritual. They may differ as moral codes and sentiments differ, and reflect all shades of opinion as this is determined by discovery and criticism.

But I propose to confine myself to a difference which is at once the most broad and fundamental, and the most clearly defined, in contemporary controversy. This difference relates to neither ethics nor cosmology exclusively, but to the religious judgment itself in which these two are united. How is the universe in its entirety to be construed with reference to the good? In both of the answers which I propose to consider it is claimed that goodness in some sense possesses the world. Hence both may be called *idealisms*. But in one of these answers, which I shall call *metaphysical idealism*, the cosmological motive receives the greater emphasis. The good is construed in terms of being; and, in order that it may be absolutely identified therewith, its original nature must, if necessary, be compromised. In the other, the ethical motive predominates. It is held that goodness must not lose its meaning, even if it be necessary that its claims upon the cosmos should be somewhat abated.

Metaphysical idealism is the extreme form of the optimistic bias. It provides a moral individual with a sense of proprietorship in the universe; it justifies him in the belief that the moral victory has been won from all eternity. Goodness is held to be the very essence and condition of being.

Let me briefly state the inherent difficulty in this philosophy of religion. Being is judged to be identical with good. But the world of experience is not good; it must therefore be condemned as unreal. Wherein, then, lies the goodness of being? If an empty formalism is to be avoided, the all-good and all-real must be restored to the world of experience. But, as the all-real it cannot consistently be identified with only a part of that world; and if it be identified with the whole, its all-goodness contradicts the moral

distinction between good and evil. The theory is now confronted with the opposite danger, that of materialism, or moral promiscuousness. Let me illustrate this full swing of the pendulum from formalism to materialism by briefly summarizing certain well-known types of religious philosophy.

At the formalistic extreme stands the Buddhistic pessimism, which rests on a recognition of the inevitable taint of this world, of the implication of evil in life. To avoid this taint, the all-real and all-good must be freed even from existence. It can be conceived and attained only by denial. Nirvana is at once the all-real, the all-good, and—in terms of the existent world—nothing.

Other-worldliness is the Christian modification of the Oriental philosophy of illusion. Heaven is a world beyond, to be exchanged for this. It is not constituted by the denial of this world, as is Nirvana, but access to it is conditioned by such denial. It is goodness and happiness hypostasized, and offered as compensation for martyrdom. But since every natural impulse and source of satisfaction must be repudiated, it remains a purely formal conception, except in so far as the worldly imagination unlawfully figures it. Rigorously construed, it consists only in obedience, a willing of God's will, whatever that may be.

Mysticism, which appears as a motive in all religions of this type, defines the all-real and all-good in terms of the consummation of a progression certain intermediate stages of which constitute man's present activities. In Brahmanism, God is the perfect unity, which may be approximated by dwelling on identities and ignoring differences; in Platonism, God is the good-for-all, which may be approximated by dwelling exclusively upon the utilities and fitnesses of things. The absolute world still remains beyond this world and excludes it, although a hint of its actual nature may now be obtained. But there at once appears a formidable difficulty. So long as the absolute world is wholly separated from this world, and therefore purely formal, evil need not be imputed to it; but at the moment when it is conceived by completing and perfecting certain processes belonging to this world, it is committed to these processes with all their implications, and tends to be usurped by them. In other words, heaven, in so far as it obtains meaning, grows worldly.

In the conception which may be termed *panlogism*, heaven is boldly removed to earth. It is identified with laws or other universals that lie within the scope of human intelligence and control the course of nature. God is now immanent rather than transcendent; he has obtained a certain definable content. But the difficulty which has already appeared in mysticism now grows more formidable. How can it be said that a being that coincides with the known laws of nature works only good? Among the Stoics the attempt was made to conceive all necessities as somehow "beneficial," as somehow good in the commonly accepted sense of the term.⁸ But even the Stoics found themselves compelled to abandon the common conception of goodness. And in Spinoza the motive of panlogism is clear and uncompromising. God as the immanent order of the world is good only in that he is necessary—good only in so far as he satisfies the logical interest and enables the mind to understand. In panlogism, then, we find metaphysical idealism already compelled in behalf of its cardinal principle to deny the moral consciousness. But this is not all. For, even were it to be admitted that mere system and order constitute the good wholly without reference to their bearing on the concerns of life, the fact remains that even such a good does not fairly represent the character of this world. For experience conveys not only law, but also irrelevance and chaos; not only harmony but also discord.

To meet this last difficulty, and at the same time better to provide for the complexity of human interests, metaphysical idealism finally assumes the aesthetic form. The absolute world, the all-real and all-good, is boldly construed in terms of the historical process itself, with all its concreteness and immediacy. Endless detail, contrast, and even contradiction may be brought under the form of aesthetic value. The very flux of experience, the very struggles and defeats of life, are not without their pictur-esque ness and dramatic quality. Upon this romantic love of tumult and privation is founded the last of all metaphysical idealisms. A strange sequel to the doctrine of despair with which our brief survey began!

⁸ Cf., e.g., Epictetus, *Discourses*, chap. 8.

I can only recapitulate most briefly the characteristic limitations of an aesthetic idealism. Firstly, in spite of the fact that aesthetic value may be extraordinarily comprehensive in its content, as a value it is none the less narrow and exclusive. For in order that experience may have aesthetic value, an aesthetic interest must be taken in it. And even were all experience to satisfy some such interest, this would in no wise provide for the endless variety of non-aesthetic interests that are also taken in it. Thus, were it to be proved that life on the whole is picturesque, this would in no way affect the fact that it is also painful, stultifying, and otherwise abounding in evil.

But, even if it were to be granted that aesthetic value embraces and subordinates all other values, this higher value would still exist only where such an aesthetic interest was actually fulfilled. If it were assumed that the totality of the world is pleasing in the sight of God, this would in no way affect the fact that it is otherwise in the eyes of men. Those who furnish a spectacle which has dramatic value for an observer do not themselves share in that value. It is an incontrovertible fact that even the aesthetic interests of men are actually defeated; and this whether or no some other aesthetic interest, that for example of a divine on-looker, is fulfilled.

But the radical defect of this aesthetic philosophy of religion lies in its absolute discrediting of moral distinctions. Optimism has so far overreached itself as to sacrifice the very meaning of goodness. In order that the ideal may possess the world, it has been reduced to the world. God is no more than a name for the unmitigated reality. Like Hardy's Spirit of the Years, he is the mere affirmation of things as they are:

I view, not urge; nor more than mark
What designate your titles Good and Ill.
'Tis not in me to feel with, or against,
These flesh-hinged mannikins Its hand upwinds
To click-clack off Its preadjusted laws;
But only through my centuries to behold
Their aspects, and their movements, and their mould.⁹

⁹ Hardy, *The Dynasts*, Part i, p. 5.

Morally, there could be no more sinister interpretation of life. It offers itself as a philosophy of hope, promising the lover of good that his purpose shall be fulfilled, nay, that it is fulfilled from all eternity. But when the pledge is redeemed, it is found to stipulate that the good shall mean only life as it is already possessed. In other words, man is promised what he wants if he will agree to want what he has. This is worse than a sorry jest. It is a philosophy of moral dissolution, discrediting every downright judgment of good and evil, removing the grounds upon which is based every single-minded endeavor to purify and consummate life. John Davidson says: "Irony integrates good and evil, the constituents of the universe. It is that Beyond-Good-and-Evil that somebody clamored for."¹⁰ Irony is indeed the last refuge of that uncompromising optimism that equates goodness and being.

But the bankruptcy of metaphysical idealism does not end the matter. There is another idealism in which religious faith both confirms moral endeavor and gives it the incentive of hope. This idealism establishes itself upon an unequivocal acceptance of moral truth. It calls good good and evil evil, with all the finality which attaches to the human experience of these things, leaving no room for compromise. Its faith lies in the expectation that the world shall become good through the elimination of evil; it manifests itself in the resolution to hasten that time. God is loved for the enemies he has made. Evil is hated without reservation as none of his doing, and man is free to reverence the Lord his God with all his heart.

From the standpoint of *moral idealism* the universe resumes something of its pristine ruggedness and grandeur. If, as James says, "the world appears as something more epic than dramatic," the dignity of life is enhanced and not diminished on that account.¹¹ Life is not a spiritual exercise the results of which are discounted in advance; but is actually creative, fashioning and perfecting a good that has never been. And the moment evil is conceived as the necessary but diminishing complement to partial success, the sting of it is gone. Evil as a temporary and accidental necessity is tolerable; but not so an evil which is

¹⁰ Davidson, *A Rosary*, p. 88.

¹¹ James, *Pragmatism*, p. 144.

absolutely necessary, and which must be construed with some hypothetical divine satisfaction.

This in no way contradicts the fact that the fullest life under present conditions involves contact with evil. Innocence must be tragic if it is not to be weak. Jesus without the cross would possess something of that quality of unreality which attaches to Aristotle's high-minded man. But this does not prove that life involves evil; it proves only that life will be narrow and complacent when it is out of touch with things as they are. Since evil is now real, he who altogether escapes it is ignorant and idle, taking no hand in the real work to be done. Not to feel pain when pain abounds, not to bear some share of the burden, is indeed cause for shame. In that remarkable allegory, "The Man who was Thursday," Chesterton has most vividly presented this truth. In the last confrontation, the real anarchist, the spokesman of Satan, accuses the friends of order of being happy, of having been protected from suffering. But the philosopher, who has hitherto been unable to understand the despair to which he and his companions have been driven, repels this slander.

"I see everything," he cried, "everything that there is. Why does each thing on the earth war against each other thing? Why does each small thing in the world have to fight against the world itself? . . . So that each thing that obeys law may have the glory and isolation of the anarchist. So that each man fighting for order may be as brave and good a man as the dynamiter. So that the real lie of Satan may be flung back in the face of this blasphemer, so that by tears and torture we may earn the right to say to this man, 'You lie!' No agonies can be too great to buy the right to say to this accuser, 'We also have suffered.'

"It is not true that we have never been broken. We have been broken upon the wheel. . . . We have descended into hell. We were complaining of unforgettable miseries even at the very moment when this man entered insolently to accuse us of happiness. I repel the slander; we have not been happy."¹²

But the charge of happiness is to be repelled as a slander only because there are real sufferers in the world to make the charge. It is after all not happiness but insensibility which is the real

¹² Chesterton, *The Man who was Thursday*, p. 278.

disgrace. If the suffering is real, not to see it, not to feel it, not to heal it, is intolerable. To say, however, that suffering is willfully caused in order that it may eventually contribute to an ultimate reconciliation, is to charge God with something worse than complacency. If life is a real tragedy, it can be endured, and to enter into it will bring the deep satisfaction which every form of heroism affords. But if the tragedy of life be preconceived and wilfully perpetrated, it must be resented for the sake of self-respect. Even man possesses a dignity which is not consistent with puppetry and mock heroics.

Moral idealism means to interpret life consistently with ethical, scientific, and metaphysical truth. It endeavors to justify the maximum of hope, without compromising or confusing any enlightened judgment of truth. In this it is, I think, not only consistent with the spirit of a liberal and rational age, but also with the primary motive of religion. There can be no religion with reservations, fearful of increasing light. No man can do the work of religion without an open and candid mind as well as an indomitable purpose.

I cannot here elaborate the evidence upon which moral idealism is grounded; but it might be broadly classified as ethical, cosmological, and historical. The ethical ground of moral idealism is the virtual unity of life, the working therein of one eventual purpose sustained by the good will of all moral beings. The cosmological proof lies in the moral fruitfulness and plasticity of nature. The historical proof lies in the fact of moral progress, in the advent and steady betterment of life.

In conclusion I wish to revert to the topic of the generic proof of religion. We have defined the tests which any special religion must meet, and unless conformably to such tests it is possible to justify some form of idealism, it is clear that the full possibilities of religion as a source of strength and consolation must fail to be realized. But it may now be affirmed that there is a moral value in religion which is independent of the cosmological considerations which prove or disprove a special religion. No scientific or metaphysical evidence can controvert the fact that man is engaged in an enterprise which comprehends all the actualities and possibilities of life, and that the success of this enterprise is con-

ditioned in the end on the compliance of the universe. A summing up of the situation as involving these two factors is morally inevitable. Some solution of the problem, assimilated and enacted, in other words, some form of piety, is no more than the last stage of moral growth.

The value of religious belief, in this generic moral sense, consists in the enlargement of the circle of life. Man knows the best and the worst. He walks in the open, apprehending the world in its full sweep and just proportions. An inclusive view of the universe, whatever it may reveal, throws into relief the lot of man. Religion promulgates the idea of life as a whole, and composes and proportions its activities with reference to their ultimate end. Religion advocates not the virtues in their severality, but the whole moral enterprise. With this it affiliates all the sundry activities of life, thus bringing both action and thought under the form of service of the ideal. At the same time it offers a supreme object for the passions, which are otherwise divided against themselves, or vented upon unworthy and fantastical objects. Through being thus economized and guided, these moving energies may be brought to support moral endeavor and bear it with them in their current.

Piety carries with it also that sense of high resolve without which life must be haunted with a sense of ignominy. This is the immediate value of the good will: the full deliverance of one's self to the cause of goodness. This value is independent of attainment. It is that *doing of one's best* which is the least that one can do. Having sped one's action with good will, one can only leave the outcome to the confluence and summing of like forces. But such service is blessed both in the eventualities and in a present harmony as well. The good of participation in the greatest and most worthy enterprise is proved in its lending fruitfulness, dignity, and momentousness to action; but also in its infusing the individual life with that ardor and tenderness which is called the love of humanity and of God, and which is the only form of happiness that fully measures up to the awakened moral consciousness.

Since religion emphasizes the unity of life and supplies it with meaning and dignity, it is the function of religion to kindle moral enthusiasm in society at large. Religion is responsible for the

prestige of morality. As an institution, it is the appointed guardian and medium of that supreme value which is hidden from the world; of that finality which, in the course of human affairs, is so easily lost to view and so infrequently proved. It is therefore the function of the religious leader to make men lovers, not of the parts, but of the whole of goodness. Embarrassed by their very plenitude of life, men require to have the good will that is in them aroused and put in control. This, then, is the work of religion: to strike home to the moral nature itself, and to induce in men a keener and more vivid realization of their latent preference for the higher over the lower values. This office requires for its fulfilment a constructive moral imagination, a power to arouse and direct the contagious emotions, and the use of the means of personality and ritual for the creation of a sweetening and uplifting environment.

In culture and religion human life is brought to the elevation which is proper to it. They are both forms of discipline through which is inculcated that spirit of magnanimity and service which is the mark of spiritual maturity. But while culture is essentially contemplative, far-seeing, sensitive, and tolerant, religion is more stirring and vital. Both are love of perfection, but culture is admiration; religion concern. "Not he that saith Lord, Lord, but he that doeth the will of his Father, shall be saved." In religion the old note of fear is always present. It is a perpetual watchfulness lest the work of life be undone, or lest a chance for the best be forfeited.

*THE EVANGELIZATION OF JAPAN VIEWED IN
ITS INTELLECTUAL ASPECT*

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When Protestant missionaries arrived in Japan with the religion of one God and the brotherhood of mankind, the native religions of Japan were in a deplorable condition. Buddhism had received such a fatal blow that there could be no hope of its revival. It was almost destroyed by the revolution of 1868. Many priests and monks had left their professions. Some became Shintoists; others became officers, soldiers, teachers, merchants, or artisans. Temples were deserted, and used for schools, offices, or barracks. Bells were converted into cannon. Sacred books were burned or sold as waste paper. Idols were standing neglected, partly stripped or broken—despised, mocked, and shunned. Compared with Buddhism, Confucianism was in a somewhat better state; but some of its progressive adherents, filled with admiration for western science, lost faith in the sacred books, and turned from the study of them to that of science. Those who still adhered to Confucianism were despised as conservative, bigoted, ignorant, and narrow-minded, unable to go forward in the advancing steps of the nation. At the time of the revolution Shintoism gained the ascendancy, and for a time was considered a state religion. The decree of the emperor was given in the name of the heavenly gods. "Return to your origin and be grateful to the beginning" was the motto of the loyal and patriotic. But among the preachers and adherents of this movement there were many who went to extremes, insisting that along with the power of the emperor everything else that was ancient should be restored. Some of these nationalists were narrow-minded, especially in their attitude toward foreigners. They insisted that the holy land of Japan should not be trodden down and defiled by unclean strangers. Meanwhile the tide of the revolution changed its course from restoration to progress, from exclusiveness to open-

mindedness. It began to flow directly against the principles of Shintoism then held by many. This decided its destiny. Shintoism met the same fate as Jewish Christianity in the first century of the Christian era. Thus Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism had been, one after another, submerged in the overwhelming tides of the revolution when Christianity appeared in the extra-territorial establishments of foreign residents.

Though the soil was thus ploughed and made ready for the seed, Christianity was not a religion to be at once welcomed by the people. It had failed three hundred years before to take root in Japan, and had lost the confidence of the people. It was at that time too extreme, too exclusive, and too intolerant of other faiths. Its Spanish adherents persecuted the people of other faiths at Nagasaki, and tortured them with cruel instruments which Japan had never known. No wonder that the tolerant and gentle-hearted Japanese hated Christianity as an enemy to gods and men! The government had also discovered the political intrigues of the Jesuits, and decided to expel them at once. From that time, for more than two hundred and fifty years, Christianity had been dreaded as the religion of devils. This was the religion in name, notwithstanding the radical change of its spirit and principle, which came again with the new civilization. Though the people were very enthusiastic to receive anything that was new, they hesitated to accept Christianity, because it seemed to them but the same evil in new form against which Japan had been compelled against her will to close her doors for almost three centuries. Missionaries patiently waited for the change of national sentiment and attempted gradually to introduce Christian truth. It was slow work; only patience could accomplish it.



Meanwhile western science and thought spread over all Japan with wonderful rapidity. Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws*, Mill's *Representative Government* and *Three Essays on Religion*, Bentham's *Legislation*, and Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason* were translated, and eagerly read by many people. Buckle's *History of Civilization* and Draper's *Conflict between Science and Religion* were also read. I need not say that Spencer's works were very popular. Some of the advocates

of western civilization thought it advisable to introduce Christianity also. Their moral and intellectual influence was considerable, and, as they were the leaders of new thought, their voices were regarded as prophetic. Two of them were already Christians. One was Dr. Nakamura, the greatest Chinese scholar of Japan, and the other was Viscount Mori, who became the minister of education. The latter was the first advocate of strict monogamy, and of the abolition of the *eta*, or outcast, class. The former translated Smiles's *Self-help* and *Character* and Mill's *Essay on Liberty*. As they advanced in thought, they came, however, to see, and to acknowledge without reserve, that there were many doctrines in Christian belief which could in no way be reconciled with the requirements of reason. Gradually their faith became cold, and finally died out, though their Christian character was retained. If they had become the champions of Protestant Christianity in Japan, their religious influence might have been tremendous. But, alas! this opportunity was missed. It pleased God that the burden of the task should be placed, not on the shoulders of older men, but on those of the younger generation that succeeded them.

While western thought was spreading speedily, only a small number of young men who were studying the English language and western science were affected by the Christian idea of ethics, religion, and science. Four things especially in Christianity impressed them deeply—the idea of one living God and his universe, the new life of freedom, the Christian idea of chastity, and the universal brotherhood of mankind. They were convinced that these truths should form the spiritual foundation of new Japan. They believed the gospel of Christ as it is clearly stated in the Sermon on the Mount, and received baptism, which was then a very bold step. Some became Christians at Yokohama, some at Kumamoto, some at Sapporo, some at Hirosaki and elsewhere—the majority led to the truth by foreign teachers both in Government and private schools. Almost all these young men were the sons of Samurai. They became earnest preachers of the Gospel and the founders of Christian churches in new Japan.

The task which they took upon themselves was a very hard one.

"Without were fightings and within were fears." They had to fight with the long-inherited prejudice of their fellow-countrymen against Christianity. Their battles were not alone with mortally wounded Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism, but with vigorous European infidelity also, which was already introduced and not to be easily defeated. They had fears within themselves. They must reconcile themselves to many hard Christian doctrines before they could preach—the infallibility of the Bible, the credibility of miracles, the partiality of divine government, the origin of evil, the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of two natures in one person, the doctrine of vicarious blood atonement, the plan of redemption, future retribution, and so forth. Missionaries, who inherited these doctrines from their ancestors without asking any questions, were surprised by the searching questions put to them by their pupils—questions which seemed to them strange and even impious. Sometimes they tried to suppress them as instigated by evil, but in vain. To the Japanese mind these traditional doctrines did not appear axiomatic, but questionable. Was it necessary to believe them equally with the truths of one living God and the new spiritual life of freedom, chastity, and the brotherhood of mankind?

Though oppressed by such doubts, these young men could not but preach. "Necessity is laid upon me; for woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel," was an inner feeling of compulsion that they could not suppress. By their zealous and pure lives they led many to Christ, although they could not satisfactorily answer the difficult questions put to them. Churches were founded here and there—the light of the nation. Christian work went on prosperously for fifteen years, from 1872, in which the first church was founded at Yokohama, to 1888, the year of Viscount Mori's assassination. Outside of Christian circles there were also some tendencies that helped the spread of the new religion. The Europeanization of Japan was the far-reaching demand of intelligent men, to which not a few listened with approval. Many understood that this demand included Christianization also, and thus it helped considerably the spread of Christianity. This period was the bright morning of Protestant missions in Japan.

The period of spontaneous faith passed, and that of reason ensued. While Christianity was being propagated, the scientific doctrine of evolution was spreading; Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man* were eagerly read by many educated people. From the first, Christian missionaries taught the Copernican theory of the universe, which conflicted with the astronomical theories of Buddhism and Confucianism. They were thus esteemed as heralds of new knowledge, and Christianity was regarded as a patron of science and philosophy. But it was soon discovered that the missionaries were very conservative in regard to the doctrine of evolution. Some branded it openly as a false philosophy, the wisdom of this world that soon passes away. On the other hand, scientists began to attack Christianity as a religion of the ignorant and backward, which could not keep abreast of science; it had done its appointed work and bequeathed its task to science, its rightful successor. Foreign missionaries and native scientists could not be reconciled to each other. The stories of creation in Genesis could not be accounted for in the light of science. The infallibility of the Bible could not be maintained beside the scientific doctrine of evolution. Some tried to affirm that the Bible is inspired only so far as the ethical and religious truths were concerned, but this was considered a lame solution. As the young Christians of scientific culture grew in religious experience and thought, they found out more and more fully the irreconcilable contradiction between modern culture and some of the Christian doctrines. They prayed earnestly, and sometimes even expostulated before God. That we cannot have both faith and knowledge was the conclusion of some earnestly pious minds. The Japanese already felt the power of the living God in the innermost depth of their hearts, in spite of disturbing doubt concerning some Christian doctrines. It was thus impossible for them to forsake their faith and follow after science; although it must be frankly stated that some, whose religious experience was not sufficiently deep, failed to maintain their religious life with some of their beliefs thus contradicted and plainly demonstrated to be absurd. A still greater and harder trial awaited them.

Intelligent Christians found out not only the contradictions

between science and Christianity, but the inner contradiction between Christian experience and doctrine. For instance, they were taught that God is supramundane, dwelling in the highest heaven, yet coming down at times to intervene in the actions of men. They were taught also that he is the creator of heaven and earth, the first cause of all things, and that he had appeared at sundry times to reveal his will to his chosen people. On the other hand, they experienced in themselves the reality of the Holy Spirit, who is ever present in the Christian consciousness as the comforter and the teacher of all truth. They were taught also that the Holy Spirit is God. The idea of God as the first cause might please their intellect, but could not satisfy the requirement of their religious consciousness, which demands the immediate presence of God within as well as above. "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God," is the longing cry of the pious soul of Japan. If the Holy Spirit be God himself, Christian experience testifies that men have God in themselves. "Having God in us," they questioned, "must we go to the records of the ancients to know the truth?" Is the age of revelation passed? Must revealed truth be stereotyped in books, and handed down to generations that have no knowledge of God in themselves? Has he not rather been revealing his truth to his sons and daughters in an ever better way as mankind has advanced in its capacity of understanding? They were not only taught that God is a gracious father, who gives bountifully a spirit of sonship that cries after God, "Abba, Father," but they experienced in themselves a heart yearning after God, and were convinced that God is really their Father, ever near them, forgiving their sins, and receiving and caressing them in his loving arms.

What did it mean, again, that one should die to appease the divine wrath? "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life"—this is the voice of the deepest Christian experience. Is it not a contradiction to offer a human or divine sacrifice to propitiate such a loving father? Is not this doctrine a contradictory combination of the Jewish idea of God according to law and the Christian idea of God according to

love? God lives in us and we live in him through the same spiritual essence that exists in God and man. Is it necessary that such an intermediate being as the angel Gabriel should come down and intercede between them? If God is the father of mankind, does he not make his sun of righteousness rise on Mohammedans and Jews, and send his rain of grace on Christians and Buddhists? Are not all religions the revelations of one eternal, omnipresent God, the father of all, who is over all, through all, and in all? If the patriarchs, prophets, and saints of Israel are in heaven, why not the sages, wise men, philosophers, and saints of all the world? Not that there is no distinction between Christianity and other religions. As the revelations of the old dispensation were not equal to the new, so all revelations are not of the same kind and degree. One form of Christianity is superior to another, according to the law of evolution. But there is no doubt that the highest, clearest, and richest will supersede all. God has been educating mankind from the beginning even until now. The great Apostle of the Gentiles taught that there are many stages of belief; so that it is not necessary to follow all the details of revelation, either in the old or in the new dispensation. Paul plainly expressed his own experience when he said: "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child; now that I am become a man, I put away childish things. For now we see in a mirror darkly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then shall I know fully even as also I was fully known."

These thoughts, questions, doubts, upset the minds of the young ministers of Japan. They felt that they must solve these problems themselves. Collision between the missionaries and the thinking native ministers was inevitable. The former were very solicitous for the latter, as an aged father for his young and enterprising son. Misunderstandings and ill feelings alienated the two parties. For a time they could not work harmoniously as before. It was a sad situation. German missionaries, the representatives of the liberal school, arrived; American Unitarian missionaries also came in the early part of this critical period. Though the liberals did not succeed in organizing strong churches, they diffused their liberal thought. It was at first

controverted by native ministers, but at last captivated them. Not a few bright young scholars of the Congregational faith went over to liberalism and became an intermediate link between liberal Christianity and Congregationalism in Japan.

One more difficulty had to be overcome. Ever since the introduction of western science and civilization Japan had been surprised and blinded by the dazzling light of the intellectual attainment of the western nations. She lost her self-consciousness in admiration and her self-respect in blindly following their footsteps. But when some of the Japanese patriots found out how conscious the western nations are of their own powers and proud of their own things and ways, the conviction flashed upon their minds that without self-consciousness and national pride a nation cannot maintain her dignity and make her people patriotic, energetic, and virtuous. Thus they brought Japan to reflect about herself, and to inquire what good and valuable things she had of her own; she began to be conscious of her own nationality; she found out that she had not a few valuable possessions. She perceived that she must be independent, dignified, and follow her own ways. To do otherwise would be unpatriotic and dishonorable to herself. Thus came a reactionary feeling against the Europeanization of Japan. The people began again to set up their native religions against Christianity, which they stigmatized as a foreign religion. The national feeling awakened; Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism began to revive and to resume their former glory. Viscount Mori was assassinated for innovation and sacrilege. Count Okuma was struck down because his treaty revision was supposed to bring dishonor to the nation. Reactionary feeling became intense. Just at this time the imperial edict on education was issued. It was interpreted by many as the voice of the Japanese nation, maintaining itself against Christianity and stigmatizing it as a foreign innovation.

This national consciousness did not fail to affect the Christians. Some Japanese ministers, conscious of their own peculiar experiences, began to emphasize what was national and unique in their religious experience, protesting that a true Christian may be a true citizen, not only of the British Empire or the American Republic, but of Japan also, and interpreting the national spirit

in a broader way and with a deeper meaning. They endeavored to set up what is called the Christianity of Japan; that is, a Christianity founded on, or interpreted by, the peculiar religious consciousness of the Japanese. As Latin Christianity differs from Greek, and both from Teutonic, Christianity, so there may well be an Oriental or Japanese Christianity. This religious spirit, reflecting the national spirit, stood up and bravely fought against jingoism, as hard steel against a blunt sword. Yet it appeared to some not a development of the teachings of the missionaries, but a rebellion against them. While some thought it a degeneration, many prized it as their own glorious production. The so-called Christianity of Japan—let it be said—is as yet nothing but a germ. Whether it will grow and attain to its own ideal life is for the future to reveal.

One more important fact is to be noted, as a result of the blended spirit of Congregationalism and nationalism. The American Board of Missions emphasized the self-supporting principle. It was welcomed by the Japanese. The poor and inexperienced young Christians endeavored to organize self-supporting churches under the auspices of their foreign teachers. But, when they became more resolute to follow their own ways and govern themselves, they tried to be entirely independent of the influence of the missionaries. While the missionaries were petting them as small, clever boys, they ventured to take the responsibility of entire self-management upon themselves. Those who bring up strong boys will endure harder experiences than others. Such was the experience of the missionaries of the American Board in Japan during this critical period.

The discipline of the young Christians in Japan was indeed a severe one. But through this divine ordeal the churches were purified, strengthened, and prepared for a greater and more important task. During these internal and external struggles, two important events favorable for Christianity occurred in Japan. The constitution was promulgated in 1889; and freedom of faith was declared. Hitherto the spread of Christianity was winked at. After the promulgation of the constitution no one could say publicly that Christianity was a prohibited religion. This was no small gain.

The great Chino-Japanese war took place in 1894. Some imagined that, if the Japanese were victorious, they would be puffed up with vanity, arrogance, and self-conceit, and hold the religion of Christ in contempt. In this they were mistaken. The war broadened the minds of the people. Their political and commercial activity became wider than before. With the growth of the national consciousness, the nation felt a greater responsibility. Victory made Japan humble, and conscious of her want of moral power. Professors of the Imperial University were convinced of the lack of the spiritual element in their instruction, and tried to find a warrant for it in the Imperial Edict on education. Shintoism was consulted as a guide at hand. The Shintoists and their ardent pupils boldly emphasized the national spirit exemplified in Shintoism, and vehemently attacked both Buddhism and Christianity as aliens. Apparently they were about to triumph; but in reality they were behind the time. The national spirit expanded on a larger scale than they had supposed. The spirit of Shintoism was too narrow, and not adequate to the enlarged national sympathy. Shintoism was forever doomed because the nation had outlived it, whereas Buddhism, with its universal law and transcendental idea, rose again, as it were, from the dead, claiming to be a sister religion of Christianity.

Buddhism no longer treats Christianity as its enemy, but looks complacently on its progress. With its optimistic faith, it has begun a new career, endeavoring to be the most comprehensive religion of the world ever produced. It tries to include Christianity as an important branch of itself, and regards Jesus as a Buddha. It has taken up Christian chastity, temperance, philanthropic work, prison improvement, Sunday-schools, young men's associations, translation of the sacred books into Japanese colloquial language, and so forth. Buddhism endeavors to keep abreast with Christianity. Whereas the latter is emphasizing the doctrine of divine immanence, the former emphasizes that of divine personality. The terms Buddha and God are now interchangeably used. The ideas of the Christian religion and ethics have been rapidly spreading, whether in the name of Christianity or in the name of Buddhism.

The period of these internal and external struggles lasted for eleven years, and ended with the close of the nineteenth century. During these eleven years Christians did not greatly increase. The number who fell away equalled the number received. Many intelligent men thought that Protestantism also had failed, as Catholicism seemed to have failed three hundred years ago. Perhaps Christianity was by its very nature ill-adapted to the Japanese. This judgment was erroneous. Christianity was not deteriorating during the years of its internal struggles, but undergoing a metamorphosis. "Life is conflict," says a great German philosopher. Christianity has often experienced just such severe trials as it did in Japan. Internal struggles have not always been detrimental to Christianity. Rather the fountain of Christian experience has become deeper and purer through them. Christianity recovered its strength, and was ready to spread anew with the commencement of the new century. Christians were no longer babes. Churches had become mature enough to carry out their self-governing policy.

Man cannot live by bread alone, much less by the husks that swine eat. Young men, especially students, began to yearn after spiritual food. For thirty years religion had been despised as a thing for the ignorant. The older men had had some sort of spiritual education in their youth, through the influence of Confucian teachings, but the younger generation had received none. Their minds were filled with the dry knowledge of western science and nothing more. They felt intensely in their hearts the lack of spiritual culture. They hungered after righteousness—not dead theories of ethics, but the living personality that touches the innermost heart. One of our brilliant scholars, who received the complete education of Japan, from the lowest grade of the common school to the highest grade of the Imperial University, cried out in pathetic tones, "Whereas I asked for bread, my teachers gave me a stone; I sought after a fish, but they gave me a serpent; I longed for eggs, but they gave me scorpions." Hundreds and thousands of students sympathized with this heart-rending cry. Carlyle, Tennyson, Wordsworth, Goethe, Schiller, Browning, Tolstoi, Byron, Milton, even Dante and Spinoza, were consulted to show the way of life. Longing after spiritual food

has never been so intense in Japan as during the last ten years. Some have tried to find the way of life in Confucianism; some have turned to Buddhism; and some have come to Christianity.

Yomei Gaku, the most spiritual school of Confucianism, has been resorted to by many. It teaches the essential spirituality of human nature. To be conscious of that is the beginning of knowledge. True knowledge realizes itself in conduct, and makes man essentially free and noble. Some Christian ministers, even, oppressed and annoyed by the complicated reasonings of systematic theology, have consulted this school and received much benefit.

Buddhism in its old form cannot meet this new longing. Only its newer types, reading the longing on the faces of their fellow-students, try to fulfil their need. There are two schools of the new Buddhism: one is something like Unitarianism, while the other is pious and practical like Methodism. Buddhistic Unitarianism is extremely rational, critical, and destructive. Its aim is to save the people from old superstitions and errors. It is not cold and indifferent, but zealous to fulfil its task. It has, however, very little of the religious element. The pious type of Buddhism emphasizes religious experience, the principal manifestations of which are peace, joy, comfort, and hope, the fruits of faith in one eternal merciful Buddha, who saves all sinners, giving himself for them. It holds the total depravity of human nature; that man is radically sinful, and has no capacity in himself to get rid of sin and guilt; only the gracious hand of all-merciful Amida can save mankind from its utter depravity. Beside these bodies, one more sect is becoming popular. It is that of Zen-shu, which teaches the essential spirituality of human nature and the vanity of the material world. Its first effort is to get a clear consciousness of Buddha, who lives in every soul on earth. There are many steps through which human souls must pass in order to enter Nirvana or to obtain Buddhahood, the perfect salvation of the soul. Thus two opposite doctrines, the total depravity of human nature and its essential spirituality, are proposed in the name of Buddhism, for the salvation of the people. Those of a weaker type prefer the former, while those of stronger mental constitution adopt the latter. Their ways are antipodal, but

their common goal is Buddhahood. One emphasizes the salvation of the soul by its own power; the other, salvation only through the power of another. These forms of Buddhism are now gaining strength and influence. It is a great and interesting problem whether they will prove able to accomplish the reform of Buddhism which they desire. They are very friendly to Christianity and Christians.

Meanwhile Christianity has recovered its former vigor, and again begun to spread. The atmosphere and soil have become more favorable to its propagation than before. The inherited prejudice has almost passed away. Students, both male and female, frequent in crowds the preaching of certain special pulpits. They do not come to hear something to satisfy their curiosity; they are earnestly seeking the bread of life. Not a few receive baptism. But Christianity is not yet readily received by educated men, and the uneducated still cling to their ancestral faith. New doubts have begun to trouble inquiring minds. What is Christianity? It is rather a new question. In former times the people were taught, and sincerely believed, that Christianity is the religion of devils. Such an absurd interpretation has been forever buried by the peaceful lives of the missionaries. What, then, is Christianity? Educated Japanese answer: It is the religion taught by most of the Protestant missionaries in the last forty years—that the world was created in six days through periodical divine interventions, and that man was formed from the dust of the earth by the divine hand; that God was existent as the Holy Trinity before the creation; that death entered into the world through the sin of Adam, the ancestor of all mankind; that one of the three persons in the Godhead came down from heaven to save mankind from eternal death, was incarnated in the Virgin Mary, performed many miracles, died on the cross to propitiate a wrathful God, was buried, and rose again bodily from the grave on the third day; that God lives somewhere in heaven, surrounded by angels and archangels, but sometimes comes down to earth to amend his work by supernatural operations; that Christ will come on the clouds of heaven to judge the world and separate the righteous from the wicked—and so forth. We once tried, they say, to believe this teaching, but could

not. The God of Christians is a creation of their own imagination. Christians are good men, doing good works, encouraging temperance and philanthropy, but their doctrines are unreasonable and contradictory to science. Christianity is a relic of the past; it does not deserve the faith of students.

If there be some who insist that the essence of Christianity is not creeds, notions, opinions, and theologies, but life and spirit, manifested in the ethico-religious consciousness of its founder and his followers, Japanese scholars declare that this is not genuine Christianity. Some conservative Christian ministers, also, assert that whatever is stated in the form of the new theology is not genuine Christianity; it preserves merely the name, stripped of its essential contents and doctrines. Japanese scholars are pleased to have this confirmation of their own contention, and turn it to prove the absurdity and worthlessness of Christianity.

There is one more obstacle to the progress of Christianity. Some Christians—though they are a very small number—are socialists or friends of extreme socialists. They condemn war absolutely, insisting that nationality is itself an evil. Some are anarchists. Hence many are suspicious of Christianity, imagining that it is the seed of socialism and anarchism, and urge strongly that it must not be allowed to spread among soldiers.

The experience of the great apostle of the Gentiles is still a reality—"Without were fightings, within were fears." But the God of Christ and his apostles has been ever present with the missionaries and the Christians of Japan, to will and to work in them for the furtherance of the eternal living gospel, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of mankind. Christianity has succeeded at many points. The people have recognized the truth taught in the Sermon on the Mount—the fatherhood of God, the inner righteousness of spiritual disposition, the worth of the individual soul, chastity, monogamy as the basis of the family, and the brotherhood of man. None, whether they be Buddhists, Shintoists, or Confucianists, can gainsay these teachings; rather they now endeavor to realize them in their life and conduct. The Japanese long for whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things

are of good repute; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, they think on these things. The essence of Christianity as recently expounded by eminent scholars will be appreciated and gladly believed by many in Japan if demonstrated to be true Christianity. But it is doubtful if the traditional creeds and theologies will take root in the religious soil of Japan. Have they not been troubling many western Christians, presenting obstacles to the faith of philosophers and scientists? If that be the case in the West, why not also in the East? Japan longs after the essence and kernel, not the formal shell of Christianity.

The Japanese-Russian war did much to rouse the people from their spiritual torpor. Soldiers and officers, even the emperor himself, attribute the great victory to the unseen hand of Providence. The people have become more religious, and are ready to hear religious truth. The higher schools are open to religious teaching. Men of strong personality are invited by the school authorities to address the students, whether they be Christian ministers or not. People come in crowds to hear the addresses of eminent pastors and laymen. Last year the Congregational churches alone received over two thousand and three hundred new members. Business men are now beginning to realize that men who have genuine religious faith are more reliable than the unbelieving or superstitious. Some propose that the business principles of Japan be conformed to European standards. To accomplish this object, it is recognized that Christian principles should be inculcated in the minds of young business men. For a long time the business class was despised. Bushido, the virtue of Japan, was not taught as ethics for this class. Business men were left alone in their low morality and superstition. But they have just begun to see new light. As they come more and more in contact with the intellectual and moral civilization of the Anglo-Saxons through their business transactions, their eyes are opened to recognize the new principles on which their own business organization must be founded. Christianity has already taken root in the intellectual circles of Japan. If it succeeds also in taking root in the business world, it will triumph, and become the strongest moral power in Japan. Morality cannot be kindled except

by the intense heat of religious fire. Bushido, the virtue and glory of Japan, cannot be deeply inculcated in the minds of the people without the powerful aid of religion. Any authority that can sanctify virtue, any power that can nourish moral strength, will win the glorious leadership of Japan. Is not Christianity the power by which the eternal ideal is to be realized in man?

TRUTH AND IMMORTALITY

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One everywhere finds people who have given up the hope of immortality or else regard it with extreme doubt. Forms of belief with which it has been associated have proved unthinkable to them. Worse yet, to hope for immortality seems not to be loyal to truth. "We want reality," they say. "We propose to face the facts; we demand honest thinking. We have no use for dreams, however pleasant; we wish only truth." Mr. Huxley's famous letter to his friend Charles Kingsley expresses this attitude. Here is a man who, in the greatest of sorrows, feels obliged to put away comfort and hope in obedience to the demand of truth. It is not possible to divide his mind into exclusive compartments, and to indulge an ancient religious emotion on one side of himself, while on the other side he remains the conscientious student of science. He must keep his integrity at any cost to his feelings. No one can help admiring this type of mind. A multitude of people who have nothing like Mr. Huxley's rigor of conscience are immensely moved by the attitude of such men as he. If he could see no truth in immortality and had to remain an agnostic about it, why should we not be agnostics also?

I believe that Mr. Huxley was right in his insistence upon truth and conscience. I believe also that he was mistaken as to the relation between truth and the hope of immortality. I shall try to show in this paper that the hope of immortality, so far from being excluded from the realm of truth and reality, is involved in the essential structure of this realm. I shall have occasion to point out considerations to which I see no evidence that Mr. Huxley (and I use his name as the type of a considerable class) ever paid attention. The fact is, that the thinking men of the last century suffered an immense reaction in the tide of

the new thoughts that came in with the scientific period of development. The first net impression was the sense of a loss of the fabric of ancient traditions and religions. It was not easy immediately to adjust's one's eyes to the new light and to estimate what kind of a universe had been brought to view. I cannot doubt that if such minds as Mr. Huxley had only gone on to urge their splendid courage and loyalty a few steps further, they would have come to the same constructive conclusions which their somewhat cautious negative work has vastly helped us of a later generation to reach.

Let us, however, put aside the subject of immortality for a while, and first ask the straight question: What is truth? Or, what constitutes reality? As with most ultimate questions, this is not easy precisely to say. The ultimate things appear always to be larger than our definitions. In a general and quite undogmatic sense we may say that truth is that which fits into its place or order. The untrue is that which does not fit, or match. We are using here a parable taken from outward things, but our thinking is none the worse because it falls into this form of illustration. Does not all thinking proceed by figures and symbols?

We make a simple statement: The earth is round. This is true, so far as the description "round" fits the shape of the earth. We know that it is not exactly true. Why is it not quite true? Because we have an idea of perfect roundness into which the earth, as it is, does not fit. We describe an occurrence, an accident perhaps, which we have witnessed. Our account may possibly express our view of the facts. Yet we can almost never make our description tell the exact story of what happened. Our senses are imperfect instruments of observation; our memories may play us false; our language is only a makeshift, and never quite conveys even our imperfect impressions of an event. Neither do our words—a system of makeshift symbols—always mean the same thing to another as they mean to us. No two pairs of eyes perhaps witness exactly the same occurrence. The question already begins to arise: Why, since the truth is so elusive, should we be so strenuous to insist upon it?

Our idea of reality is involved with our notion of truth. We

hold that, behind impressions and sensations and the words that describe our feelings about things, there is some substance (call it matter or spirit as you please) which, so far as our description of it is exact, corresponds to, or matches with, the description. We do not pretend that we know or can know this substance, as it is, but we think or assume that we know it at least in the form of its relations to us, and that its relations, as we discover them, translate the reality on the whole fairly well, as if by picture language, for all practical purposes.

We assume, too, or surmise (may we dare to say that we know?) that everything in this realm of reality that lies just behind all phenomena is related or matched together with everything else. To know the truth would be to know how things fit or are related together. To know all about a grain of sand would thus be to know all about the world. At any rate the phenomena—the picture language with which our minds are impressed through our eyes and ears and nerves of sense—come to us in the most elaborate network of relations, sometimes of mere juxtaposition, sometimes in relations of what we call cause and effect, always in a certain succession in time, always also suggestive of a unity, or order, or harmony, to which, if we knew enough, all would be found to belong. In other words, we surmise that truth, if we could get at it, would be the complete description of the order and unity of the world in and through all its parts and its motions.

We are now sailing audaciously over great depths in thought. If any one cares to object and question: How dare you surmise and assume so much? How dare you speak of fitnesses and order and relations of unity? we have to reply that we cannot help making these bold assumptions if we are going to think at all, or to investigate, or even to live sanely. Our interest and impulse to observe, and still more to try to order our observations into the form of science, spring from our conviction, or faith, that there is order and significance and unity to be discovered—in other words, that this is not chaos in which we live, but a universe. This is a faith; it certainly is not "solid fact" or knowledge. But the very idea of truth is bound up with the faith. If there were no reality corresponding to our view of

things, if things did not fit together so as to spell out into intelligible meanings, if the net impression of the world was only an ash-heap and not a universe, what possible sense would there be in urging the necessity of truth? Truth is a postulate of faith, albeit an intellectual and not a supernatural kind of faith.

We know more about our own minds than we know of anything outside of us. Our minds impose certain forms of thinking upon us. Our minds instinctively work on the lines of order. They tend to expect relations of fitness and harmony. They are prompted by all kinds of stimuli to set up standards and ideals. They act under certain universal categories to inquire, Where? When? Why? To use a figure of speech, we may say that they behave like a kaleidoscope, which, turn it as you will, imposes color and order on the material within it. So it is the nature of intelligence to reflect everything which falls upon its mirror in forms of order. The mind seems to be made to construct, that is, to fit its material together, as a poet or architect does. The intelligence looks for and expects significance and unity. Even before it gets demonstration, it tends to proceed on its faith that its world is reasonable, or, at least, that there is a standard of reason and fitness into which, if things do not match, they are futile. Yes. Even when the doubting mind in its pessimist mood pronounces the world an illusion, or when the agnostic mind halts in doubt whether the universe means anything to man beyond his burial-ground, this very pronouncement of desperation proceeds on the marvellous conception of a possible world of order and beauty with which, as a standard, the actual world is tried and found wanting.

Thus the most negative "truth" gets its meaning out of the depths of an intelligence that cannot help thinking in terms of reason and unity. Why tell the dismal truth, some one asks, that all things are vanity? Because the mind conceives the idea of a real world which puts a vain world to shame. It is the faith in at least the possibility of a real world that gives character to criticism, blasphemy, and denial.

What we call "reality," at every point, when we try to approach it, proves to be beyond anything that we distinctly

know or can define. Our thought of it arises, indeed, out of the region of our senses and by the aid of our instruments of research. It begins with "solid facts" (which are not solid at all, but merely our consciousness of relations in phenomena) and passes over at once into a realm, absolutely necessary to our thinking and living, and yet always beyond the touch of our senses. We have so many things, *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., given us as our working material, and presently we find *x*, *y*, *z*, into which the simple deliverances of our senses have been irresistibly transformed. The realm of what we call known values in things is not so real or necessary to us as is this realm of thoughts, of order, of fitnesses and unity, with which alone truth is concerned. Truth is thus always *a* + *x* or *b* + *z*; that is, the thing we get by our senses plus what our minds make of it by the act of the faith of reason, in trying to fit it as well as we can into a place in our realm of reality.

See how true this is in the very beginnings of our thought of the visible world. We call a stone hard and rough. This is the *a* and *b* of our knowledge. But we go a step further, and every atom of the stone is in motion. These atoms are unknown creations, *x* and *y*. We try to catch the atoms and weigh them and tell in how large platoons they march together. Presently we are not contemplating atoms at all, in the sense of hard bits of stuff. We are in the presence of infinitesimal tornadoes of force. Whatever now we decide to call this substance of the rock, whether matter, or atoms, or centres of force, or spirit, it is the name for our faith in an almighty and wonderful reality rather than an exact description of a solid fact that we know all about. Our conclusion—that is, the truth about matter—is the best makeshift or working theory that we can reach to fit together our experiences of what matter does for us. Truth challenges our modesty as much as the accuracy of our observation and description.

Take another simple statement of fact. We say that a certain line drawn on the paper is not straight. How do we know this? No one of us has ever seen a perfect line; yet we carry in our minds the idea of straightness, or of circularity, which has only been suggested to us, but never realized. In the realm of

our thought, the idea of the straight line or the perfect circle is essential. It is more real, though invisible, than any line that we see. We are so made that, while intelligence survives, this idea will live with us when all visible lines are expunged. Truth in lines and forms is measured by this ideal and most actual standard. However this standard may have grown out of our experience, it always transcends experience. It is indeed a necessity of our thought.

We catch sight now of a group of standards and ideals, all different from the actual "facts" of life, related to the facts, suggested perhaps by the facts, but always above the facts, and quite as essential to our practical use of the facts as the yard-stick or the standard pound is essential in buying and selling. Every utility or convenience, a comfortable dwelling, a hygienic system of plumbing, a proper suit of clothes or pair of shoes, presupposes an ideal, invisible standard of thoroughness and excellence of workmanship. We say that the suit fits; we say that the foundation wall is true. We proceed at every practical issue by ideal standards which no work of man ever completely reached. The ideal of what a house or a ship should be is more real than the actual construction. Moreover, we believe that, if we knew more, we should see even a nobler ideal of fitness and truth than that by which we now measure our workmanship. Our ideal is like the asymptote, always approximating, but never quite touching the invisible ultimate ideals toward which our faith, guided by each new access of experience, climbs.

We are introduced immediately into the realm of beauty. To the eyes of the artist or poet there is nothing so actual as the vision of beautiful objects that the visible universe only suggests, but never quite realizes, or can realize, in material form. Our true humanity has not begun till we love these visions of beauty and strive to keep their company. Thus, there is nothing in the world more wonderful and mysterious than the facts, the forms, and the power of music. It arises out of noises and sound waves, but it consists in harmonies which ally it to the ideal kingdom of mathematics. Its delight is in the fact that it fits and satisfies

our ears. It demands truth or fidelity in the musician; it depends upon the attunement and the perfect time of his instrument. The standard is always beyond his best effort. This standard, which no man ever reaches, is more real than any of his work.

Why must the artist or the musician obey the law of this quite ideal vision or standard? Why must the violinist play up to a degree of perfection that no one can reach? Why must the painter follow his vision, though he may never be thanked or rewarded, and though the work of the "pot-boiler" may bring him cheap fame and pay? The fact is that man, at his best, belongs to an ideal world, which, once being entered upon, becomes more real than the solid ground under his feet. There is no truth, except within this region of invisible realities.

All the moralities now face us with their commanding Presences. "Duty, stern daughter of the voice of God," is here. Conscience sets up its imperative, the strange word "ought." We can get along quite well for a little way with a superficial explanation of morality. We may say that it is merely customary conduct, imitating the traditions and usages of a tribe or a family. We may say that it arises out of social expediency. All this is true. The point which we urge is that all morality, however simply it arises, moves up into the realm of ideal values. In other words, truth in morals is more than the mere fitness of an action to a custom or tradition or an act of legislation; it is the effort to fit a standard or ideal that no words, least of all the terms of an enactment, can define. Take Mr. Haeckel's insistence upon the scientist's duty to say what he thinks. You cannot measure this duty in terms of expediency, any more than you can rate a beautiful painting in so many dollars. You cannot prescribe how far the scientist must go in his telling the truth, any more than you can say how far the musician shall go in his effort after perfection of tone and harmony. You cannot prove that it will do Mr. Haeckel any material good to tell the truth, or even that his truth will do the world any good. Yet we all agree with Mr. Haeckel that he must tell the truth, even if the whole world holds up its hands in horror at him. This idea of

an absolute or infinite duty to truth is in another realm from that of the "solid facts" of the man on the street. It belongs in the realm of the ideal and invisible, and what, for want of any better term, we call the spiritual. But the man on the street applauds it, and believes in it, and owns that it is more real and permanent than the stones under his feet. Yes, It is a part of his being.¹

Consider, again, the ideal of wedded love. There is nothing that we behold more real and yet more wonderful. It has its rise on the animal side of us. It is related to the bodily senses and to passion. It has a strange, gross, sensual history of ages behind it. It hardly yet more than fairly emerges into the higher consciousness of the average man. The woman is still a chattel or plaything in the eyes of multitudes of brutish men. Nevertheless, here stands the ideal of true marriage and a love mutual, loyal, devoted, constant, undying, which no two lovers ever succeeded altogether in compassing, yet without which real love hardly exists. This love already orders thousands of homes. It commands the consciences of a host of people who only feebly live up to its splendid "ought." It brings joy and satisfaction wherever men and women obey it. Under its beneficent rule, the passions and senses themselves are at their highest perfection of use, and children are born under auspices most favorable for their health and happiness. The word "home" gets all its wealth of significance from this ideal reality of love.

What, now, is truth in the marriage relation? It does not merely mean to hold to a verbal promise or to obey the laws of the state. It means nothing less than fitness of act and thought, and of temper also, to an ideal standard beyond and above all words. Once seeing this ideal, we become base and unworthy to fall away from it. Who in England had a loftier sense of this reality than Mr. Huxley had? What a world of ethical reality he lived in and belonged to!

Consider a moment the almost new sense of humane social relations that slowly tends to prevail among men. You can always make out a case for the grim rule of selfishness, more

¹ The lack of clear recognition of the fundamental idea of truth in Mr. William James' Pragmatism is perhaps the chief fault in his treatment.

or less enlightened. You can say that the law of life is the survival of the fittest; you can translate human realities into animal, military, and commercial terms. You can say, "Every man for himself," and "Every man has his price." Why is it that no man can ever be content in saying such things? No man who is a man really believes that these things are quite true. What, then, do we all, at our best, hold to be true of social relations? We believe in an unwritten law, quite ideal, beyond the range of all human rewards or penalties. This law bids us each and all to share our good things with one another; it bids us be ready to suffer and die for the common good—not merely for the nation, but for humanity, for those whom we have never seen, for those unborn. It bids us let our own selfish will go, in the name of a universal good will. It sets martyrs rather than kings, Jesus rather than Caesar, Lincoln and not Napoleon, for the admiration of the world. There is no true man who does not, at his best, bow to this kind of ideal. Here is a touch of the infinite in man. There is no finite range to the bounds of his duty.

There is a philosophy that undertakes to explain everything in terms of mechanics. Whatever a man does, or thinks, or feels is registered in the changes of motion in nerve cells. First comes the change in a cell, as the man's senses are moved from without, and then, as if pulled by a wire, thought and consciousness follow. No one doubts the fact of this registry of deeds and thoughts. Does it explain anything? Does it not rather leave a world of mystery still to be explained? For consciousness is infinitely more wonderful than motion or mechanics, which in no way explain consciousness. The great overpowering fact of life is not the mechanical motion in a man's brain, but the vast range of his consciousness. His life, however related to the brain cells, is not real life at all till it rises into consciousness. All reality, in fact, lies in the field of consciousness, without which we could not even know anything about the mechanics of motion or the elementary differences between greater and less, higher and lower, better and worse.

Moreover, so far as consciousness tells any truth, it tells us of moral and spiritual sequences that daily alter the flow of our lives,

and in the aggregate make and alter the meaning of history. The story of a hero, a bit of a psalm, "a passage from Euripides," strikes our consciousness, and we become, at least for the moment, changed men in our conduct. The alteration of conduct, itself touching material facts, perhaps costing hard-earned money, or risking labor and life, is a spiritual or humane or social change in us. Its value consists in ideal terms, such as happiness, contentment, satisfaction.

We have used the word "happiness." What is this thing that every one wants, that no one can exactly define, that begins in the plane of creature comforts, and rises into all manner of ideal relations? Our thought of what truth is helps us to answer this question. Truth is fitness, harmony, the unison of relations. The happy life, then, is the life in which all the parts fit and match and make unity. The body is well and serves the man; the mind is sane, the conscience is enlightened and prompt to act, the man is full of good-will, expressing itself in kindly words and generous deeds. In short, the happy life conforms to, and corresponds with, an ideal beyond and above itself, never yet exactly seen, but the most real furniture that exists in every mature man's consciousness. The perfect truth of manhood is more than the man reaches, yet the reality of the man himself consists in his reaching toward this truth and trying to fit himself to it. His highest satisfaction lies in this effort. In this type of effort all the experiences of his life, even his failures and sorrows, tend to blend and harmonize into the unity of a real person. Consciousness tells us nothing more sure than this, and the more surely, the more often we have made the endeavor. We are happy, we reach approximate unity, in and through every moment of hearty good-will. To be true to a man's standard of manhood is the essence of the happy life.

Here again, as before, truth is both *a* and *x*. It is that which fits facts which we have experienced, and it is also an item of faith or venture; it is that which fits into an ideal beyond actual experience. This transcendental element of truth, this venture from the known towards the higher and unknown, is precisely what gives truth its character of reality.

Another idea has been, and is still, immensely important as a factor in the highest human activity. It is the idea of progress. It is related intimately to the great scientific thought of development and evolution. Men think that the world is better than it once was, and they believe or hope that it will grow better. This is not an unpractical thought. It adds value, worth, and motive force to action. It is a spur to morality and the noblest forms of devotion. The world and human life are worth more in a world that grows better than in a world that has stopped growing and may even be on the decline. Though I ought to be just, floating on a raft and waiting to be annihilated, yet I can have no enthusiasm for justice in such a condition. Give me the hope that my justice may bring rescue from the raft, even though to save others at my own loss, and my whole soul rises to do justice. So men are stirred to activity in the hope of human progress, not for their own sake, but for generations to come. This hope of progress moreover is illimitable. Draw a line anywhere and put an end to it; translate the efforts of men into any final form of death, however many thousands of years away, and the heart goes out of their work. There is an infinite element in the thought. It seems to point to something beyond the terms of mortal life. It is not *a*, however multiplied, but *a plus x*. The unknown part of it makes it true,

We have already suggested the bold but quite necessary venture of thought that we make in speaking of a world-order, or "universe." We thereby express our faith that all things fit together and make one world. Thus all the sciences are one science. Thus all processes are a part of a universal order. This is faith or trust quite as much as knowledge. But, as Mr. Tyndall has happily shown, science proceeds by leaps of inspired imagination, and arrives at its conclusions in advance of its ammunition trains and baggage wagons. Thus faith proceeds in the face of superficial difficulties. At first blush no one sees a universe, but rather the theatre of conflicting powers. The savage's gods are in conflict. Yet we hold, for substance of truth, that all forces are one. Doubt this, and the universe itself begins to dissolve, and truth to disintegrate.

The mightiest of all generalization follows, inextricably involved throughout with all that we have said. It is the thought of God. The word or name is of little moment. We take such words as we have at hand—only symbols at best for a conception which no words can do more than suggest. Our thought of God is only the extension and perfecting of our vision of a world-order or universe. It is equally necessary; it grows out of the other; it is born of and arises out of our science and experience. It seems compelled upon us by our thought, unless we stop thinking altogether.

Our thought of God is the expression of our sense of the necessary unity of all the values, ideals, and standards which give meaning to life. Order, beauty, intelligence, goodness, truth, love, are so many names of God. They all seem to go together. The realm of beauty is not alien to the realm of righteousness, but one with it. The realm of things—atoms, forces, motions—is not alien to the realm of consciousness, thought, order, ideals, justice, goodness, but subsidiary to it and one with it.

This carries us further. The thought of God means that the world outside and within, phenomena and consciousness also, is significant. It is an intelligible world—intelligence appealing to, and reflected upon, intelligence. This is the idea that men have expressed in the thought of a purposeful world. They have meant to express the conviction that no blind fate, but an all-inspiring reason ruled the universe. They meant a conviction that the universe is good, not evil—good in its whirling forces, good on the side of its omnipresent beauty, good in the working of its supreme intelligence. They meant that even seeming evil will be found, when once we know enough, to fall under the compelling law of good.

This is bold to think, but necessary if we think at all. We may not say that we know God instinctively. But we are compelled by the quality and framework of our intelligence to think in the terms that sooner or later signify God. The thought of God, in the ultimate analysis, is imposed on our thinking, first, as crudely suggested by the facts of life; then, as a form of intellectual faith; then, next, as required to meet the demands of that ideal realm of ethics and truth to which as men we belong.

World forces running to evil, a universal intelligence without purpose or meaning, consciousness everywhere yet void of reality, beauty everywhere expressing nothing real behind it, morality, virtue, conscience, and duty in us pressing us to be willing to die for a principle or an ideal, and yet nothing moral in the universe to match with and correspond to this universal pressure; love in us rising to a sense of infinite devotion, and no infinite love above or beyond us—these things do not fit together, are not intelligible, do not therefore make truth. Our thought of God is our way of affirming that the universe is real, is one, is beautiful, is good, is enduring.

This faith in the truth of the universe, that is, in God, is akin to the faith that we have in ourselves. We are a mystery and enigma to ourselves. Where are we? Who are we? What are the bounds of our personality? How can we be described or defined? And yet we believe in ourselves, the invisible persons, inhabiting space, using atoms and forces, and dwelling in consciousness. We believe in ourselves, the microcosms, much as we believe in God as the universal order. We are what we are, and real persons, by virtue of thought, beauty, good-will, unified together and entering into a vast conscious or vital order of goodness.

We deny God, and we presently cut at the roots of our faith in ourselves. What is real, if the universe is not real? What is good, if the life out of which we spring and of which man at his best is the highest and most illustrative fruitage that we know, is not good? What is worth while—science, or justice, or love, much less food and comfort—unless the standards hold good by which we set values? Now God is our name for the standards that give life its meaning.

We have taken a very long circle to reach the idea of immortality. But here at last it stands, as inevitable as any of the other items of reality which go to constitute life. Truth, we see, is that which fits and makes harmony and unity. It is whatever is necessary to make the order of thought complete. It is whatever belongs to the realm of reality. Truth is not merely what we see embodied, but beyond our immediate sight—what

our faith in the ultimate reality foresees by anticipation. This fact has held good at every step which we have taken. Truth was always more than we could define or demonstrate. It was also what our intelligence demanded in order to fit things together and make sense of them.

It need not disturb us in the least to be told how the hope of immortality may have arisen. Grant that it had its origin in material sensations, in the visions of savages, in the repeating of ghost stories. What human thought, art, or science, did not thus spring out of the earth, and take material shape to clothe itself? The indisputable fact remains that there is an immaterial, and yet real, order of life, which characterizes man as human. There is a hierarchy of values, leading up to the True, the Good, the Beautiful. We cannot throw them aside or contemn them, and keep our humanity. We cannot belittle truth or reason and logic—the architect's plan of the Cologne Cathedral, the builder of the Brooklyn Bridge, the painter of the Dresden Madonna, the exiles for conscience' sake who founded America, the integrity of honest fathers, the love of our mothers, the death on the Cross. "Here are the infinite values," say all of us, or else we cease to be men.

We belong to a kingdom of values, an order of good, a universe. Grant this. What of it? We cannot think then that a man dies like a fly, and that is the end of him. We cannot think that the sweet mothers, and the brave, true-hearted men whom we have known, are of no more use in the order of the universe than the whirling dust in the streets. We cannot think that the life of this planet, with its gigantic cost in blood and sorrow and tears, with its glorious victories of truth, freedom, justice, and love, will all be measured up, in a few thousands of years, in the mute story of the moon—a dead world without a conscious intelligence to shed a tear over it. This is to pronounce the doom of the universe, to break the order and beauty, to bring intelligence to confusion, to deny serious values, and to dethrone reality.

The intellect in us, the sense of right, the instinct for order, the love of beauty and goodness—all that makes us worthy as men—the reality in us reacts against an unreal world. The

hope of immortality is our sense that the world may be trusted, that the real values abide, that the sum of all life is not death, but life yet more noble.

This is not a strange and unscientific statement. It is quite like the statement of our senses touching the straightness of a line or the beauty of a face. We know it, but we cannot prove it to a blind man. The standard of our judgment is in our own nature. The one thing is true or fits, and the opposite does not fit or correspond. We cannot help trusting this judgment. It is all that we have to trust. Moreover, in this instance, as with the judgment of the line or of a righteous act, there tends to be a great and growing consensus of similar judgment. The same mind everywhere tends to see something real in the hope of immortality.

Another harmony now appears. We have seen that a man has a certain integrity as a person. At his best, all his powers working in unison, he is at the acme of efficiency and happiness. Three great spiritual elements go to make such a man. One is faith, or trust, for example, in the validity of law, in the essential righteousness of the world, in the humanity of one's fellow men—in a word, in a good God. Another element of the complete life is love, or good-will. The man at his best pours out, or expresses, his good-will in all his acts and words, in his face and gestures. Again, the man needs hope in order to be at his best. He will work best, he will best keep his health, he will do most good to his fellows, he will be most truly a man with hope in his eyes.

We do not say what the object of his hope must be. It surely need not be selfish or personal. But it must be worthy of his manhood and fit the terms of manhood. We will not insist that his hope shall rest on the idea of immortality. But it must rest on reality. It needs to go up into the ideal realm of values, where the idea of the infinite and the immortal belong. The man cannot be satisfied for long with any hope that is sentenced to ultimate death.

Now we hold that whatever is essential to the best and most harmonious life of a man, without which he is reduced in his manhood, deserves to be trusted as true or real. The immense

presumption is in its favor. If hope is one element of life, then there is that which corresponds to hope. The hope is entitled to "the benefit of the doubt." If a grand hope is needful to a noble life, then we hold that whatever substance corresponds to the hope will be noble also. True, this is faith again; but the same kind of faith which we have found to be inseparable from all valid thinking.

We are often asked if we can believe in personal immortality. The truth is that in the highest region of thought all terms and definitions are inadequate. We felt this even in our glimpse at the mystery of substance, or matter. We use the terms *atoms* and *wave motions* and *vortices*, not as sufficient to express the reality, but as the best modes of imaging to ourselves the nature of the reality in which, in some sense, we firmly believe. Substance, we say, seems to behave like groupings of orderly atoms, or like whirling forces. It behaves as if waves traversed it. So we say with the use of the term "personal immortality." This is the best form of thought we know to express our sense of the abiding reality of a noble life. Thus "In Memoriam" rises, in the face of all doubt, to the conviction that the loved friend can never die. As we see no other way to conceive of substance except under the figure of some form which we know, so we see no possible way to conserve immortal values in persons except what we name personal immortality. As substance may prove to be more valid and wonderful than any of our figures of speech, so immortality may prove to be richer and more satisfying than our name for it suggests. We cannot believe it to be less than our name for it. Meanwhile we have to go on using the words that serve to convey the utmost positive sense of reality. That they are popular words does not hurt their value, but rather enhances it. Why should not the popular instinct go in the direction of the best constructive and philosophical thought? Here is another fitness or harmony such as we find everywhere in our world. What kind of philosophy—that is, love of truth—would it be that proved to serve no end except to destroy man's sense of worth and reality! This would be, in the name of truth, to deny the existence of truth.

We have proceeded very much as men do in building a struct-

ure, for example, an archway. We have used the best material. We have set the base of our structure into the concrete matter of all sorts of facts of life. We have laid logic and reason for foundation stones. We have built the values of order, beauty, justice, truth, humanity, and love into our work. We have found a place for every noble experience of sympathy, of sorrow, of victory, for every aspiration, for every mighty standard. All the high things that make life worth living are in our structure. The name of the structure is the universal life; it means the integrity of man and the reality of God.

There is just one stone which we need to make the arch complete. It is the keystone of the work. It is small, compared with the massive foundation; one might possibly think that the columns would stand apart by themselves. They would stand for a while if no great stress were put on the work. But our sense of form and perfection, that is, our sense of truth or fitness, calls for the keystone in order to join the piers and springers together. Our sense of necessity also and our knowledge of the action of forces call for the keystone. Our arch will never be safe till we have put that one binding stone into place.

So we judge of the hope of immortality. It belongs with and fits into a structure; it is that without which you can never make the beauty or unity last, without which also the structure tends to fall apart. The arch is not yet *true* till every stone fits into place. Put the hope of immortality into the crown of the values of life, and they cohere, and all of them take on new significance. Each stone built into the structure is worth more than it is worth by itself in the field. Each stone is worth still more when the structure is finished. Refuse your keystone the place for which it seems to be fitted exactly, and you have put every precious value at risk. You are not so sure of a good God any longer. Human life is no longer so significant as it was before. You have lost worth out of love and friendship, and levelled them toward the dust. You have reduced patriotism and philanthropy to finite values, each with its price. You have taken buoyant joy and enthusiasm out of all mature men's life, and threatened them with an earlier old age. You have shaken the bases of morality and put righteousness into terms of comfort and policy. You

have bidden the artist, the poet, and the prophet laugh at their visions and doubt their validity. You have distinctly shaken man's faith in logic and reason, and brought all intellectual processes into discredit. For all that logic is for is to bind things into coherence and unity. All values, in fact, belong in the ideal realm; they go together and make a unity, or else they fall together.

Fall together? No! No man can make the great values fall, or take them apart, or hurt one of them. A man can hurt and mar his own life by his distrust, but he can mar no reality. No man's doubt can make justice, beauty, truth, love, less than real. These things are ingrained in our nature. We need only to trust them. They constitute an infinite order. They validate themselves the more we throw our weight upon them. The hope of immortality is simply the keystone, which always stands fast, beyond any man's doubt, at the crown of the structure. It fits its companion values, and they clasp it with their arms into a serene integrity. They bid us trust our lives upon the archway, which every value in the universe has joined to construct. We did not build the beautiful structure: we only found it.

“What is excellent,
As God lives, is permanent.”

I have wished to make it plain that the hope of immortality is not merely the concern of sentimentalists, ready to hug a pleasant delusion, much less of egoists, eagerly grasping after every straw of selfish comfort for themselves: it is the serious concern of all men who have other values at heart besides pleasures and money; of all who care for law and order, for true homes, for just government, and friendly society among men; of all who love their fellows and struggle for human progress, having faith that such struggle is worth while; of all who love beauty, and find a noble worth in art and music; of all who think sanely, and have any sort of faith in a good universe—the poets, the artists, the thinkers, the statesmen, the multitude also of modest and high-minded men and women whose religion consists in acts of faith, hope, and love. The companionship of such persons, the mem-

ory of such persons, their faith and their deeds, bring you into, and leave you in, an attitude of hope. This world would not be a quite true world with the hope of immortality left out. This world needs nothing less than the hope of immortality in order to complete its integrity.

*INDIVIDUALISM AND RELIGION IN THE EARLY
ROMAN EMPIRE¹*

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Whoever reads the meditations of Marcus Aurelius must be impressed with the constant self-examination which the writer practised. Far on the northern boundaries of his empire, among the Quadi, on the banks of the Gran, he composed his first book, analyzing his own nature, gratefully recounting his obligations to his kin, his teachers, and his friends. All the succeeding books grow out of a similar self-examination, accompanied by self-directed exhortations to fidelity, constancy, and patience. The title which the work bears is indeed the only possible one—To Himself—for self is alike the subject and the object of the author's meditations. The emperor's simple humility, his high desire to fulfil in every way his duty, his patient humanity, shut out effectively all priggishness and offensive egotism from his pages. Marcus Aurelius was not alone in his concern for self. If we look into other ranks of life in the second century, we find the same interest. With all its peace, calm, and nobility, the age of the Antonines was an age of egoism, of valetudinarianism both of body and of soul. Aristides the rhetorician has left us an account of his long and impassioned search for health, which for him was a religious quest. Apuleius, in his anxiety for his soul, had himself initiated into all possible sacred mysteries, until he at last found rest in the holy brotherhood of the servants of Isis. The emperor, the rhetorician, and the superstitious mystic furnish three striking illustrations of the tendency of the time.

Self-examination was no new thing for the philosopher under the empire. While Epictetus, so far as we know, did not incul-

¹This article originally formed part of a lecture delivered before the Harvard Summer School of Theology in July, 1908.

cate its practice directly, none the less his teaching implies it, for the individual, the self, was the centre of his universe; self-concern was for him the proper interest for the *sapiens*; in self he found the source and warrant of the soul's security and independence. Seneca in a familiar passage tells us how each evening in quiet he reviewed his words and acts of the day, concealing nothing from himself, omitting nothing. This practice he had learned from his teacher Sextius, for that exercise of the Pythagoreans, which their ancient interpreters at least regarded as mnemonic, in the course of time had become a moral discipline. Witness these verses of the *Carmen Aureum*: "Never let sleep come upon thy yielding eyelids until thou hast thrice reviewed each one of thy acts of the day. 'In what have I erred?' 'What have I done?' 'What have I failed to do that I should have done?' Begin with thy first act and review in order. If thou hast done ill, be ashamed; if well, then rejoice."

When one surveys the history of Roman thought from the last century of the republic to the reign of Marcus Aurelius, he finds that the earlier ideal of action was gradually replaced by that of contemplation; that the concept of the individual as an inseparable member of the state yielded to that of the individual, independent of external relations, but the centre of man's thought and interest. Evidence for these individualistic tendencies is by no means confined to the works of the philosophers, but is found in many other forms of literature as well. Among Roman historians Tacitus shows pre-eminently a psychological interest; turning from mere events, he endeavored to find in the human soul the motives of the individual's action. The comparison frequently made between him and Thucydides brings clearly into contrast the interests of the two. The latter is concerned chiefly with events—expeditions, battles, victories, defeats; in his entire account of twenty momentous years few personalities appear: the actors are Athenians, Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, Argives. In like fashion Cato the elder, writing in the middle of the second century before our era, did not even name the Roman leaders in his *Origines*. In Tacitus, however, the actors are not peoples, but individuals. The characters of Tiberius, Germanicus, the two Agrippinas, of Claudius and Nero, of Galba, Otho, and

Vitellius—to mention only some of the chief personages—are clearly drawn. It is true that Tacitus's sense of the dignity required of the historian kept him from sinking to the meaner external details which Suetonius employed, and that he also avoided the carefully balanced antitheses which Sallust used in his elaborate portraits; but none the less we see in every case the individual clearly defined as Tacitus conceived him. The anecdotal character of Suetonius's work, as of the biographies of the Scriptores Historiae Augustae after him, is due to the same interest in personality. In fact, the rise of Roman biography in the latter part of the second century B.C. was coincident with the increase of individualism; likewise among the Greeks the development of this branch of literature, as of realistic portraiture, fell in the period after Alexander. The growth of Roman epigraphy was prompted by the same interest as biography; and satire in the sense of *carmen . . . maledictum et ad carpenda hominum vitia . . . compositum* developed with the spread of individualism until it reached the bitter invective of Juvenal.

The causes which produced the extraordinary change of interest in the period from the Second Punic War to the age of the Antonines were manifold—political, economic, social, and philosophic. The great period of Roman conquest and struggle which continued to the close of the Second Punic War on the whole fostered a national spirit; the citizen's life was inseparably connected with the state; but, when the stimulus of common dangers from foreign foes and of common victories over them had ceased, new phenomena arose. On the one hand a cosmopolitan spirit appears, on the other we find men trying to realize their own individualities. The course of conquest had widened men's views; contact with other nations and with ancient civilizations had made it impossible to confine their thoughts and interest to the old narrow limit. Hellenism now poured the full stream of its influence into every channel of Roman life, but in Hellenistic thought that revolution has already been wrought which it was to pass on to Rome.² The increase of wealth gave men leisure for

² On the development of individualism in the Hellenistic period, see Jevons "Hellenism and Christianity," in this REVIEW for April, 1908.

intellectual pursuits or the means of gaining political power, while the realization of selfish ambition was made the easier by the fact that the problem of the poor had become more pressing, so that the demagogue had a larger opportunity. As is well known, political history from the time of the Gracchi to the battle of Actium centres around prominent men, leaders in attempts made more or less openly to override the constitution. Unselfish though the Gracchi may have been, they hurried Rome on a new course; the day Tiberius Gracchus deposed his fellow tribune, he began a revolution which was to end a century later in the establishment of the empire. Political agencies were corrupted and weakened; the allegiance of the citizens was transferred from the state to Marius, Cinna, Sulla; to Caesar, Pompey, Crassus; to Octavianus, Antony, and Lepidus. The ability, and to no small degree the desire, to govern was lost in the people. When the battle of Actium decided the leadership of the Roman world—the form of government which was to ensue had been determined long before that event—peace and security were finally obtained, but at the expense of political power. The assemblies of the people ceased to perform any real functions before fifty years had passed. The Senate, even under Augustus, became hardly more than an advisory board, although the fiction that it was a co-ordinate and independent part of the government was kept up for two centuries. In fact, from the first that which was a dyarchy in theory tended to become a monarchy in reality. Political life, once the free field of action for the Romans of the higher class, was now largely closed; dignity, not power, was the highest possession of the Senate. The equestrian order likewise had little opportunity save in a few administrative and military offices; while the mass of the people was wholly without political activity and without interest in government; indeed so indifferent was the populace that the bloody struggles of the year 69 A.D. between the armed forces of Vitellius and Vespasian interested the masses chiefly as a superior kind of gladiatorial show, which concerned them as little as the murder of Galba had earlier in the same year.

The stifling of political life had its inevitable results; the upper classes turned, some to the empty employments of luxury or to sensuality, while others of a nobler cast devoted themselves to

rhetoric, philosophy, and similar intellectual pursuits. The old ideal of devotion to the state which we find in Cicero, which lay behind Horace's earlier political verse at least, and formed the basis of Vergil's appeal to patriotism, gave way to the concept of a paternal government which was the ideal of Seneca, Pliny, and Dio Chrysostom, as well as the desire of the mob. The influence of Greece and the Orient had overcome the earlier Roman concepts of government. As a result, the national spirit was weakened or gone. Thinking men could no longer effectively make the welfare of the state the object of their thoughts or satisfy their own needs by action in its behalf, but were rather turned in upon themselves. In short, the political changes all tended to give an individualistic direction to Roman thought which was often noble, but was capable of becoming utter selfishness.

Yet the selfish satisfactions of great possessions were checked by the time the first century of the empire had passed. The enormous losses caused by the civil wars had been followed, it is true, by a rapid increase of wealth which gave opportunity for an extravagance hitherto unknown in the Roman world; but, as Tacitus in a familiar passage points out, waste and imperial oppression had done their work before Nero's death, so that with Vespasian, under force of necessity and the imperial example, a simpler mode of life began to prevail. Yet the happy age of the Antonines after Domitian's reign of terror could not restore the wasted wealth. Agriculture had never been successfully revived; oppressed by a system of slave labor and many centuries of bad management, the economic condition of the West steadily grew worse. This fact goes far to explain the general pessimism of the second century of our era. Empty rhetoric was not able to lighten this gloom; scientific pursuits, which had been followed with no little interest during the first century of the empire, as is attested by Seneca and Pliny the elder, and which might have provided intellectual satisfaction to the educated class, had been largely abandoned from lack of good scientific method. Marcus Aurelius thanks heaven that he never wasted his time on natural philosophy. Furthermore, among the intellectual classes there had actually developed a certain ascetism, a scorn of the body, which stood at diameter with the older Hellenic satisfaction with

life and with the former Roman physical vigor. The welfare of the soul, the safety of self, had become the chief interest of men. Nor was this interest confined to the upper classes; the humbler grades of society were moved by the same desires.

While political changes tended to develop individualism, the social changes of the period under consideration seem at first sight to tend rather toward cosmopolitanism. Rome's population from an early period was composite; but during the closing century of the republic and the first of the empire it became international, as is shown by every grade of society. The literary class was hardly Italian after Cicero's day. Toward the close of the republic and in the Augustan age, we find Furius Bibaculus, Catullus, Vergil, Cornelius Gallus, Aemilius Macer, Nepos, and Livy from upper Italy; Varro Atacinus and Pompeius Trogus from Transalpine Gaul. In the next century Gaul had become the teacher of the Britons—"Gallia causidicos docuit facunda Britannos"—while Spain furnished the two Senecas, Columella, Pomponius Mela, Lucan, Quintilian, Martial, Herennius Senecio, and perhaps Valerius Flaccus; and Africa had become the nurse of advocates—"Africa nutricula causidicorum."

The international character of the population, however, is naturally seen more clearly in the trading and lower classes. The numerous slaves and freedmen were made up of all nations, although chiefly Greeks and Orientals; so large were the additions made by manumission to the ranks of the freedmen that Augustus felt it necessary to have a law passed restricting to one hundred the number of slaves to whom freedom could be given by will; this very number shows how serious the danger of swamping the Italian elements was felt to be. Immigration from the East had been great. Under Augustus an embassy from King Herod was attended by eight thousand Jews resident at Rome; in 14 A.D., four thousand freedmen tainted with Jewish and other Oriental superstitions were banished to Sardinia; under the empire a large Oriental quarter developed in what is now Trastevere. Voices of protest against this invasion were not lacking. Lucan declared that the single city of Rome was receiving the whole world's dregs; and Juvenal vowed that he could not endure the capital, with its flood of Greek-speaking peoples from Asia

Minor and Syria—"Long since the Syrian Orontes poured its flood into the Tiber." Furthermore, society was rapidly affected by the number of plebeians and freedmen who came to wealth and influence. The vulgar pretensions of the rich parvenu became one of the stock subjects for the satirist. Petronius has given us Trimalchio, who made a cool ten million by a single lucky venture; Juvenal depicts the rich upstart, whose pierced ears showed that he was born on the banks of the Euphrates, but who none the less demands precedence over praetors and tribunes because of his four hundred thousand a year. In the imperial service, until Hadrian's day, freedmen were widely employed in positions of power and authority. Many a knight or senator traced his ancestry back to a wealthy *libertus*; the upper classes were recruited and often revivified from below, while the lowest class was constantly looking forward to the possibility of wealth and social advancement. Such influences broke down the social narrowness of an earlier day, when the Roman noble prided himself on being a noble of a city-state apart from the rest of the world, member of a class, not impregnable, it is true, but seldom invaded from below. Nor must we forget the effect of the decay of family life which is eloquently testified to by the vain marriage laws of Augustus and the efforts of his successors. The constant flux of society, the varied nationalities living at Rome representative of the complexity of the vast empire, alike operated to substitute a cosmopolitan spirit for the earlier provincialism, and uniting with the influence of a common allegiance and a common law which bound the empire together, made men feel, before the age of the Antonines, that they were no longer citizens of a town or district, but of the world. Yet these same influences loosened the bonds that bind the individual in a coherent society, and left him in a certain isolation.

But a most potent influence in the period we have been considering was philosophy, and above all Stoicism. When introduced, this system appealed to the Romans because it fitted action, it worked in practical political life; when that life was gone, the resistent elements of Stoicism were brought to the front and became a source of moral strength and of spiritual consolation. Stoicism at its birth had been influenced by the new concept

of a world-wide empire just realized by Alexander. In his treatise on the state Zeno first taught the doctrine of the common citizenship of man in a state identical with the world, and at once gave his philosophy that cosmopolitan stamp which in spite of all changes it retained to the end. The latest leaders among the Stoics—Seneca, Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius—dwell on citizenship in the cosmos, in which all reasoning men are brothers by virtue of their very reason. It is not wholly alien to our subject to note the extent to which the Stoic ideal of the brotherhood of man was realized under the empire. Though no attempt was made to illustrate the equality of the *servus sapiens* and the *Caesar sapiens* by replacing Caesar with the slave, the Stoic teachings, more than any other influence, led to the amelioration of the condition of the slave and to care for the children of the poor and for orphans, while the jurists Paulus, Ulpian, and Florentinus fixed permanently in written law the doctrine of the freedom and equality of men, secured to them by a law of nature superior to all human law. In short, the dominant philosophy of the second century of our era was at one with the cosmopolitanism of every-day thought and practice. But cosmopolitanism is the very soil in which individualism grows best. When the close bonds of state, society, and religion are broken down, as they were in Greece during the Hellenistic period, or as they were, *mutatis mutandis*, in the Roman world after the Second Punic War, the individual is always turned in upon himself, and, unable to feel the demands of the larger world as his fathers felt the claims of their provincial state, finds in self the centre of his interest. Philosophy of every school had long made self the subject of man's thought and measure of his world. The sophistic dictum, "man is the measure of all things," and the personality of Socrates had accomplished that. The Stoic doctrine of perception and concept, which is closely allied to the nominalism of the Cynics, and above all the ideal of the self-sufficient wise man, fostered egoism; and, further, the Stoic doctrine of *απάθεια* led in this direction hardly more insistently than the Epicurean *τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν* and the Sceptic *ἀταραξία*.

To resume then briefly, political changes cut the Romans off from the great fields of activity in which the higher classes had

once found their satisfaction, and forced them to turn to unsatisfying pursuits. Economic decay, following on the period of extravagant luxury, deprived many of the satisfactions which the possession and expenditure of money give, and before the close of the second century of our era had produced a deep pessimism. Social changes had broken up the old class solidarity. Finally, philosophy had made men feel themselves citizens of the world, but of a world whose centre was the individual. Cosmopolitanism and individualism were therefore equally the results of the complex influences which I have sketched above.

I now wish to consider some of the results of the development of individualism so far as religion was concerned. In spite of all shocks and catastrophes, there is no question that at the close of the republic a strong religious sentiment still persisted among the people. Its existence is well attested by the poem of Lucretius, by many passages in other writers, and by the fact that the religious reforms of Augustus were based upon it. The means of religious expression, however, were unsatisfactory; the approved Graeco-Roman religion inculcated scrupulosity in fulfilling one's duty towards the gods, in properly paying them one's obligations, and, no doubt, offered a certain aesthetic satisfaction; but it made no moral demands on the worshipper beyond those of duty; it was objective and external, a community affair rather than the individual's dearest concern. But both national interest and the Hellenic confidence in the satisfactions of this life lost their hold. A new sense of moral guilt, stimulated in Italy no doubt by the horrors of the civil war, finds expression in Vergil, Horace, and in Livy's preface. Seneca recalled with new emphasis Plato's definition of the sum of righteousness—imitation of God: "The first point in the worship of the gods is to believe that the gods exist; second, to render unto them their own majesty, to render their own goodness without which there is no majesty; to know that the gods are they who preside over the world, who direct the universe by their power, who protect mankind, and sometimes have regard for individuals. These neither bring evil nor have it in themselves; but they chastise and check some men, they inflict penalties, sometimes they punish under the guise of blessings. Wouldst thou propitiate the gods? Be thou good thyself. He

has worshipped them rightly who has imitated them." Again, "The divine nature is not worshipped with the fat bodies of slain bulls, nor with gold or silver votive offerings, nor with money collected for the sacred treasury, but with a pious and upright will." Epictetus regarded the praise of God to be man's first duty: "I am a rational creature, and therefore I should praise God; this is my task; I will do it, nor will I leave my part, so long as I may keep it; and I urge you to join in this same song." Such passages show the change which had taken place in Roman religious thought. The time had indeed come before Seneca wrote when many an individual was possessed by a sense of moral unworthiness, when he demanded some spiritual satisfaction for himself, some assurance that he could personally enter into communion with divinity and find a warrant therein for his own security.

This warrant and satisfaction were given by the cults imported from the East. The hold these cults had at Rome and in much of the West can only be understood, I believe, in connection with the changes which we have been hastily reviewing. Their introduction began early, for the Great Mother of the Gods was imported by state action in 204 B.C.; but her orgiastic worship was so abhorrent to the Romans that at least three centuries seem to have passed before the state allowed Roman citizens to become members of her priesthood. On the other hand, the Dionysiac mysteries, coming by way of southern Italy, spread rapidly after the Second Punic War; although their excesses had to be checked in 186 B.C., their hold was so great that the authorities did not try to forbid but only to regulate initiation into them. The famous Pythagorean books, which a timid senate burned in 181 B.C., should be reckoned with the religious rather than with the philosophic movements of the period, if we may presume to separate the two. A century later Sulla's campaigns in the East brought in the Cappadocian Ma, and gave the legions their first acquaintance with the Persian Mithras. Soon after, Isis with her associates had established herself on the capitol, whence she defied all efforts to dislodge her. It may be claimed that these divinities under the republic were worshipped only by foreigners and the lower classes, but this is certainly not true of the first century of the empire. It must be remembered that these cults offered, in

crasser form perhaps, the same satisfactions and assurances that were given by the Eleusinian mysteries, which had always enjoyed high social favor; and the fact that Nero was at one time devoted to the Dea Syria, that Otho, Vespasian, and Domitian favored the Egyptian divinities, secured these Orientals some following among the official, if not among the intellectual classes. As a matter of fact, there is little doubt that all grades of society, with the possible exception of the most intellectual circles, in which ancient traditions or rationalistic views were strong, were profoundly affected by the tide of orientalism which rose rapidly in the latter part of the first and throughout the second century of our era. Mithras became prominent in Trajan's day; soon after, the *taurobolium*—the rite of blood—was introduced into the worship of the Great Mother, whose festivals were greatly extended before the close of the second century. It is unnecessary to name all the Oriental gods whose devotees were to be found in Italy and the West; many of them, it is true, appealed chiefly to the people of the land from which they sprang, but many were worshipped by Roman citizens. All required penances and purification, all offered through their mysteries a communion with the divine, and gave a warrant of safety in the present life and the life to come. Upon the neophyte who was to be admitted to the sacred band of the *Isiaci* were imposed continence and abstinence from animal food and wine; he began the day of his initiation with sacred ablutions and prayers, and was baptized with holy water from the Nile; then, clad in a linen robe, he was led into the holy of holies where the secret ceremonies were performed. Although we are naturally ignorant of what was actually done in these mystic rites, there can be no doubt of the effect on the initiate. Apuleius's hero Lucius exclaims in ecstasy, "I have approached the threshold of Proserpina, and after being carried through all the elements I have returned into the upper world; at midnight I have seen the sun flashing with a brilliant light; the gods of heaven and hell I have approached in very person and done them obeisance face to face." Many other moving ceremonies were performed, closing with a sacred meal, all calculated to impress the novice and to satisfy his religious desires. The rites of admission to each of the three grades in the mysteries of

Isis were essentially similar. In the mysteries of Mithras there were no less than seven grades in all, the first three of which were preliminary to full communion; lustral ablutions, self-restraint and abstinence, an oath, and tests of courage and constancy were required. A holy communion was regularly celebrated by the devotees, who thus recalled the final act of Mithras upon earth, and strengthened themselves for their warfare with the powers of evil, in which struggle Mithras was the ally of the faithful, protecting them in this world and assuring them immortality hereafter. In the worship of Mithras, Isis, and indeed in most if not all similar cults, matins and vespers, recurring festivals and fasts, sacred processions and reunions of the *sacra*, satisfied religious desires and stimulated religious emotion. The ecstatic joy which the devout soul felt may be well illustrated by the opening of the hymn of praise to Isis which Apuleius puts into Lucius' mouth: "Thou holy and eternal preserver of mankind, thou dost ever cherish mortals by thy kindness, thou dost show the sweet affection of a mother toward the wretched in their afflictions. Neither day, nor night, nor briefest moment passes without thy bounty; thou protectest man on land and sea, and driving away the storms of life thou dost extend thy saving hand," etc. Of the reality of the religious satisfaction which these Oriental cults brought there can be no question; and the joyful anticipation of the future which the *sacra* possessed was not less than that of an Eleusinian initiate of the third century whose tombstone declares, "Death is not only no evil, but is a blessing to mankind." It was then through such mysteries that the individual found assurance of his own security. Not by reason or philosophy, but by penance, purification and mystic communion he secured his peace. In fact, before the close of the second century of our era the world had passed from rationalism to mysticism.

It has, however, been maintained that these Eastern worships did not exert so powerful an influence as the above implies, that the number of their devotees was not large, and that they did not swamp the older gods. It is very true that dedications to the old Roman and Graeco-Roman gods continued to be set up into the fourth century, but the phenomenon of a state or tra-

ditional worship supported and carried on by men whose beliefs are quite at variance with the doctrines of that worship is no strange thing in modern times; still less remarkable was it in antiquity, when men were not bound by the exclusiveness of monotheism, but were ready to see the divine anywhere; the priest of Mithras could set up a dedication to Jupiter without hesitation or any sense of incongruity, although his concept of Jupiter was probably profoundly modified by the ideas he derived from the East. As to the number of dedications to the Oriental gods, they form a large proportion of the total number preserved to us, and come from almost every portion of the western part of the empire, so that there is no reason to doubt that the total number of devotees was very considerable. Furthermore, no one can study the religious history of the first three centuries without seeing how completely men's thought was permeated with ideas derived from the pagan East.

The victory of mysticism carried with it the doom of Stoic philosophy; in spite of all the modifications which that system had undergone, even the intellectual world demanded something more satisfactory than the virtue of the self-sufficient *sapiens*; men felt the need of help from a divine source, and this assistance the Oriental mysteries secured them. Marcus Aurelius was the last of the Stoics, because the Roman world had absorbed what Stoicism had to give; but Stoicism had helped to prepare the way for the Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism of the third and fourth century. Side by side, or rather in connection with these pantheistic religious philosophies, we see the Oriental gods reach their highest influence.

The same individualistic tendencies which fostered the spread of Oriental paganism contributed to the expansion of Christianity. This offered similar rewards and imposed similar obligations. It was, however, free from those crude and repulsive legends which were connected with every one of the pagan cults, and which could only be explained away for the cultivated devotee by some rationalistic effort or by a violent exercise of faith. Not only did it have a nobler character in its origin, but it offered a loftier satisfaction and warrant to those who accepted it. The world into which it came was bound together in an empire whose

roads were to be the highways for its missionaries to remotest lands. But this is not the place to trace the history of early Christianity. In Marcus Aurelius' day it was comparatively weak in the West, but before a century had passed it had spread enormously; in fact the battle between paganism and the religion of the cross had been already won.

*THE SERVICE TO NERVOUS INVALIDS OF THE
PHYSICIAN AND OF THE MINISTER*

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Nervous invalidism as a specific problem is in one way or another everybody's concern. The invalid himself naturally wishes to get well; but he should recognize that it is possible to be sound in mind even though limited in bodily strength, and should come to see with peculiar clearness some of the needs and dangers and opportunities that illness may bring. We are apt to construe health too narrowly, and to forget the relations of both health and illness to character and insight.

It is better that invalids should think of themselves as students and teachers of an important subject than that they should feel themselves to be objects of commiseration. The community needs the counsel of the intelligent invalid in deciding how the problem of invalidism should be met.

But the well should likewise understand this problem. Not only are they neighbors to the sick, but the strongest person's health is not so secure that he may not at any moment be called upon to face the responsibilities of illness, and he should have a fair and just conception of the nature of these responsibilities. The problem is also of importance for the parent and the school-teacher. For the more closely the subject of the origin of nervous invalidism is studied, the more clearly it appears that this condition often rests upon tendencies formed in childhood, frequently overshadowed shortly afterwards, but having a strong liability to reappear under new forms. The nervous child's greatest danger seems to lie in misdirected repressions and concealments; while the best means of prevention consist in giving him intelligent sympathy and explanation, the chance to develop his powers through well-directed activity, and the conditions favorable to good bodily health. The ignorance of the nature of their children shown by

well-meaning parents, and the cruelty due to ignorance, have been a source of nervous invalidism to a degree that we are now learning to appreciate. A more than halfway readiness on the part of parents and teachers to talk with children over their difficulties, freely and in a liberal spirit even if without expert knowledge, is often of immense service, while there can be no question but that there is abundant room for expert knowledge. Through the studies of physicians into the working of the disordered mind, facts are being gathered which parents and teachers will be able to utilize in the service of good mental health. A portion of these facts have already been made public, but it is certain that there are many more to come.

Even in drawing this hasty outline of the influences which favor healthy childhood, it would be unjust to omit mention of the importance of the religious training of the child, and of the principle recognized by the best educational systems, but especially by the kindergarten, that moral development and intellectual development may go on, not only side by side, but as a double outcome of many single efforts.

For many persons, the religious sentiments acquired in childhood serve, in later years, as their best defence against the demoralization with which illness threatens them, but there are others for whom religious doctrines have proved a source of excitement of a morbid sort. Even at this day, nervous invalids occasionally present themselves to physicians, whose childhood was made terrible by the doctrines of eternal damnation and the unpardonable sin. It is true that the children who take these doctrines so seriously to heart are usually of the sort to whom a sense of dread is natural, and whose own brothers and sisters may have turned an indifferent ear to the same teaching; but, none the less, the experience of the more sensitive children should serve as a valuable warning.

The child's own home, the kindergarten, the school-room, the playground, and all the other centres where eager children congregate are likewise places where all who seek means for preventing nervous invalidism, whatever their professions, can meet in imagination, as on common ground. Few persons would dispute the view that the encouragement of personal enthusiasm,

of personal skill and effort, and of the habit of personal effacement for the general good, that mark so many different educational movements of the present day, counts against invalidism and for good health.

Finally, the problem of nervous invalidism comes home to the psychologists, the physicians, the clergymen, the social workers. All such persons and all such classes of persons may make some contribution towards its solution, but each should realize that this opportunity entails a corresponding responsibility. The contribution, to be of value, should be based on adequate knowledge, and should be made with the best interests of the community as a whole in clear sight. This last point is of great significance. We ought to conceive of the community as personified, as marshalling its forces to meet the dangers that confront it, and as indicating to individuals and to professions their appropriate duties and opportunities, with the double purpose of founding systems endowed with the capacity for healthy growth and of encouraging individual enterprise. Every one concerned may and should study into the facts of nervous invalidism with the intention of forming a personal judgment as to what measures ought to be adopted with regard to them; but, when it comes to making expert application of this knowledge upon a large scale, every one should recognize that the best interests of the community demand the separation of those who work in its behalf into separate professions, organized so as to secure for each individual member a thorough, guaranteed training, subject to ready criticism and supervision. Private persons, school-teachers, clergymen, physicians, and social workers may profitably work in common, sharing and contributing to each other's knowledge, using each other's weapons, enjoying each other's confidence, but always under a tacit agreement that every one should recognize the importance of promoting the steady growth in expert skill of special groups of workers, the gain in strength and public confidence of professions and of systems; in other words, with a view to the best interests of the community as a whole.

The progress which the last forty years have seen with regard to the study of the nervous system and the mind has taken two strikingly different lines. On the one hand, any one who really

considers, in the light of accurate knowledge, what it means to acquaint one's self not only with medicine and surgery in general, but with the anatomy and the physiology of the nervous system, psychology in its new developments, philosophy and metaphysics—all of which are closely correlated studies, and all necessary for an adequate knowledge of the working of the mind—must realize that the department of nervous diseases is the most difficult of any with which the physician has to deal. It is so difficult that even the most advanced thinkers and observers feel themselves still groping in the dark, though not without visions illuminated by certain brilliant gleams of light.

Yet, on the other hand, in spite of all difficulties, this subject has a very popular and very fascinating side, and to that side the public has been effectively introduced. Of late years we have been showered with a popular literature, much of which is of an excellent sort, and every one has had abundant opportunity to make himself familiar with technical terms, such as "sub-liminal consciousness," "double personality," "obsession," and many more, without having the fact at all adequately forced upon him that these terms hint at depths of ignorance which no one has adequately plumbed. Furthermore, it has been made obvious that great knowledge is not an essential element of the power to bring about striking cures in certain cases of nervous invalidism. Enthusiasm, "suggestion," expressed or even implied, confidence in another or one's self, obedience to a principle or a belief, have often proved sufficient to accomplish these results, whether in the tents of the medicine-man, the shrines of the churches, or the consulting-rooms of the experts. This discovery that persons not having a physician's training could often accomplish successfully a portion of what had previously been considered the physician's work has favored the establishment and growth of certain popular movements the study of which is full of interest. I have in mind especially the Christian Science movement, and that which came in under the name of "mind healing" and is represented by a number of persons who have believed in themselves and in their cause, and have benefited a great many of their followers. One striking feature of the Christian Science movement, which is present also, though to a much less degree, in "mind healing," is the

discarding of scientific and medical authority and methods. To this iconoclastic attitude the Christian Science movement has undoubtedly owed a certain measure of its success.

Then came the Emmanuel movement, with its cordial recognition of scientific and medical authority, yet with its assertion of an independent position on many medical questions, and its claim that it is the duty of the church to assume various responsibilities and utilize various methods that hitherto physicians alone had been considered qualified to employ. One avowed reason for the movement was a desire to strengthen the position of the church, and another was a belief in the insufficient preparation of the great body of the physicians for adequately seeing and dealing with the mental element in disease. This movement is still on trial. The vast majority of physicians unquestionably disapprove of it. But there are others who support it, and others still who welcome it as one of the means through which popular sentiment may arouse a keener interest in an important subject.

The leaders of the Emmanuel movement in Boston have, it is understood, recently adopted new rules and to some extent new principles for their guidance. But it is still held to be desirable for clergymen at large to act as practising physicians; that is, systematically, and as a part of their regular work, to give practical advice to sick persons with regard to their sicknesses, provided only that the plan has the approval, in each case, of a physician who at least nominally has the patient in his charge.

The question is not whether physicians who feel themselves unable to give in a suitable manner the moral advice and consolation which a patient needs should be given a better opportunity to secure the aid of clergymen especially interested in the mental and moral state of sick persons. It is whether the community should indorse a new form of medical specialty, represented by persons without adequate training for their task. It is unquestionably true that persons without medical training have sometimes utilized their talents and their devotion in giving object-lessons that physicians could profitably follow. It was an engineer of Zürich who gave the first definite impulse to the important movement for utilizing work of various sorts as a cure for nervous invalidism, and his successful efforts met with warm

appreciation. The *Naturärzte* of Germany went far beyond reasonable limits in substituting zeal for knowledge. Yet it has been asserted that their successes and their popular following did great service to the cause of physical therapeutics by forcing an important means of treatment upon the notice of scientific men. Private enterprises of these sorts stand, however, on a different plane from wide-spread movements to become the basis of organizable institutions.¹

It is often said that physicians have only themselves to blame if so many of their patients have left them to join one or another popular movement, and that the success of these movements constitutes a species of rebuke to them for not having paid more attention to their patients' mental and spiritual needs. In fact, I do not think that the indication furnished by the number of adherents to the popular movements is really to be read in this sense, nor that the defects of the physicians are sufficient to justify the establishment of a new system. Obviously, a portion of the support given to such movements is mere restlessness and a vague hope of gain through change. Defects must, however, be admitted, both in the physicians' knowledge of the nervous system and its diseases and in their general attitude towards life. Many physicians are materialistic in their tendencies; familiar with the marvellous discoveries of natural science, they make the mistake of believing that the methods by which these discoveries have been made afford an avenue to the whole field of knowledge.² But, although these statements are true of many physicians, they are far from being true of all; and no one has been able to take a step of any consequence in the treatment of the nervous invalid without referring to the pioneer work which physicians are doing and have done.

¹ It has long been known to those who cared to know, that a few professed psychologists, whose studies, sympathies, and talents have led them to take a special interest in the condition of persons suffering from mental troubles, have given them advice and treatment through "suggestion" and in kindred ways. This has been done on such a limited scale that the question has never arisen in connection with it whether a new medical specialty was likely to become thereby established. It has been, rather, an affair of personal enterprise and experiment, analogous to that of the Zürich engineer referred to in the text.

² Farrar, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, January, 1909.

I think it is true that physicians as a body, and even neurologists as a body, have been backward in the study and treatment of certain forms of nervous invalidism, but I feel less concerned to blame them for this lack of interest than to find out its cause and to help toward a better state of things. One portion of the cause has been that general practitioners have either seen or dimly felt the difficulties of the study, looked at from its scientific side, and have shrunk from making the effort needed to overcome them. Yet they shrank also from joining popular movements and felt it their duty to disapprove the action of those among themselves who adopted popular fashions of influencing nervous invalids.

There is something to regret and something to approve of in these attitudes; but, however that may be, the main object of interest for the community is to see that the defects of physicians are removed by a better education, and the relations between physicians and clergymen improved by a better comprehension of each other's aims.

Physicians and clergymen represent two different but co-ordinate professions. The community should be willing to show infinite patience with the mistakes and shortcomings of both, infinite willingness to note one by one the defects in their work with the purpose of removing them. At the same time their permanent distinction should be safeguarded, for the very life of two great institutions of civilization, each with a long history and manifest future, and each founded on a different set of instincts, is at stake. A profession represents the filtered thought and traditions of many generations; it is the product of growth and continuity; it represents more than the best of any individual or of many individuals. No one person can adequately represent the whole of these traditions, any more than one person can adequately represent all the good qualities of the nation to which he belongs. But what every one can do is to recognize a certain patent of nobility, and the obligations that go with it by virtue of the aggregate achievements of the profession to which he owes his allegiance. The standing in the community of the two professions of religion and medicine is unquestionably strong, and yet not by any means so strong but that it could be

stronger. It is the duty of each member of both of them, and of every man who believes that the community should husband its resources to the best advantage, to see to it that by his criticism, on the one hand, and his effective support, upon the other, he endeavors to strengthen their dignity and sense of responsibility and to define the boundaries of their respective functions.

The clergymen who now stand forward as the representatives of the new medical movement are able and energetic, and their purposes command our sympathy; they are in the first flush of recognition of their power in a new field over large numbers of their fellow-men; they see, as might have been predicted, diseases usually accounted very serious or even incurable apparently yielding to their touch. It would be impossible that they should escape a certain intoxication of success in the face of these experiences, impossible that they should abstain from using their new-found powers in ways that their own riper judgment might disapprove. On one side, it is urged, stands the community with its sorrows, on the other stands a band of men knowing themselves equipped with weapons for rescue and capable of utter devotion in the use of them. Why should they not rush in, thrust aside customs and conventions, constitute themselves a *posse comitatus*, and do what they can, as men for men?

There are many generous-minded persons who regard these facts and arguments as covering the case, and say that when the house is in flames it is no time to inquire too carefully into the credentials of those who pass the water-buckets. From this standpoint it would obviously be of little consequence whether the performance of the volunteer fire-brigade was in all respects up to the best technical standard, or whether or not it exactly squared with their intentions as at first asserted.

But do these sentiments really represent the facts? I think that they do not, and I ask you to consider, fairly and calmly, what really are the needs of the nervous invalid and of the community which contains nervous invalids, and by what organized means these needs can best be met.

It is common to hear it said: The teacher, the clergyman, the social worker, should treat the "mental disorders" of the invalid; the physician should treat his body; or, in other words, the

clergyman may treat "functional" diseases, the physician "organic" diseases.

But these distinctions are untenable and unworkable. The mind, strictly speaking, is not subject to disease, any more than is the force of gravitation; and the only practical question is, What are the conditions which prevent the mind from working to the best advantage, and how can these unfavorable conditions best be removed? The needs of the nervous invalid—which we may take as indicating the kinds of expert skill required in meeting them—can be roughly classified as follows. People become depressed, discouraged, the victims of fears and doubts, of the sense of isolation, of incompetency and failure, or of a thousand lesser or analogous ills, partly because of bodily illness, partly because of unfortunate mental habits—dating back it may be to experiences of childhood—which have become so fixed that they share the attributes of bodily illnesses; partly because of faulty mental attitudes; partly because of peculiarly unfavorable environments.

How may these unfavorable conditions best be neutralized? I shall speak only of two principal and contrasted methods. First, there is no doubt that one of the most effective ways of meeting the signs of invalidism is by boldly ignoring them and pressing forward confidently toward a better future. Many symptoms may be effectively side-tracked by an engrossing occupation, or made trivial through the growth of character, or reduced to insignificance under the touch of an inspiring personality or the acceptance of an inspiring creed. So much can, indeed, be accomplished in this way that it is not to be wondered at that this method should have been widely regarded—especially by vigorous-minded persons who had acquired skill in wielding the weapons that it furnished—as affording a complete solution of the problem of invalidism, and as adapted for unlimited use without fear that harm could follow.

Clergymen, parents, teachers, physicians, and neighbors have all utilized with good effect agencies of the kind just indicated, but the more conservative of them have felt that the method had its limitations. Gallantry, courage, energy, and faith can accomplish much, and may successfully carry many an invalid over

some danger-point or open for him new avenues of power. At the least it may enable him to fulfil an important task with credit, as in the case of Napoleon's ensign-bearer in Browning's "Ratibus." But they may also conceal from him the need of other remedies until it is too late to use them to advantage. It is obvious that some way should be found for securing the benefits of this method without opening the door to too many of the risks which sometimes follow in its train.

The second method of meeting the needs of the nervous invalid is that which involves a careful searching out of all the bodily and mental causes of the invalid state, and an equally careful application of the appropriate physical and mental remedies. It takes much personal experience and strong interest to enable one even to appreciate the importance of this method, the difficulties attending its application, the length of training in all the branches of medicine, and the amount of personal investigation needed for making it successful and for eliminating the dangers that attend it. But on the development of this second method the very future of the scientific treatment of nervous invalidism depends. No large portion of the medical profession is as yet thoroughly aware of the importance of the part which that department of medicine that deals with the nervous system is bound to play in the future; and for most laymen the striking effects of the first of the two methods of treatment that I have here outlined has led to a misapprehension of the real province of the ideal neurologist, who must utilize both methods alike.

The specialty called neurology has been until recently accounted relatively narrow; but in fact it is bound in the end to be recognized as more important than any other specialty, just as the functions of the nervous system are more important, at least as regards success and happiness, than the functions of any other organ of the body. Functional nervous disorders are more common than any other class of disorders to which the human being is exposed. The troubles of the nervous invalid are full of interest, human and scientific, the more so because the invalid himself is often a person capable of intelligent co-operation and appreciation. The work of the neurologist brings him into close contact with all the great departments of medical theory and prac-

tice. Even ordinary fatigue induces disorders which the neurologist cannot understand unless he is theoretically and practically familiar with the work of the orthopedist, the gynaecologist, and the internist, and unless he is able to consult with them on almost equal terms. He must be equally familiar with the work of the laryngologist, the oculist, and the aurist, for the headaches and signs of mental weakness which occur so often with debilitated conditions of the nervous system may be induced by disorders of the organs with which these specialists have primarily to do. Thus, while the neurologist is himself neither an internist nor a surgeon of any of the numerous types, he must be in close sympathy with all of them. But the work of the ideal neurologist only begins with these sorts of co-operation. His acquaintance with the disorders of the mind makes him familiar also with a long series of great influences, varying from those that rock the foundations of society to those which contribute to its passions, its pleasures, and its needs, from which these disorders spring. He must study, likewise, the more intimate disturbances of the brain in its relations to the body and the mind; and the person who would fulfil such obligations must, for the time, take the standpoints of the pathologist, the chemist, the anatomist, the physiologist, the psychologist, and the student of philosophy. Let me go one step farther, and in doing so open the door leading to regions which in some respects are more important than any of those yet indicated, by saying that in dealing with patients suffering from fears and broken hopes the neurologist must feel himself in full sympathy with the clergyman.³

³ I wish to acknowledge that it rests with the neurologists to see that the students who graduate at our medical schools have a far better training as regards the knowledge and qualities necessary for appreciating the needs of the nervous invalid and applying the suitable remedies than their predecessors have had. It is one of the advantages of specialism in medicine that the more prominent specialists, by gathering together and condensing into a small space the main results of their vast experience, can place at the service of their colleagues a collection of relatively simple principles of diagnosis and treatment which can then be utilized by a large number of practitioners. Every intelligent physician can thus obtain, if he will take the pains, a broad outlook over the whole field of medicine. But in order to take this broad view he must devote himself to the principles and practice of medicine with his whole heart and mind, making every other interest secondary to that. In order to give this teaching in the way it should be given, neurologists

I have given it as my opinion that the training and experience of the physician is absolutely indispensable for certain portions of the treatment of the nervous invalid, and that the ideal physician should be capable of appreciating, and in some measure of representing, the whole field of duties to which reference has been made. But in saying this I have not claimed that all physicians or all neurologists now fulfil these duties as they should, or that there are no others with whom these duties should be shared.

The work accomplished by the churches in behalf of the nervous invalid is, in its field, as important as that of the physician, while it is even broader in its scope. For the particular problems that come to each man and each profession for solution are all subservient to the larger problem of the duties of each man and each profession as members of the community, conceived in the widest sense. The churches stand for this wider view of personal responsibility, and are in a position to look at the problem of nervous invalidism, at the work of the medical profession as a whole, and at the moral and spiritual issues that this work involves, as against the background of a thousand other issues and problems of duty and opportunity related to the work of the lawyer, the statesman, the man of business, and the philanthropist, and to the problems of the rich and of the poor. The clergyman thus stands for the recognition of a sort of public service in which all professions may unite, and has the chance of pointing out for the benefit of each one the landmarks of moral progress to which the others have attained. But, further than this, he is the natural representative and exponent, through word and pen, of a great realm of scientific truth concerning the spiritual life of human beings, and of the sentiments that accompany, and in a sense forestall, conviction on these matters. Here his province overlaps the province of the philosophers; and, if the signs of the times are being rightly read, we are entering on a period when their joint arguments will secure a hearing to a degree that has

need endowed departments in our medical schools, and endowed hospitals in which nervous invalids can be adequately studied and treated. We must look for the means for accomplishing the difficult task before us to the liberality of interested members of the community. A generous friend of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore has already provided an ample fund for this purpose in that city. This example should be imitated elsewhere.

been denied them during the past half-century of intense absorption in the scientific problems of the physicist and the biologist. I wish I could adequately express my appreciation of the service of this sort which the church can render, and has rendered, to the physician and to the nervous invalid.

Daily, to each of them, the question presents itself whether he shall content himself with the belief that the narrow world of sense and suffering within which he is apparently confined is necessarily bounded by a prison wall, or whether he may not discover that it is a world of freedom, of order, of beauty, and of power.

“While I walk about my chamber with unsteady steps, my spirit sweeps skyward on eagle wings, and looks out with unquenchable vision upon a world of eternal beauty”⁴—this is the sentiment of one who was deprived at an early age of the two senses of sight and hearing, yet who won a sense of spiritual freedom such as few attain to in greater measure. Visions of truth and power, of this and kindred sorts, have been gratefully received in the past at the hands of inspired ministers of the churches of every name, and of inspired writers like Emerson. Such preachers, such writers, have never lacked an audience.

But this sort of service by no means represents all that the churches have done for nervous invalids.

It is well known that the influence of clergymen as friendly advisers of individuals in distress has at times been great, and has been particularly marked, or at any rate particularly wholesome, when the social or pastoral relationship has been of long standing. The clergymen who have rendered this sort of service have not as a rule felt the need of special training other than that which they had acquired in studying and practising their own profession. The very fact that they have not pretended to great technical information has enabled them to impress with greater force the beliefs on which their lives were based.

The work of the clergymen for the sick has, as every one is aware, varied in amount in proportion to each man’s special

⁴ Helen Keller, *Sense and Sensibility*. *Century Magazine*, February and March, 1908.

sense of fitness. Some ministers shrink from sick persons, and go to them only from a sense of duty, while others feel an instinctive desire to make themselves of personal use to individuals in distress. The name of the late Bishop Brooks has often been mentioned in connection with this sort of work. The pastor of Emmanuel Church evidently belongs in this same class.

Something should be said as to the difficulty of estimating the number of persons who suffer from nervous symptoms so seriously as to need help from outside sources, and for whose needs the community should provide. In endeavoring to make this estimate, the significant fact should be borne in mind that it depends very much upon circumstances whether a man classes himself as sick or well. When new and attractive opportunities for treatment are offered, they are taken advantage of by new groups of applicants, especially if the treatments are of a sort to appeal strongly to the imagination and the sentiments. There are many invalids, also, who like to meet in groups, as if to make common cause in seeking relief from their afflictions and to gain from each other new enthusiasm and new hope. This is all in accordance with deep-seated human instincts, and accounts in part for the success of popular healing movements as well as of popular religious movements. It is something more than convenience that draws into one pilgrimage from many quarters the throngs that pay their annual visits to the shrine of Lourdes. The size of the multitude measures in part the success of the visit. But these chances of success necessarily attract many individuals who would have done better to stay at home or to seek advice in private. All of us have troubles of which we gladly would be rid, and in conversation with our friends, if in no other way, we often seek consolation, encouragement, or advice. But it oftens happens, also, that we purposely refrain from doing this, and feel ourselves the stronger for refraining. If this latter sentiment were recognized on a larger scale, the number of invalids in the community would seem smaller than it now does.

Still another inference suggests itself in this connection. It has been asserted that we physicians have not adequately appreciated the legitimate emotional needs of the people who make the

large popular movements possible, and have not prepared ourselves to offer them a sort of leadership that we could offer and they accept. My own experience induces me to believe that there is something to say for this opinion.

Let me summarize, in conclusion, the points to which I wish to call attention: There is undoubtedly a real problem of nervous invalidism, though just what its magnitude is it is impossible to say. Many different classes of citizens, including invalids themselves, have special opportunities and responsibilities in relation to this problem. Contributions of every sort, from whatever source they come, looking toward a solution of this problem, should be welcomed; but intelligent and liberal-minded persons who have the best interests of the community at heart should seek to strengthen the hands of those groups of persons who have laid out for themselves the most difficult and the most comprehensive portion of the task. The work of the church seems to me to consist mainly in the development of character and motives, and in these respects it occupies the same position with regard to the sick as to the well. Believing that individual enterprise and skill should be encouraged, yet not at the cost of endangering the progress of organized institutions, I should welcome the aid of clergymen as of real value, but should deprecate the systematic entrance of representatives of the churches into the medical field. Physicians should stand for the skilled employment of special means of preventing disease, with all its causes, and of treating sick persons;⁵ clergymen represent

⁵ I cannot leave this characterization of the physician's work without some reference to that of the social service workers, at present developed mainly in connection with certain hospitals and dispensaries. The nature of this admirable work, as organized three years ago at the Massachusetts General Hospital by Dr. Richard C. Cabot, deserves particular mention. The physicians to the great dispensaries save out some two or three hours from a busy day and devote them to giving what advice they can to a large number of patients whose illnesses present problems of the most varied sorts. In the department to which I am attached the needs of as many as forty patients must at times be considered by the physician and his assistants in the course of one forenoon. It is obvious that these physicians cannot find time to know in detail what goes on within the homes of these many individuals, nor to what harmful influences they are exposed; nor can they give the patient labor needed for ferreting out the best measures of relief. All this the social service worker spends her day in doing, ever increasing thereby her

the main agency by which the demoralization of invalidism is counteracted, and the misfortunes of the invalid transformed into a means of progress, through the instilling of moral courage, religious insight, and the sense of fellowship and of responsibility.

own rich stock of kindness, hopefulness, and wisdom, and leading the patients to exhibit these qualities in their turn. A piece of therapeutic work unique in dispensary experience has been done, through the help of these workers, in maintaining instruction in clay-modelling for some of the nervous invalids attending as out-patients at the Massachusetts General Hospital, and the intelligent co-operation of an outside friend has made it possible for these same patients to attend lectures at the Museum of Fine Arts.

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